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Two things are in.nite: the universe and human stupidity; 
and I’m not sure about the universe.
Albert Einstein
3e whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics 
are always so certain of themselves, and wiser people so full of 
doubts.
Bertrand Russell
To be stupid, sel.sh, and have good health are three 
requirements for happiness, though if stupidity is lacking, all 
is lost.
Gustave Flaubert
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Preface
A few years ago, both of us were invited to an o=cial dinner. 
We found a place at a table together, sat down and started to 
catch up. One of us described how his student had recently been 
doing an internship with a powerful government department. 
Over the period of three months, the student had to help write a 
report. 3is was not the kind of report that would be shelved at 
once and read by no one. 3is report would set out an entirely 
new policy area for the government. You might think this was a 
di=cult job requiring a team of very experienced people doing 
in-depth research. Apparently not. 3e student worked largely 
on her own. Her manager was in his twenties. When she asked 
him what was the most important aspect of developing a really 
good report, he replied: One or two impressive PowerPoint 
slides. 3is struck both of us as really stupid. How could an 
important new government policy that would a>ect millions of 
people be based on a few PowerPoint slides created by an intern 
who was managed by a twenty-something?
Was this just a one-o> case of stupidity, we asked, and 
began to swap stories from the dozens of organisations we 
have studied over the years. We talked about top executives 
who rely on consultants’ PowerPoint shows rather than careful 
analysis, headmasters and teachers who spend their time 
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enthusiastically talking about vague but positive organisa-
tional values rather than educating students, managers who 
try to be inspiring leaders even though their subordinates are 
not interested and are capable of working on their own, senior 
.gures in the armed forces who prefer to run rebranding exer-
cises rather than military exercises, engineers who overlook 
fatal ?aws, IT analysts who prefer to ignore problems so as 
not to undermine the upbeat tone of their workplace, senior 
executives who keep on launching programmes for change yet 
have no interest in the outcome, and newspaper editors who 
are more interested in .nding the perfect mixture of celebrity 
gossip than in preparing themselves for profound changes in 
their industry.
When we came to the topic of universities, we real-
ised there were just too many kinds of stupidity to mention: 
pointless rebranding exercises, ritualistic box-ticking, mis-
guided attempts at visionary leadership, thoughtless pursuit 
of rankings, to mention just a few. We were worried that all 
this stupidity was detracting from the core purpose of our 
institutions: to educate students, develop new knowledge and 
contribute to the wider community.
As we piled up all these examples, we started to realise that 
something was very wrong here. We are constantly told that 
to be competitive we must be smart. We should be knowledge 
workers employed by knowledge-intensive .rms that trade in 
the knowledge economy. Our governments spend billions on 
trying to create knowledge economies, our .rms brag about 
their superior intelligence, and individuals spend decades of 
their lives building up .ne CVs. Yet all this collective intel-
lect does not seem to be re?ected in the many organisations 
we studied. Much of what goes on in these organisations was 
described – o"en by employees themselves – as being stupid.
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Far from being ‘knowledge-intensive’, many of our chief 
organisations have become engines of stupidity. We have fre-
quently seen otherwise smart people stop thinking and start 
doing stupid things. 3ey stop asking questions. 3ey give 
no reasons for their decisions. 3ey pay no heed to what their 
actions cause. Instead of complex thought we get ?imsy jargon, 
aggressive assertions or expert tunnel vision. Re?ection, 
careful analysis and independent re?ection decay. Idiotic ideas 
and practices are accepted as quite sane. People may harbour 
doubts, but their suspicions are cut short. What’s more, they are 
rewarded for it. 3e upshot is that a lack of thought has entered 
the modus operandi of most organisations of today.
But one thing puzzled us: why was it that organisations 
which employed so many smart people could foster so much 
stupidity? A"er some discussion, we realised something: smart 
organisations and the smart people who work in them o"en do 
stupid things because they work – at least in the short term. By 
avoiding careful thinking, people are able to simply get on with 
their job. Asking too many questions is likely to upset others – 
and to distract yourself. Not thinking frees you up to .t in and 
get along. Sometimes it makes sense to be stupid. Perhaps we 
live in an age where a certain type of stupidity has triumphed.
But that was not the end of the story. As we talked more, we 
realised that while being stupid might work in the short term, 
it could lead to bigger problems in the long term. When people 
buy into baseless ideas it can create a nice feeling today, but 
lay traps for tomorrow. At the time, the global .nancial system 
was in turmoil. One of the reasons was that banks had bought 
.nancial products they didn’t fully understand. In the short 
term this didn’t matter, as the banks continued to make money 
from these products anyway. But when .nancial markets 
soured, this lack of comprehension thwarted solutions.
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If organisations create so much stupidity, what does that 
mean for the people who run them? 3e fact is, many managers 
try to ensure that smart people don’t use their intellect. 3ere 
are many tactics that are used to do this. Anyone who has spent 
even a few days in a large .rm knows many of them. But to us 
it seemed that within modern organisations there is just too 
much stupidity, and that what is needed is a concerted e>ort 
to minimise some pointless practices that we .nd all around 
us at work. As we re?ected further on this problem, we started 
to identify some very practical steps that can be used to destu-
pidify our organisations.
Our realisations during that dinner – that smart organisa-
tions encourage stupidity, that this pays o> in the short term, 
but creates problems in the long term – led us to write this 
book. Welcome to the paradox that is functional stupidity.
Mats Alvesson and André Spicer
Lund and London, February 2016
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Introduction
Attack of the quants
At the dawn of the twenty-.rst century, one thing haunted the 
greatest scienti.c minds. It was not the promise of a theory 
of everything, threats like global warming, or even new areas 
of research. Scientists at the best-known institutions across 
the world were complaining about the career choices of their 
students.
In the past, we are told, top young scientists were inspired 
by their studies to pursue careers as researchers. 3is produced 
a stream of brilliant thinkers who would come up with Nobel 
prize-winning breakthroughs. But this had stopped happening. 
Many of the brightest graduates had rejected careers in science. 
Instead they were ?ocking to banking.
3e world of .nance o>ered defectors from science many 
perks. 3e pay was much better, career prospects looked stellar, 
the plush o=ces full of attractive people were far more com-
fortable than dreary labs sta>ed with other nerds. Many of the 
skills that scientists developed during their training were in 
high demand in the .nancial markets. At the same time the 
long working hours and high levels of stress were familiar, and 
just like the lab, .nance was still largely dominated by men.
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Despite these strong similarities, there was one clear dif-
ference between the world of science and that of .nance: the 
culture. For many years, .nance had been dominated by a 
hard-driving culture of individual gain. Greed was good, 
money was king and success was ?aunted. In science the watch-
words were truth and discovery. People were proud of being 
fairly indi>erent to money. Intellectual challenges, developing 
new knowledge and being recognised by the community were 
much more important. 3e prospects of someone who had been 
nurtured in the culture of science thriving in the showy world 
of .nance looked bleak.
However, the scientists who crossed over into .nance did 
not just survive – they began to thrive. 3e steady stream of 
science graduates brought with them well-honed quantitative 
skills. 3ey were quickly put to work building highly abstract 
models. Instead of trying to develop equations for tracking 
the movement of stars, they were modelling the movements 
of markets. 3ese former scientists did not enter the rowdy 
crush of the trading ?oor. 3ey did their work in the hush of 
air-conditioned o=ces. 3ey did not see themselves as traders, 
they were ‘quants’. No longer scientists or bankers, they saw 
themselves as members of a cutting-edge new .eld: .nancial 
engineering.
As the number of quants employed by banks increased, 
so their prestige and resources grew. Decisions about trading 
strategies were no longer made in the heated cut and thrust of 
deal-making. Instead, the abstract mathematical models took 
over. Hundreds of billions of dollars quickly became dependent 
on the models the quants devised. As the economy boomed, 
untold wealth ?ooded into .nancial institutions. 3is moun-
tain of money was placed under the purview of quants. What 
had once been a fringe pursuit practised by a few geeks in 
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marginal institutions was now the axis of the modern .nancial 
system. 3e quants’ con.dence increased as their models gen-
erated exceptional returns. 3is in turn buoyed the con.dence 
of the .nancial markets. Some grew so con.dent in .nancial 
engineering that they declared an end to boom and bust and 
the dawn of perpetual prosperity.
But at the very same time as con.dence in .nancial engi-
neering was increasing, the connection between the quants’ 
clean abstract models and the messy realities of markets was 
beginning to fray. 3e fate of collateralised debt obligations 
(CDOs) is a perfect example. A CDO combines di>erent kinds 
of debt. To create a CDO you might combine mortgages on 
houses in a@uent neighbourhoods owed by prosperous fami-
lies (a sure bet), car loans granted to people with modest means 
(a reasonable prospect, but some risk), and ‘sub-prime’ house 
loans made to so-called NINJAs – an acronym for people with 
‘No Income, No Job or Assets’ (a sure loss). 3e trick was to 
assess this package of di>erent types of debt only on the basis of 
the safest debt. So for instance a package of debt that was made 
up of sure bets, risky bets and sure losses was treated as if it con-
tained only sure bets. 3e abstract models represented CDOs as 
one thing (a sure bet), while the reality was quite di>erent (they 
were a messy mix of everything from sure bets to sure losses).
At this point you might ask: ‘Why didn’t someone stop and 
ask some hard questions?’ 3e answer is: a few people actu-
ally did. A handful of people at all levels of the industry had 
pointed out some of the hidden problems in these .nancial 
models. However, these critics were a very small minority who 
were almost without exception ignored. 3eir old-fashioned 
messages of .nancial doom did not match the prevailing mood 
of optimism. But the major reason that bankers did not ask 
the tough questions about their increasingly fragile models was 
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that they simply did not understand them. Financial markets 
had grown so complex that only a handful of quants could 
actually understand certain narrow aspects of what was going 
on. Senior managers of the largest banks had little idea what 
was happening in their own institutions. Regulators who were 
supposed to act as watchdogs either ignored problems or simply 
failed to grasp them. What is perhaps most shocking is that 
many quants admitted to not even understanding how their 
own models matched reality.1
3is shared abyss of knowledge was .ne as long as the 
market continued to rise, but serious problems emerged when 
markets started falling. When this happened, it became clear 
that many .nancial models were constructed on false assump-
tions. As this collective thoughtlessness grew more and more 
obvious, trust in these models evaporated. A"er all, banks 
were not even sure about the assumptions built into their own 
models. When this collective stupidity came to light, people 
stopped lending and trading with one another. 3e whole 
.nancial machine seized up. 3e result was a .nancial crisis 
with worldwide e>ects that are still being felt years later.
3e .nancial crisis that began in 2008 is a testament to the 
stupidity lurking at the heart of knowledge-based societies. If 
we re?ect on the crisis we can see an all too common story: 
banks appointed many extremely intelligent people. 3ese 
smart people set about applying their impressive but narrowly 
focused skills. 3ey developed complex models few people 
could understand. 3e glamour of .nancial engineering created 
a sense of hope and excitement throughout the whole industry, 
and investors began to believe in the power of the quants to 
work magic. 3ey stopped asking tough questions and started 
to just believe. 3e upshot was a .nancial system that no one 
fully understood and no one was willing to question. As the gap 
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grew between what models predicted and what markets did, 
problems built up, eventually to explode in the form of a global 
.nancial crisis.
3e lead-up to the 2008 .nancial crisis shows us the stupid-
ity paradox in action: smart people who end up doing stupid 
things at work. In the short term, this seemed to be a good 
thing because it helped to produce results. But in the longer 
term, it laid the foundations for a disaster.
Stuck in the silicon lagoon
Knowledge, learning, talent, wisdom, innovation, creativity: 
these words are all too common in business-school textbooks, 
consultants’ reports and politicians’ speeches. Organisations 
abound with ‘chief knowledge o=cers’, ‘cognitive engineers’, 
‘data alchemists’ and ‘innovation sherpas’. Even relatively low-
level jobs have received the knowledge makeover: bin-men 
have become ‘waste management and disposal technicians’; 
technical help-desk workers are ‘investment development and 
research analysts’; secretaries are ‘directors of .rst impressions’.
To .nd a place in this knowledge-intensive world, young 
people are advised to build their intellectual capital through 
years of more and more expensive education and a dizzying 
array of new experiences. Undergraduates now have CVs that 
boast of building wells in Ugandan villages (‘entrepreneur-
ship’), working in a café in Brooklyn (‘service management’), 
making photocopies in London investment banks (‘analysis’), 
and teaching children to ski in the Canadian Rockies (‘lead-
ership’). 3ey hope this wide array of unrelated experience 
will win them a place in the supposedly lucrative ‘creative 
class’.2 3is is of course a wonderfully elastic and seductive 
term which includes 30 per cent of the population in countries 
like the USA. Everyone from teachers to engineers .ts in. 3e 
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fantasy image of the knowledge worker is of a smart and amply 
rewarded free agent hanging out in an inner-city café and 
pushing their intellect to the limit. 3e reality is more likely to 
be someone working on a short-term contract in a data centre 
situated in an o=ce park at the edge of a motorway. If asked 
(which is unlikely), they may well describe their job as dumb.
We are told that in order to ‘win the war for talent’ in a 
‘knowledge economy’, organisations must cra" smart strate-
gies, build intelligent systems and nurture their intellectual 
capital. Nation states have been striving to become knowl-
edge economies and attract highly skilled (and well paid) jobs. 
3ey sink millions into building ‘knowledge clusters’, ‘science 
parks’, ‘innovation zones’, ‘talent corridors’ and ‘smart cities’. 
Most countries in the world have attempted to create their own 
‘unique’ version of Silicon Valley. 3ere is Silicon Alley (New 
York), Silicon Lagoon (Nigeria), Silicon Island (Japan), Silicon 
Oasis (Dubai) and Silicon Roundabout (UK).
3is widespread zeal for smartness seems to be based on one 
single message: that the fate of our organisations, economy and 
working life hinges on our ability to be smart. Knowledge and 
intelligence are thought to be the key resources. But is being 
smart actually so important? Are knowledge workers really as 
smart as we would like to think? Do knowledge-intensive .rms 
really act so shrewdly? Do nations have to nurture their intel-
lect capital to thrive in the global economy?
It is time to question much of the hype about the knowl-
edge economy, smart companies and brain workers. We think 
that most apparently knowledge-intensive organisations can be 
pretty stupid. Far from running a knowledge-based economy, 
most developed nations utilise most of their people to do low-
level service work. Quick feet and hands combined with a 
friendly smile matter more for the economy than the intellect 
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of a relatively small group of elite knowledge workers. Even if 
you possess some intellectual capital in the form of a university 
degree, there is a high likelihood you will end up working in a 
job that only really requires high-school quali.cations. But in 
order to get there you need the credentials .rst.
If you scratch the shiny surface of almost any organisation 
claiming to be knowledge-intensive, you will .nd a quite dif-
ferent reality. Sure, there are o"en many well-educated smart 
people, but there is o"en little evidence that most of the corpo-
rate intelligentsia are fully using their intellect. Sometimes this 
is because many knowledge-intensive .rms are packed with 
clever people working in jobs that are routine and uncompli-
cated. 3ink about your average market-research company. 
3ese knowledge-intensive .rms typically hire well-mannered 
young people with decent degrees to do two things: call people 
while they are eating dinner to ask inane questions, or crunch 
the data that these phone calls yield. It is questionable just how 
much intellectual skill is required by either of these jobs. What 
they do require is a nice accent and thick skin. Small wonder 
that one call-centre operative described the job as ‘an assembly 
line in the head’.3
Even when people do .nd themselves in a context where 
there is some scope to exercise their intellect, they o"en seem 
to avoid this. A recent study by psychologists at the Univer-
sity of Virginia found that over half of the people they tested 
would rather give themselves electric shocks than sit and just 
think for between 6 and 11 minutes.4 3is abhorrence of inde-
pendent thinking is also common in the workplace. Managers 
o"en avoid having to think for themselves by becoming over-
enthusiastic about showy ideas. For instance, following the 
.nancial crisis, senior executives at a large global bank started 
getting interested in ‘authentic leadership’. 3ey thought that 
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by reconnecting with their ‘inner values’, it was possible to 
become more ethical and to increase their performance at the 
same time. 3e bank decided to send all its senior managers 
on training courses that would help them to locate their inner 
values. While this may have looked good on paper, many par-
ticipants found the exercise to be either invasive, a waste of 
time, or both.
What is so striking is not just that bright people buy into 
stupid ideas. 3e real surprise is that by buying into these ideas, 
they can help organisations to function well and aid individuals 
in building their career. Baseless ideas can help organisations 
and the individuals working in them to look and feel good. By 
going along to an ethical training course, a senior banker will 
probably not change their values, but they might end up feeling 
a little bit better about themselves. In addition, people can be 
rewarded for having the right appearance, the right beliefs 
and the right attitudes. For instance, individuals who resisted 
going on the ethical training course were seen as being devi-
ants who did not comply with the new more righteous tone at 
the bank. Indeed, the bank as a whole probably bene.ted from 
such training courses. It could show the media, politicians 
and the regulators that it was doing something (irrespective of 
how e=cient or e>ective it was). It sent out a positive message 
to potential employees. Maybe it made existing employees 
more committed to the .rm. What was much less certain was 
whether it actually achieved the putative aims. In many ways, 
this was completely incidental.
Shoot "rst, ask questions later
To understand why smart people buy into stupid ideas, and 
o"en get rewarded for doing so, we need to look at the role that 
functional stupidity plays. Functional stupidity is the inclination 
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to reduce one’s scope of thinking and focus only on the narrow, 
technical aspects of the job. You do the job correctly, but 
without re?ecting on purpose or the wider context. Functional 
stupidity is an organised attempt to stop people from thinking 
seriously about what they do at work. When people are seized 
by functional stupidity, they remain capable of doing the job, 
but they stop asking searching questions about their work. In 
the place of rigorous re?ection, they become obsessed with 
super.cial appearances. Instead of asking questions, they start 
to obey commands. Rather than thinking about outcomes, they 
focus on the techniques for getting things done. And the thing 
to be done is o"en to create the right impression. Someone in 
the thrall of functional stupidity is great at doing things that 
look good. 3ey tick boxes for management, please the clients 
and placate the authorities, but they also o"en do things that 
make little sense and that a sharp outside observer might .nd 
strange.
It is easy to suppose that people who do stupid things at 
work have a low IQ, poor education, a narrow mindset, or have 
been seduced by dogmatic ideas. And at times this is true. 
Most of us have encountered people in the workplace who have 
limited intellectual capacities, yet still seem to hold important 
positions. We have also probably worked alongside someone 
whose irrational prejudices and dogged .xations stop them 
from making rational decisions.
Most of the time, it is not imbeciles or bigots who do the 
most stupid things. Some of the most problematic things are 
done by some of the smartest people. A lot of these stupidities 
are not recognised as such. Instead they are treated as normal, 
and in many cases even applauded. 
You need to be relatively intelligent to be functionally 
stupid. You need to use some of your cognitive capacity: even 
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be analytically and technically sharp. But once in the grip 
of functional stupidity, you avoid thinking too much about 
exactly what you are doing, why you are doing it, and its poten-
tial implications. By following this tried and true recipe, you 
hope to avoid punishments and many worries that might come 
from deviation. You sidestep the burdens of having to think 
too much and upsetting others by asking di=cult questions. 
What’s more, you are usually rewarded for doing this.
Organisations encourage functional stupidity in many 
ways. Some have cultures that emphasise being action-ori-
ented. ‘Just do it’ is no longer a catchy marketing slogan: it has 
become standard marching orders for the corporate nincom-
poop. As Michael Foley puts it in !e Age of Absurdity: ‘It is 
only our own impatient, greedy age that demands to be told 
how to live in a set of short bullet points.’ Other .rms have 
kindled an intense faith in leadership. As a result, practices 
that would not be out of place in a religious cult have become 
stock responses for managers in our largest companies. Many 
organisations foster a deep belief in the rationality of what are 
clearly irrational structures and systems. 3is means people 
cling to systems and structures that obviously do not yield the 
results they are meant to. Companies routinely talk about their 
brand as what makes them di>erent, but if you take a careful 
look it seems to be same as in other companies. Firms o"en 
go out of their way to copy other organisations they think are 
successful, but o"en they have little or no idea of why they are 
copying them. 
Our obsession with leadership, formal structures, brands 
and industry standards might seem sensible, but when taken 
to extremes – as it all too o"en is – it can shackle thinking. 
When people are obsessed with buying into success recipes 
and taking action, for instance, they are relieved of the burden 
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of actually having to consider the tacit assumptions they act 
on, and the implications of their actions. It plays out as if they 
have learned that great military adage, shoot .rst, ask ques-
tions later.
!e paradox of stupidity
Shutting o> parts of your brain at work may seem like a bad 
idea, but it o"en comes with some big bene.ts. When func-
tional stupidity kicks in, employees are spared from the taxing 
task of using all their intellectual resources. Instead, they can 
cognitively coast along and steer clear of irksome doubts. 3is 
can pay o> for some individuals. 3ey are not seen as trouble-
makers who ask too many awkward questions. 3ey can display 
the kind of resolute certainty that singles out ‘leadership mate-
rial’. When they make authoritative claims that their company 
pursues ‘excellence’, their decisiveness and conviction will 
betray no signs of doubt.
Functional stupidity can have similar bene.ts for the entire 
organisation. By ignoring the many uncertainties, contra-
dictions and downright illogical claims that are rife at work, 
people are able to ensure that things run relatively smoothly. 
We o"en value convenience over confronting the inconvenient 
truth.
Yet while stupidity can be convenient, it can also have 
major downsides. When people start ignoring contradictions, 
avoid careful reasoning and fail to ask probing questions, 
they also start to overlook problems. 3at way you may rest 
easy in the short term, but in the long term these problems 
will build up. As this happens, the gulf between rhetoric and 
reality becomes hard to deny. 3is triggers a profound sense 
of disappointment and disengagement on the part of employ-
ees. When this becomes overwhelming, it can easily spread to 
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stakeholders like customers, communities, buyers and suppli-
ers, regulators and investors. As a result, people stop trusting 
the organisation.
But there is an even more dangerous consequence of func-
tional stupidity. As well as sapping trust, it can sometimes 
create the conditions for larger crises or disasters. 3is happens 
when minor problems build up, become connected, and create 
wicked problems that are impossible to ignore. 3e 2008 .nan-
cial crisis we described at the start of this chapter is a case in 
point.
Functional stupidity is not just a one-way highroad to 
disaster. It can also sometimes spark more fundamental 
changes. When the costs of overlooking problems become too 
great, people usually start to re?ect on their assumptions, ask 
questions about why they are doing things and consider the 
implications of their actions. As this starts to happen, they no 
longer engage in an elaborate dance of sidestepping di=cult 
questions. Instead they face up to them. Rather than seeking 
safe consensus, people start to look for much more challenging 
and intellectually demanding dissensus. When this happens, 
the fog of collective thoughtlessness can start to li".
Weeding out functional stupidity sounds like a great thing 
to do, but it always comes at a cost. O"en this is huge. Con-
stant questioning can create doubt, uncertainty and con?ict. 
Too much time can be wasted thinking and debating. Toes 
might be stepped on. People might be embarrassed and hurt. 
Critical re?ection can become an obstacle to creating com-
pliance, motivating employees, implementing strategy and 
leading e>ectively. It can undermine authority and leadership. 
To nurture a positive image can be di=cult if people think too 
much.
Occasionally in organisations there are ?urries of critical 
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re?ection. 3is happened in one large US company when a 
vice president stunned a seminar room full of junior managers 
by suddenly asking why not a single member of the audience 
had pointed out the radical discrepancy between all the talk 
and how the company actually worked. 3e audience did not 
know what to say. 3ey were perplexed by the brutal honesty – 
a virtue not common in a world where people prefer to believe 
what is preached rather than what is practised.5 3e interven-
tion did open up some space to re?ect on what was actually 
happening in the company, but such moments come rarely.
Functional stupidity is a paradox, simultaneously thought-
less and useful. It has good and bad sides. For instance, a 
compulsively optimistic outlook may mean that people in an 
organisation feel very positive and committed to their job. At 
the same time, it can mean that people overlook negative things, 
leading to costly mistakes. What was functional can prove to 
be disastrously stupid. In other instances, idiotic ideas can have 
some clearly positive e>ects. Steve Jobs was an expert at this. At 
some points of his career he had stupid ideas that came to grief. 
At other times these ludicrous ideas paid o>.
!e Marine Corps of the corporate world
‘Like other meetings, this one was a ceremonial event. We 
marked it on our calendars many weeks in advance. Everyone 
wore the uno=cial corporate uniform: a blue pin-striped suit, 
white shirt, and a sincere red tie. None of us would ever remove 
the jacket. We dressed and acted as if we were at a meeting of 
the board of directors.’6
3is is John Sculley’s description of a typical meeting 
at Pepsi-Cola’s headquarters during the early 1980s. People 
entered the room in hierarchical order. First came the market-
ing consultants, clad in appropriate grey suits, sitting alongside 
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the wall at the back of the room. 3en the junior executives 
entered the room, and took a seat at the back. Only then did 
senior executives arrive, in a sequence dictated by rank. 3e 
chairman came last. 3ey arranged themselves around the 
table in strict hierarchical order.
A"er this ritual was enacted, the meeting kicked into 
action. 3e main business was monitoring results, an o"en 
harsh business:
3ese sessions weren’t always euphoric. O"en the tension 
in the room was su>ocating. Eyes would .x on Kendall [the 
chairman] to capture his response at every gain or drop in 
every tenth of a market share … An executive whose share 
was down had to stand and explain – fully – what he was 
going to do to .x it fast. Clearly in the dock, he knew that 
the next time he returned to that room, it had better be 
.xed … Always, there was another executive in the room, 
ready to take your place.7
Pepsi is described as a place characterised by extreme, but 
fair, competition. Frequent, short-term, precise measurement 
of results based on market share meant that the contribution 
of each executive was easy to track. 3is was a workplace for 
the best and the brightest, but also the toughest. War meta-
phors were frequent. Managers described themselves as the 
Marine Corps of the business world. 3ey were physically and 
mentally very .t. 3ey hit the gym for frequent intensive work-
outs. During the ‘Cola wars’ of the 1980s – the competition 
between Coca-Cola and Pepsi over market leadership – there 
were many casualties, but people did not complain. Instead 
they lived up to an ideal of strong masculinity. According 
to Sculley, in this corporate Marine Corps, loyalty was vital. 
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When he decided to resign to move to Apple Computers, he 
was forced to break this bond of loyalty – an act that caused 
him a great deal of pain.
Sculley’s story may help us to understand the success of 
Pepsi at that time. 3e Marine Corps culture meant that its 
executives felt under pressure to do their utmost. 3ey focused 
intensely on results, worked very hard and gave little considera-
tion to their life outside of work. Friends and family were o"en 
marginalised. 3e obsession with competition – both between 
and within the company – nurtured a rich martial vocabulary 
and combative rituals to match. 3is energised the executives 
by giving them a feeling that they were proving their worth 
through masculine rivalry: if you happen to be part of this 
group of company he-men, you belong to the best, the tough-
est and most capable corporate warriors who can handle the 
.ercest competition. In this corporate culture, men of true grit 
were selected and then promoted if they continued to deliver 
the goods by increasing sales, market shares and pro.ts. 3is 
was all that mattered.
3e culture Sculley describes was clearly functional. At the 
time, Pepsi moved from being a relatively marginal player in 
the market to challenging Coca-Cola’s leading position. But it 
also had negative elements. 3e .erce competition obstructed 
cooperation. 3e company grew obsessed with short-term 
results and ignored the longer-term implications. For them, 
corporate life was like war. 3is meant they could do little else 
but .ght and compete. 3ere was not much room for re?ection, 
careful thinking or critical analysis – beyond how to improve 
sales and market shares.
To fully embrace the idea that executives at Pepsi were 
the Marine Corps of the business world, some serious mind-
lessness was needed. A"er all, o=ce workers in suits and ties 
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sitting around in meetings and analysing numbers are not 
quite engaged in mortal combat. Intensive exercise at the gym 
and heated battles on the squash court would not change that. 
If they wanted to cling to the Marine Corps image, it was vital 
to suppress any re?ection and exorcise any form of self-irony.
It is interesting how eagerly the executives of Pepsi 
embraced a militaristic identity. 3ere seemed to be little re?ec-
tion or doubt about the rigid rules of the (war) game inside 
the company. People appeared to be caught up in a quasi-
totalitarian set of beliefs. Any personal sacri.ce in the cause of 
increasing market share was celebrated. Sculley writes that he 
felt guilty if he had not done his utmost during the day and was 
not really tired when he went to bed. 3e rigid rituals, the mili-
taristic language, the strong codes of physical appearance all 
came together to create a masculine, disciplined, performance- 
and career-.xated individual. 3oughtfulness was not a virtue 
during the Cola Wars.
Looking at this world from a safe distance, you might be 
puzzled. How was it that executives could summon up such 
energy and commitment? In fact, it is hard to imagine a sci-
entist about to .nd a cure for cancer or a person in an aid 
organisation rescuing people from a disaster being more com-
mitted than Pepsi’s warriors in the Cola wars. And for what? 
Selling sweetened water at a high price to teenagers? At the end 
of the day Pepsi’s ‘substantive’ contribution to humankind is 
partly negative: the product is full of sugar which can endanger 
people’s health.
In Moby Dick, Captain Ahab says ‘All my means are sane, 
my motive and my object mad’.8 3is is the functionally stupid 
person in a nutshell. Narrowing your thinking can do wonders 
for the business and be great for your career, but it comes at 
a signi.cant cost: stunted personalities, a complete imbalance 
Stupidity Paradox.indd   16 07/04/2016   20:00
INTRODUCTION 17
between work and life, the myopic pursuit of questionable 
goals, and immersion in an unrealistic fantasy about yourself. 
To see just how ridiculous this is, try a brief thought experi-
ment. Instead of seeing Pepsi as a Marine Corps, imagine if the 
situation was reversed and instead we saw the Marine Corps as 
the Pepsi of the US Armed Forces. If the US is in mortal danger, 
what should we do? Send in the Pepsi sales executives!
!e road ahead
Our thesis in this book is that many organisations are caught 
in the stupidity paradox: they employ smart people who end up 
doing stupid things. 3is can produce good results in the short 
term, but can pave the way to disaster in the longer term.
Many organisations claim they rely on well-educated, 
re?ective, bright people who are eager to learn. 3e sad reality 
is that they actually rely even more on almost the opposite: 
discipline, order, mindless enthusiasm, conformity, loyalty 
and a willingness to be seduced by the most ludicrous of ideas. 
Creating these characteristics can be tough. 3e solution that 
many organisations have hit upon, and many employees go 
for, is functional stupidity. How this works – and sometimes 
does not work – will be explored in depth in the rest of this 
book.
In Part One we look at the role stupidity plays in contem-
porary workplaces and professions. We begin by considering 
the myth of the knowledge economy. We question claims that 
developed countries have intelligent economies made up of 
smart organisations and even smarter workers. 3e reality is 
o"en the opposite. In chapter 2 we explore the thoughtless-
ness that characterises so much of organisational life today. 
We consider the role of cognitive biases, bounded rationality, 
ignorance and other intellectual traps in our working lives. 
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Chapter 3 outlines the concept of functional stupidity. We take 
a look at how functional stupidity works and what the conse-
quences are.
In Part Two we will examine .ve kinds of functional 
stupidity which are common in organisations. 3e .rst is 
leadership-induced stupidity – this is when people develop 
an unquestioning faith in their own boss (‘the leader’) and 
the magical powers of leadership more generally. We look at 
structure-induced stupidity. 3is is what happens when people 
completely buy into processes and systems which they can see 
do not produce the result they hope for. Next we examine the 
kind of stupidity created by an untrammelled enthusiasm for 
brands and images. We then look at the stupidity created by 
imitating other organisations. And .nally we look at how cor-
porate culture can be a signi.cant source of stupidity.
In Chapter 9 we ask what might be done about stupidity 
in organisations. We ask how stupidity can be managed. We 
outline some tactics that wily managers and savvy employees 
can use to turn functional stupidity to their own advantage. We 
also ask how it is possible to make organisations less thought-
less. We outline some interventions managers can make to 
drive down levels of stupidity in their .rm. We conclude with 
a plea to make our organisations less stupid. By stopping all 
the talk about knowledge and starting to allow people to think 
again at work, we might be able to make our organisations, our 
working lives and our societies a little better for everyone.
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Stupidity Today
Stupidity Paradox.indd   19 07/04/2016   20:00
Stupidity Paradox.indd   20 07/04/2016   20:00
1The Knowledge Myth
!e glorious age of the knowledge worker?
We live in an age of the knowledge worker, and have done so 
since at least 1962. 3at was the year the management thinker 
Peter Drucker was asked by !e New York Times to write about 
what the economy would look like in 1980. One big change 
he foresaw was the rise of the new type of employee he called 
‘knowledge workers’.1 3ey were not managers, shop-?oor 
workers or professionals. Rather, their work was applying 
abstract knowledge to practical problems.
For Drucker, the rise of the knowledge worker had little 
to do with the changing nature of the economy. What had 
changed was the people doing the work. Following the Second 
World War, the general level of education in the US had risen. 
Expectations had risen too: these new more highly educated 
employees wanted to be treated as independent professionals, 
not skilled workers. In Drucker’s view, the new class of knowl-
edge workers ‘expect to be “intellectuals”. And they .nd that 
they are just “sta>”’.2 3e mismatch between expectations 
and the jobs available meant that ‘knowledge jobs have to be 
created’.3 If they were not, he warned, ‘it would present an in.-
nitely more dangerous and more explosive problem than our 
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racial ghettos’.4 American companies listened to Drucker and 
took steps to resolve the problem. Corporate bosses opened 
campus-like environments, developed labs and installed open-
plan workplaces, in the hope that these new workplaces would 
make sta> who spent their days doing boring o=ce jobs feel as 
if they were knowledge workers.
Across the Atlantic, a French sociologist was coming to 
a remarkably similar conclusion. Following the widespread 
social protests during May 1968, Alain Touraine was struck 
by profound changes taking place around him. Like Drucker, 
he was worried about highly educated younger people who 
wanted intellectually stimulating jobs but found themselves 
completely alienated at work. Touraine thought that the upris-
ings in Paris were an expression of this frustration. But the 
street protests indicated, he claimed, that greater social change 
was afoot. He saw a shi" from an industrial society where one 
gained power by controlling the traditional factors of produc-
tion (land, labour and capital) towards a post-industrial society 
where the real power lay in controlling information.5 3is was a 
society where ‘economic progress depends more and more not 
only on the quantity of available labour and capital but on the 
ability to be innovative’.6 It created an economic system where 
‘the treatment of information plays the same central role that 
the treatment of natural resources played at the beginning of 
industrialization’.7
Back on the other side of the Atlantic, the Harvard sociolo-
gist Daniel Bell was thinking about similar things. He too saw 
profound changes afoot. ‘Post-industrial society is basically an 
information society,’ he asserted. ‘Exchange of information in 
various kinds of data processing, record keeping and market 
research is the foundation for most economic exchange.’8 Instead 
of seeing the vanguard of this new economy as dissatis.ed 
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students (as Touraine did), or overeducated and understimu-
lated o=ce workers (as Drucker did), Bell looked to research 
scientists sta=ng the labs of large corporations. Bell thought 
these scientists were at the cutting edge of a profound shi" in 
how knowledge was used to create innovation. During indus-
trialism, he argued, the most important innovations had been 
based on ‘random interventions’ of talented cra" workers who 
dabbled in science. In contrast, recent innovations were based 
on the direct and systematic application of scienti.c knowl-
edge. According to Bell, this would not just give rise to new 
industries, but to entirely new economic and social dynamics. 
3ere would also be a shi" in the dominant economic sector 
from manufacturing to services. 3e central resource used 
to drive the system would no longer be energy but informa-
tion. 3e technology would no longer be mechanical hardware 
such as the steam engine, but information technology such 
as computer systems. 3e core skill base would no longer be 
engineers and skilled workers in manufacturing, but those who 
controlled abstract knowledge, such as scientists, profession-
als and other experts. Instead of using empirical procedures to 
deal with ad hoc problems, this new dominant group would use 
abstract models and principles.
Bell’s ideas prompted a storm of reactions. Some agreed, 
some did not. But the idea of post-industrialism captured the 
imagination of corporate executives, management consultants 
and business-school professors. 3ere was a continual ?ow of 
books, articles, papers, keynote presentations and strategic 
reports lauding the role of knowledge for the contemporary 
corporation. A vocabulary of largely interchangeable words 
like learning, intelligence, wisdom and information came into 
vogue. ‘Knowledge workers’, the ‘knowledge economy’, ‘knowl-
edge management’ and ‘knowledge-intensive .rms’ became the 
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leitmotif of contemporary capitalism. 3ese ideas only inten-
si.ed during the mid-1990s as entirely new economic sectors 
associated with the internet became fashionable. 3e bursting 
of the dot.com bubble during 1999 did not de?ate the collective 
euphoria around these ideas. Today, it remains common for 
people to preach the gospel of ‘knowledge’, ‘innovation’, ‘crea-
tivity management’ and ‘the power of ideas’.
All this talk about the knowledge economy has generated 
a new dogma. We are told that knowledge has become the key 
resource, at least in advanced Western economies. Today it is 
conventional wisdom that ‘the foundation of industrial econo-
mies has shi"ed from natural resources to intellectual assets’.9 
Researchers write: ‘As the pace of change increases, knowledge 
development among the members of the company becomes 
the key to competitiveness, to remaining in the front line … 
Business has simply become more knowledge-intensive in all 
companies, and corporate investment in education and train-
ing is more extensive than ever before’.10
To be competitive, we are told, organisations must harness 
their intellectual capital. Knowledge is seen as ‘the most stra-
tegically important of the .rm’s resources’.11 ‘3e central 
competitive dimension of what .rms know how to do’, write 
Bruce Kogut and Udo Zander, ‘is to create and transfer knowl-
edge e=ciently within an organizational context.’12 Apparently 
the most e>ective way for .rms to remain competitive is to 
‘hire smart people and let them talk to one another’.13
3e .nal article of faith is that organisations must employ 
sophisticated knowledge workers. Even Marxists claim that 
‘the development of capitalism thus tends to create a working 
class that is increasingly sophisticated. Workers’ cognitive and 
social capabilities are elements of the forces of production.’14 
So-called symbolic analysts who do advanced thinking work 
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are now seen as the key .gures in the workforce.15 Instead of 
industrial workers who produce material goods, we now have 
knowledge workers who create ‘immaterial products such as 
knowledge, communication, a relationship or an emotional 
response’.16
3ese articles of faith form the basis of what has become 
a remarkably resilient and widely shared dogma: that we live 
in a knowledge economy, dominated by knowledge-intensive 
.rms which employ knowledge workers. A host of academ-
ics, consultants, executives and politicians have espoused this 
theme, and a vast body of writing on knowledge, information, 
competence, wisdom, talent and learning in organisations has 
emerged in recent decades. It seems that Peter Drucker’s fore-
cast in 1962 has proved to be remarkably accurate. Or has it?
!e knowledge economy?
In 1996, the members of the OECD, the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development, were worried. Since 
its foundation, membership of this exclusive club had carried 
a certain clout. 3ey are the richest countries in the world. 
However, by the mid-1990s their con.dence was waning. Fac-
tories were closing in Europe and North America and opening 
in Asia. ‘Developed’ countries worried that they were being 
overtaken by ‘developing’ countries. OECD members faced 
an identity crisis. It had grown clear that they were no longer 
industrialised countries. What then were they becoming?
3e answer was found in the idea of the knowledge economy: 
factories should be replaced with IT .rms. Unemployed man-
ufacturing workers could become computer programmers, 
consultants or personal .tness coaches. To transform into a 
knowledge economy, the OECD suggested that a nation needs 
to have a good education system, high levels of innovation, and 
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lots of information and communications technology. Each of 
these things sounds reasonable – until you take a few moments 
to think about it.
One characteristic of a knowledge-intensive country is a 
good stock of ‘human capital’. 3is means having a population 
who spend many years at school, with large proportions grad-
uating from high school and university. Having an educated 
population is certainly a laudable aim, but simply to focus on 
increasing the time people spend in classrooms or lecture halls 
or the expansion of degrees is short-sighted.
Take the case of universities. 3e last few decades have wit-
nessed an explosion of the university sector. By 2011, nearly 50 
per cent of young people were entering higher education in the 
UK.17 3ere is much to be said for extending access to higher 
education. It should create more informed citizens who are 
more capable of using their intellectual abilities. 3is, besides 
more occupational and technical knowledge acquisition, is the 
very reason we have higher education. However, reality is quite 
di>erent. One recent US study of over 2,300 undergraduates at 
29 colleges tested students when they started their programmes 
and then a"er two and four years. 3e researchers found that 
a"er the .rst two years, 45 per cent of students had shown 
no signi.cant improvement in cognitive abilities.18 A"er four 
years of study, 36 per cent of students had still made little or no 
measurable improvement in their ability to think and analyse 
problems. In other words, a large proportion of all students 
were as smart or as stupid as when they started. In some cases, 
attending university set students back. Business students per-
formed worse in their .rst few years of university than they had 
done in high school. Perhaps it should not be surprising then 
that many students in today’s universities seem to have little or 
no interest in the topics they are taught. And they don’t learn 
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that much. We have lived through a time of higher-education 
in?ation: there is more of it, but it is questionable how much 
value is created in terms of true learning or credentials that 
really lead anywhere in the labour market.
For many students, attending lectures has become a chance 
to check Facebook.19 Universities o>er classes on subjects like 
Beyoncé, David Beckham, Zombies and Star Wars.20 Entire 
.elds of study have emerged around areas that were once learned 
on the job in a few days. Some universities have started o>er-
ing degree-level courses in bartending or spa management. Of 
course, there are some institutions that have standards. Some 
of the traditional subject areas – natural science, engineering, 
medicine – are also less vulnerable to forces that lower quality. 
And according to the US study we mentioned above, about 60 
per cent of students did develop intellectually. But on the whole, 
the university as a bastion of knowledge and learning has been 
replaced by mass education and lower demands. Customer ori-
entation means that students should expect to have an easy life 
rather than struggle with learning. Rather than improving stu-
dents’ stock of human capital, it seems that the vast expansion 
of higher education may have the opposite e>ect: cultivating 
a taste for infotainment and the expectation of high grades 
for low e>ort. 3is is a typical experience of a contemporary 
university teacher: ‘image triumphs over content, presentation 
over understanding, description over analysis’.21
Not only students, but also university management and 
other groups making decisions about the institutions, appear 
to have lost focus on what could be seen as their very reason for 
being. Most UK universities now comprise more administra-
tors than faculty members.22 3is suggests that the purpose of 
higher education has become less about education and research 
and more about administering it.
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On top of boosting education, extending innovation is also 
seen as an important part of a knowledge economy. One way to 
achieve this is to increase the amount of research that a country 
does. During the past decade, countries worldwide have pushed 
their scientists to publish more of their work in high-quality 
international journals. 3is has produced a ?ood of articles and 
an exponential growth in the number of journals. However, it is 
uncertain whether it has led to much in the way of fundamental 
advances. Within our own scholarly .eld of business studies, 
it is frequent to hear complaints that very few new ideas have 
been created since the late 1970s or early 1980s.23 And this is 
despite a huge expansion in the number of researchers working 
in the area. As the numbers of researchers struggling to publish 
papers have exponentially increased, the insights from each 
published paper have likewise decreased. Mostly the results 
of all this research are next to useless for anyone beyond the 
pocket-size sub.eld the author is working in.
We thought this might just be a problem of our own intel-
lectual ghetto. Sadly, it is not. A recent study of chemistry 
found that the great majority of researchers focus on relatively 
conservative questions that have little impact. 3ey shun risky 
research strategies that could introduce fundamental inno-
vations and have a wider importance. 3is is in the face of a 
massive expansion of knowledge about chemistry that should 
o>er more opportunities for path-breaking innovations.24 
Boosting the number of high-pro.le journal articles may lead 
to increased knowledge, but in the best-case scenario it is likely 
to enthuse only a small group of specialists. Normally, papers 
pass quickly into obscurity and join the majority of scholarly 
articles that are not cited at all. 3e prevalence of journals 
online is actually making matters worse.25 Today, we seem to 
face a situation in scholarly publication where, to parody the 
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words of Winston Churchill: Never before in human history 
have so many had so little to say to so few.
3e .nal plank of building a knowledge economy is heavy 
investment in information and communications technology 
(ICT). For policymakers this means plenty of telephone lines, 
computers and internet users. For the population to have access 
to computers and the online world is important, but just to 
assume that access to the internet can make a country knowl-
edge-intensive is misguided. According to one survey, the 
most popular activities that North Americans practise on the 
internet are checking their emails, .nding information with a 
search engine, accessing a map, looking up information related 
to a hobby or checking the weather.26 People o"en use the inter-
net at work to do non-work tasks like shopping, checking social 
media, reading the newspaper, monitoring sporting events or 
even viewing pornography.27 One UK study found that employ-
ees spend an hour a day carrying out non-work-related tasks 
at their desk – mainly using the internet.28 3ese are hardly 
the kind of knowledge-intensive activities that gurus of the 
knowledge economy had in mind. Arguably, the extension 
of internet access has not just given greater opportunities for 
sharing knowledge – it has also radically expanded the scope 
for people to engage in mindless activities like playing Candy 
Crush. Of course, the internet is used for all sorts of purposes – 
many of them in line with the idea of the knowledge economy. 
But the expansion of the internet has given ample opportunity 
for mindless cyber-dri"ing.
Most countries aspire to a knowledge economy. Nations 
around the world are pouring billions of taxpayer dollars into 
increasing their ‘knowledge intensiveness’. 3ey have invested 
heavily in innovation by raising participation in higher educa-
tion, boosting the amount of scienti.c research they produce 
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and extending access to information and communication 
technology. Worthy activities for sure, but in some cases these 
investments have back.red: more people attend university, but 
students appear to learn less; more research papers are pro-
duced, but fewer fundamental breakthroughs are made. 3e 
great spread of ICT has o"en just given users access to pictures 
of cats and celebrity gossip.
Perhaps it should not be so surprising that some have started 
to point out that far from experiencing a boom in innovation, 
we are actually witnessing declines.29 Many fundamental inno-
vations happened during the middle of the twentieth century, 
but since the 1970s we have actually seen a fall in the number 
of breakthroughs that fuel economic growth. 3e important 
innovations we have witnessed – such as the internet – were 
largely based on fundamental technologies developed earlier 
in the century. When innovation does happen today, it happens 
more slowly. 3e design and development of the .rst Boeing 
747 (a radically new type of aircra" at the time) took .ve years. 
3e design and development of the .rst Airbus A380 (a modest 
evolution) took ."een years.
3is should lead us to ask whether spending on the knowl-
edge economy was more about public relations than producing 
innovation. Perhaps all this talk about knowledge is a way of 
creating an appealing image of an economy going places in 
order to avoid discussing the darker prospects that haunt de-
industrialising countries around the world.
Knowledge-intensive "rms?
While countries have tried to become ‘knowledge economies’, 
companies have sought to become ‘knowledge-intensive .rms’. 
Many of these are in the professional service .eld: accountants, 
management consultants, lawyers, communication specialists. 
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Some are in high technology. But more generally, there is an 
eagerness for .rms to promote their ‘knowledge-intensiveness’. 
Most organisations that like to stress that they are knowledge-
intensive claim to have a unique knowledge base that is di=cult 
to copy.30 For instance, a legal .rm might say it has expertise in 
an area competitors do not. 3e problem is that when you look 
carefully at what a .rm does, it is hard to de.ne and isolate 
exactly what is so special and unique about it. Sometimes what 
counts as ‘knowledge’ entails a piece of esoteric expertise, but 
what tends to matter more is the ability to mobilise extra labour 
power, be ?exible and respond to client demands.
3e role of very advanced knowledge is o"en more limited 
than claimed. Even when .rms do have a unique form of 
knowledge, it is o"en not needed in the course of day-to-day 
operations. Most businesses rely on general skills and abilities 
that other .rms in their sector also have. For instance, while an 
IT .rm may have specialists who have an excellent knowledge 
of a particular system, much of the .rm’s day-to-day work is 
likely to be unrelated to this speci.c knowledge base. A person 
we interviewed had this experience. He held a PhD and had 
written his thesis on mergers and acquisitions. He then joined 
a large management consultancy .rm and discovered, to his 
frustration, that a"er two years with the .rm he had done 
no work within his area of expertise. Instead, the .rm would 
assign people to projects where personnel were needed. O"en it 
is the ?exible use of disciplined and hardworking young people 
who can be plugged into any project that gives the edge to large 
management consultancy .rms. Not their unique knowledge 
base.
It is no easy task to quantify and judge what knowledge-
intensive .rms produce. When a car breaks down, it’s clear you 
have a problem. If it works a"er taking it to a mechanic, then the 
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problem has been solved (although how well it has been solved 
is di=cult to assess). It’s far harder to know when an auditing 
report or piece of consulting advice is substandard. It is hard to 
gauge what knowledge-intensive .rms do because they produce 
abstract things. Take a consultancy assignment. What exactly 
is produced? A report? A deck of PowerPoint slides? Meetings? 
3e substance is tenuous. O"en it amounts to little more than a 
feeling among senior managers that something has been done, 
and a sense of relief among middle managers that they are o> 
the hook.
3ere is a yawning gap between the expertise of the 
people working in ‘knowledge-intensive .rms’ and the people 
who consume their products and services. Usually clients of 
knowledge-intensive .rms respond on the basis of faith: they 
have to believe what they get is high quality. And sometimes 
faith su=ces: the fact that the client trusts the advice is what 
.xes the problem. O"en ‘solutions’ provided by knowledge-
intensive .rms are little more than placebos. 3ey make no 
concrete di>erence, but consumers feel relieved to have swal-
lowed the pill.
Being a knowledge-intensive .rm has very little to do with 
being knowledgeable. And even if you are knowledgeable, your 
clients may not care. So why do ‘knowledge-intensive .rms’ 
bother to put on the charade? 3e answer is that it is more about 
creating an image. 3e real work of a knowledge-intensive .rm 
is to persuade the client that it is smart. And in many ways this 
is OK: if the services a .rm provides were measured by complex 
knowledge, then it is likely that clients would not get it.
Persuading people that your company is knowledge-inten-
sive can earn big pay-o>s. It creates a sense of community 
among members of the .rm. To belong to a knowledge-intensive 
.rm is much more appealing than being part of an average .rm 
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operating in ‘the old economy’. Wielding the K word can turn a 
boring job .lling in spreadsheets into a much smarter-sound-
ing career in ‘data analysis’. It can boost people’s self-esteem 
and make them work harder. 3is is what happened when an 
internal IT service group in a large .rm relabelled itself as an 
‘integrated services consultancy’. It was mainly doing inter-
nal consultancy and the work was more or less the same as 
before, but sta> began to view themselves di>erently: they were 
now ‘consultants’, with ‘clients’ working with ‘integrated ser-
vices’. 3is much more grandiose title created a higher level of 
ambition.31
Knowledge-intensiveness can also foster an excellent exter-
nal image of the company. If a .rm is seen as having particular 
expertise, then it can help to convince clients that the o"en 
he"y price tag it charges is worth paying. Firms are much more 
likely to be willing to fork out big sums of money for ‘deep 
expertise’, ‘cutting-edge knowledge’ or ‘thought leadership’ 
rather than plain old advice.
3e K word is o"en part of a con.dence trick. A report from 
a highly reputable management consultancy is o"en respected 
because of the brand on the cover. Decision-makers and even 
the wider public accept the conclusions because the prestigious 
.rm that produced it is thought to employ the best and the 
brightest. 3e reality is likely to be di>erent: these same reports 
are usually produced by a handful of junior sta> who have been 
working on the task for a matter of months. Senior people are 
always involved, but they are o"en busy selling services and 
interacting with clients. 3eir involvement in hands-on work 
is typically modest.
3ere is one .nal pay-o> for .rms that style themselves 
as knowledge-intensive: it can help to hide the many uncer-
tainties at the heart of knowledge work. 3e advice that 
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knowledge-intensive .rms produce is usually presented as an 
authoritative .nal answer, but look behind the scenes and you 
discover that knowledge workers themselves are o"en very 
uncertain. 3ey are not clear what the relevant information is, 
what the best criteria to solve the problem are, or even what 
the problem actually is. Knowledge workers might share their 
misgivings over a beer with their peers, but they are unlikely 
to admit to their client they don’t know what they are doing 
or why they are doing it. Behind seemingly solid cases of ‘best 
practice’ we o"en .nd airbrushed descriptions of that practice. 
And what may be ‘best’ for one company is probably not rel-
evant for another company.
But surely clients will know? Aren’t clients rational actors 
with clear demands? No. O"en, clients look for well-known 
brands, or a consultant they have personal contacts with. 3ere 
is seldom any serious e>ort to learn from a consultancy project. 
A"er it is carried out or dropped, people in the client .rms 
move on to other work. 3ey are typically uninterested in 
careful assessment, feedback and learning.32
One of us studied an organisational change project involv-
ing a well-known management consultancy advising a large 
pharmaceutical .rm. 3e project did not go so well. Little 
came out of it, partly because the client had too few people to 
undertake the change work. 3e lure of change and savings 
o"en looks promising on paper, but the project required sig-
ni.cant resources to implement and ran into unexpected snags. 
When this happened, the consultants blamed the clients. 3ey 
were slow, cautious, a bit too plump and spoiled. 3e clients 
blamed the consultants. 3ey were young, raw, too abstract, 
and more interested in .nding additional sales opportunities 
than doing ‘real work’. 3e clients thought that the consultants 
were only good at doing one thing: PowerPoint presentations. 
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Fortunately, this was crucial for making everybody happy. A 
good PowerPoint show turned a failed project into a success in 
the eyes of top management. As o"en is the case, senior execu-
tives had no knowledge or no real interest in what was really 
going on. All they wanted was positive news and reassurance.33 
PowerPoint reality ruled.
3e lack of interest senior managers took in this project 
makes more sense when you know that the market value of 
the client .rm o"en rises when it publicly announces that it 
is hiring management consultants.34 Whether these consultan-
cies lead to concrete bene.ts for the client .rm is not the issue: 
what counts is that the share price goes up.
Let us consider another example: IBM. 3is .rm sells itself 
around the world as being a particularly smart .rm, full of 
highly trained people tackling great global problems. It uses 
slogans like ‘think’, ‘smart cities’ and ‘smarter plant’. One of 
the best-known ‘members’ of the .rm is ‘Watson’, a supercom-
puter, which has competed in chess tournaments with grand 
masters and won a di=cult quiz show on US television. 3e 
message from such PR stunts is clearly this: IBM is so smart it 
can build a computer that is smarter than the best experts in 
almost any .eld. For sure, IBM does spend a signi.cant amount 
of money on research and development. It has a track record of 
creating some important technological breakthroughs such as 
the ?oppy disk drive, the automated teller machine and various 
computer programming languages. It has also hired some very 
intelligent people who are engaged in cutting-edge projects. But 
this is a tiny minority of the .rm’s global workforce. 3e reality 
is that most IBMers do far more run-of-the-mill activities such 
as sales, business process outsourcing, distribution, call-centre 
work and so on. 3e .rst thing on most IBM employees’ minds 
is how they are going to make their quarterly results, not how 
Stupidity Paradox.indd   35 07/04/2016   20:00
THE STUPIDITY PARADOX 36
they are going to live up to grand innovative challenges. But 
this does not square with ideas of ‘smartness’. 3e .rm uses 
some highly visible symbols of intelligence to create the right 
image. It helps those who work for the company to feel good 
about themselves. It is far nicer to say ‘I work for IBM’ than 
‘I work in a call centre.’ It also helps IBM to win and retain 
clients. It gives their advice an air of authority. But perhaps 
most importantly, the image of being knowledge-intensive can 
help a .rm like IBM cover up many of the uncertainties and 
ambiguities that go into getting the job done.
If we took all the talk about the knowledge-intensive .rms 
too seriously, we would see only the brainy part of the picture. 
3ese parts exist – we don’t deny it – but they are the spice, 
not the meal. 3ese supposedly smart .rms are not radically 
di>erent from other organisations in the ‘old economy’. 3ey 
are prey to much the same follies that dog all organisations.35 
O"en, their overwhelming belief in their own intellectual supe-
riority blinds them to their own stupidities.
Knowledge workers?
One of the major ideas in any story about the knowledge 
economy is that during the past few decades, employees have 
downed tools and picked up laptops. We are told that a declin-
ing industrial labour force working in manufacturing jobs 
is being replaced by smart workers in the knowledge sector. 
3is story has seized the hearts and minds of people across 
the political spectrum. Whether you are a committed libertar-
ian or a postmodern neo-Marxist, knowledge work is already 
here. 3is is a brave and beautiful world that should make us 
all happy. 3e only problem is that no such world appears to 
have arrived.
A few years ago, Steven Sweets and Peter Meiksins decided 
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they wanted to track the changing nature of work in the new 
knowledge-intensive economy.36 3ese two US labour soci-
ologists assembled large-scale statistical databases as well as 
research reports from hundreds of workplaces. What they found 
surprised them. A new economy full of knowledge workers was 
nowhere to be found. 3e old economy was still there. Manu-
facturing still employed as many people as a couple of decades 
ago – although it was a slightly smaller percentage of the entire 
workforce, as the population had increased. 3e largest sector 
was distribution. 3e researchers summarised their unexpected 
.nding this way: for every well-paid programmer working at a 
.rm like Microso", there are three people ?ipping burgers at 
a restaurant like McDonald’s. It seems that in the ‘knowledge 
economy’, low-level service jobs still dominate.
It might be tempting to ignore Sweets and Meiksins’s unset-
tling .ndings as a freak one-o>. 3e fact is that they are not. 
More and more researchers have started to see through the 
myth of knowledge work. For instance, Peter Fleming and col-
leagues took a close look at the labour statistics in Australia 
between 1986 and 2000 – a time when there was supposedly 
a boom in knowledge work.37 3eir account echoed Sweets 
and Meiksins’s: far from an expansion of ‘symbolic analysts’, 
the increase in knowledge workers had actually come from a 
growing number of low-level information-handlers. For every 
so"ware designer there were dozens of call-centre workers. A 
report by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics painted an even 
bleaker picture.38 One third of the US workforce was made up of 
three occupational groups: o=ce and administrative support, 
sales and related occupations, and food preparation and related 
work. Other occupations included construction labourer, 
security guard, child-care worker, janitor and cleaner, teach-
ing assistant, non-construction labourer, home help aide and 
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personal care aide. 3ese are hardly well paid, highly skilled 
knowledge workers.
An article of faith in much of the talk about the knowledge 
economy is that to have the skills needed for the knowledge 
economy you need to have an advanced education: a bache-
lor’s degree at the very least. Ideally you should have a master’s 
degree or perhaps even a doctorate. 3is is a myth. Most jobs, 
even in the supposed ‘knowledge economy’, o"en require only 
the kinds of skills that you might get from a high-school-level 
education.39 A report by the US Bureau of Labor in 2010 found 
that only 20 per cent of jobs in the US required a bachelor’s 
degree, 43 per cent required a high-school diploma and 26 per 
cent did not even call for that.40
One study found that since 2000 there has been a decline 
in the demand for highly skilled knowledge workers.41 3is is 
despite the fact that there has been a dramatic growth in the 
number of people on the labour market who have higher levels 
of quali.cation. 3e upshot is that people who are highly edu-
cated do not take the managerial, professional and analytical 
roles they thought they were training for. Instead, they end up 
doing routine tasks that could easily be .lled by people with 
lower skill levels. Not only does this lead to frustrated people 
with higher levels of education doing routine work, it also shi"s 
people with lower skill levels further down the occupational 
hierarchy – and in some cases out of the labour market entirely.
Another favourite idea of promoters of the knowledge 
economy is that possessing superior cognitive abilities will get 
you o> the hook of rising expectations and declining stand-
ards of employment. 3is does not seem to be the case. Even 
sectors which are particularly knowledge-intensive are being 
progressively deskilled. A recent report by a research unit at 
the University of Oxford found that 47 per cent of the 702 
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occupations they looked at were at high risk of being replaced 
by computerised processes.42 Leading the way were supposedly 
‘knowledge-intensive’ occupations such as insurance under-
writers, auditors and credit analysts. 3e jobs that avoided the 
threat of automation o"en involved a highly interpersonal and 
situational aspect such as recreational therapy, social work and 
.rst-line supervision of .re.ghters.
Predictions about the displacement of knowledge workers 
by digital technologies and even robots have triggered much 
hype, but this is far from a new development.43 Highly skilled 
human work has been replaced by machines for centuries. 
Eighty years ago, the economist John Maynard Keynes claimed 
that the rise of automation would free us from the drudgery 
of work.44 It would allow us to work a twenty-hour week. We 
would have more time to devote to far more interesting things 
like leisure and hobbies. Today, Keynes’s prediction seems like 
a bad joke. Ever greater parts of our lives are devoted to work.45 
Work has spilled over into all aspects of our waking hours. So 
much so, that the .rst thing most people do when they wake up 
is to check their smartphone (this is the .rst of the average of 
150 times a day people check these devices). For many of us this 
means checking our work emails.
Instead of reducing work, automation has created more of 
it. But what kind of work has it created? 3e answer, accord-
ing to the anthropologist David Graeber, is ‘bullshit jobs’.46 In 
a widely circulated essay, Graeber argues that while automation 
has reduced the amount of hours we need to work to get by, there 
has also been a simultaneous increase in work. But much of the 
work that has been created is essentially meaningless. Employ-
ees working these ‘bullshit jobs’ suspect that society would be 
much better o> if their job did not exist at all. As one HR direc-
tor confessed to one of us: ‘I now realise that much of what we are 
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doing has no signi.cance whatever, and should not have either.’ 
While we might not be witnessing an explosion of meaning-
ful ‘knowledge-intensive work’, we certainly seem to be living 
through a growth in bullshit jobs. A recent survey of workers in 
the UK found that 37 per cent of employees asked thought their 
job made no meaningful contribution to the world at all.47
Knowledge cultures?
With the rise of modernism, science, education and democracy, 
the stupefying e>ects of superstition, patriarchy and reli-
gious dogmatism have been cut back. Science, knowledge and 
rationality have reduced the weight of tradition, religion and 
totalitarianism. Sometimes, however, this journey has not been 
so salutary. 3e literary theorist Avital Ronell has argued that 
the growing stress on mastering the world through intelligence 
prompts a widespread paranoia about avoiding stupidity.48 3e 
increased stress on knowledge brings with it a widespread pre-
occupation with rooting out stupidity in others, and oneself. 
In this sense, stupidity becomes the focus on intense work. We 
are locked in a desperate quest to show that we are not stupid. 
We do this by signalling our knowledge and intelligence. We 
want to show everyone that we know. Not necessarily with hard 
work to cultivate our knowledge and intellect – that is di=cult 
and demanding. Instead, we chase a"er various signs of being 
educated, knowledgeable and intelligent.
But this war against stupidity can back.re. A fetishistic 
interest in knowledge and intelligence can in some cases drive 
ignorance and poor judgement. Decades of research by psychol-
ogist Carol Dweck shows that when people are afraid of looking 
stupid they tend to miss opportunities to learn.49 Intelligence 
and reason are o"en discarded when some start to wax lyrical 
about the knowledge society. All the talk of the knowledge 
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economy, knowledge work and knowledge-intensive .rms can 
be seen as mantras being chanted in the quest to dispel the sus-
picion that stupidity remains a central part of life even in the 
most enlightened organisation. Some, such as the French phi-
losopher Bernard Stiegler, suggest that matters may have got 
worse and that we could be entering into a new age of stupidity.50 
3is kind of warning should make us wary of any heroic claims 
that we live in a culture where knowledge rules. A"er all, in?a-
tion in higher education does not produce a brighter population. 
Knowledge-intensive .rms do not always do very smart things. 
Polished CVs or in?ated titles do not certify greater competence.
A good illustration of the stupidity of trying to appear intel-
ligent can be found in the commitment to information and 
knowledge asserted in many organisations. Some time ago, 
Martha Feldman and James G. March were struck by an .xation 
on ‘information’ in the .rms they studied.51 People required it, 
talked about it, had strategies and tactics related to it, and com-
plained about shortages of it. Yet they felt there was too much 
of it. Most of the time people asked for more information, even 
though they did not use it. Feldman and March suggested that 
the preoccupation with information ?ourished due to the high 
cultural value attributed to it. Information symbolised reason, 
knowledge, reliability, security and even intelligence. Demand-
ing information could be seen as a way of legitimating decisions 
you had already made: ‘Using information, asking for informa-
tion, and justifying decisions in terms of information have all 
come to be signi.cant ways in which we symbolize that the 
process is legitimate, that we are good decision-makers, and 
that our organizations are well managed,’ they write.52
A good example of this obsession with information is 
a project group that set out to make a decision for a new IT 
system. 3ey worked hard, collected a wealth of information 
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and embarked on a detailed and careful analysis. But in the 
end they were so exhausted by all this work, so overwhelmed by 
information, and so short on time, that they just decided to buy 
the system o>ered by the most pleasant sales representative.53
Paradoxically, it is the cultural value assigned to it that 
accounts for the overemphasis on information – an exorbitance 
that o"en prevents its practical use. While so strong a focus on 
information can give the impression of intelligence, it will also 
cause problems such as wasting time, and losing energy and 
focus for little real gain.
Another instance of how trying to be smart can result in 
plain stupidities is the online retailer Amazon. A recent in-
depth investigation by !e New York Times described how the 
company runs on the principle of ‘purposeful Darwinism’.54 
3e CEO insists that employees must work smarter, harder 
and longer. He says he does not accept two out of the three. 
To make this happen, Amazon recruits cohorts of smart and 
ambitious young people prepared to work extremely hard. 3ey 
quickly .nd themselves working eighty hours or more a week. 
Sta> will receive emails past midnight, followed up by text mes-
sages asking why they have not answered. In meetings people 
are relentlessly critical of each other’s ideas. People are encour-
aged to ‘disagree and commit’. When the time comes to assess 
their performance, a report of 50 or 60 pages of metrics faces 
each employee. 3ey then have to sit in front of their manager 
and defend what they have done during the past year or so. In 
many cases, the manager would go into extreme levels of detail. 
Responses such as ‘I’m not sure’ would be dismissed as ‘just 
stupid’. 3e upshot of these meetings was ‘stack ranking’, which 
ordered employees from the highest to the lowest performer. 
3ose at the top gained promotions or additional bene.ts. 
3ose at the bottom would soon leave the organisation.
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3is culture can drive high degrees of commitment. Mara-
thon phone meetings would dominate holidays such as Easter 
or 3anksgiving – one employee reportedly spent her entire 
holidays working in a nearby Starbucks where she could get a 
wi. connection. However, there are others who .nd the relent-
less demands too much. Employees who had su>ered personal 
bereavements or serious health issues, or who had to care for 
others – a stillborn baby, cancer, a dying father – were seen 
as unlikely to o>er the requisite commitment. 3ey were o"en 
managed out of the company, or le" under their own volition. 
All in all, this extreme pressure meant that Amazon had a par-
ticularly high employee turnover rate. When former employees 
transferred to a new company, they would o"en take with them 
the grindingly critical work practices which they had learned 
at Amazon. As a result, they were o"en known as ‘Amholes’.
3e culture at Amazon encourages employees to be smart in 
a way that sometimes leads to the very opposite. 3ey ask ques-
tions about everything and o"en neglect sociable manners. 
3e president of Human Resources described how ‘it would 
certainly be much easier and socially cohesive to just compro-
mise and not debate, but that may lead to the wrong decision’. 
3is constant critique might show that Amazon employees 
are intellectually switched on, but it leaves a vacuum of emo-
tional intelligence, re?ection and good judgement. 3e distress 
caused by these management practices is taken for granted. 
People crying at their desks are seen as a normal part of o=ce 
life. Few moral questions are asked. 3ings that would signify 
failure in other organisations, such as extremely high turno-
ver rates of employees, were taken as proof that the system 
was working e>ectively. Events that would normally prompt 
sympathy met with silence. What is perhaps most striking is 
that few people asked what the ultimate purpose of this harsh 
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work culture actually was. 3e answer? To facilitate the high-
speed delivery of Cocoa Crispies, sel.e sticks and Elsa dolls. An 
overeagerness to celebrate intelligence here leads to its opposite. 
In trying to demonstrate how bright they are, Amazon people 
reveal thoughtlessness in terms of interpersonal relations and a 
disregard to what other uses such intelligence could more fruit-
fully be employed.
Conclusion: the stupid idea of the smart society
Since the late 1960s, commentators have been predicting the 
onset of a knowledge-based economy where knowledge-inten-
sive .rms compete to attract the smartest knowledge workers. 
We are still waiting. Some increase in the number of jobs that 
require advanced knowledge does not justify the hype around 
the idea of knowledge. Instead of a drastic boom in high-paid, 
knowledge-intensive jobs, we have witnessed a surge of low-
paid, highly insecure, low-skilled service work. Although there 
is some growth of knowledge-intensive organisations using 
highly specialised knowledge, we have largely seen .rms doing 
routine things but posing as if their roles were much more 
complex. Contemporary Western societies are full of grade, 
credit and title in?ation. Institutions and people working in 
them try to beef themselves up to appear to be knowledgeable, 
creative and innovative. Rather than the boom of a knowledge 
economy, we have seen a series of policies being put in place 
which have back.red and actually reduced innovation.
No one would claim that knowledge is unimportant. Any 
number of professions call for skills, knowledge and seasoned 
judgement. Formal and symbolic knowledge probably matters 
more than ever. But this does not mean that a major part of 
the economy is about creative, intelligent people using sophis-
ticated knowledge to create value. 3e problem is that the 
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knowledge economy is more about alluring promise than hard 
realities. While it may give us a buzz to celebrate the 19,500 jobs 
created by the $15.8 billion of investment in the digital economy 
in the San Francisco bay area,55 we pay little heed to the hun-
dreds of thousands of jobs that are created every year in routine 
service work such as food preparation on the basis of much less 
investment.
3e situation Peter Drucker described over ."y years ago 
has only got worse. 3ere is a gap between the expansion of 
formal education and the facts of working life. 3e number of 
adults in the US attending colleges has quadrupled since 1970 
(though this has come partly at the cost of lower quality and 
reduced learning). Yet the demand for employees with college-
level education has not matched this rise. 3e result is more 
would-be knowledge workers and more frustration. 3ere 
is now an army of people who want to ?ex their intellectual 
muscles at work, but .nd the only muscles they get to exercise 
are in their legs as they walk down the block to fetch the boss 
another latte.
3e only solution that companies seem to have come up 
with to Drucker’s question is this: convince your employees 
that they are knowledge workers employed by a knowledge-
intensive .rm that competes in the knowledge economy – even 
when they are not. 3is feat can be relatively easy: most of us 
like to feel that we are doing something smart. Label a job as 
knowledge-intensive, and the person who does it is apt to prize 
the label. It o>ers them the glow of being smart and at least 
occasionally doing smart things – even if they are not.
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Sleeping dogs
Sowing seeds, building sandboxes and encouraging artistry. 
3ese are hardly words that spring to mind when you think 
about writing so"ware code. But this was how managers in the 
so"ware division of Technovate, a hi-tech company, described 
how they dealt with engineers.1 While managers emphasised 
creativity, they also said it was vital to maintain a ‘.rm grip’ 
on the engineer’s work. 3ey wanted to make the work process 
more predictable, more controllable and more structured, 
while stressing too that all engineers are naturally creative – 
like artists. Believing that people are naturally motivated and 
creative then tracking their work in minute detail seems con-
tradictory, but this did not trouble managers at Technovate. 
3ey easily toggled between claiming to encourage freedom 
and controlling their employees. But how did they deal with 
this glaring contradiction? 3e answer is straightforward: they 
ignored it.
Turning a blind eye to these tensions helped the middle 
managers get on with their day job, but it also created some 
problems. Engineers became confused. 3ey were not sure 
exactly what their managers wanted from them – creativity or 
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e=ciency. 3ey did their work but failed to come up with any 
particularly creative ideas.
3ere were a few moments when managers stumbled upon a 
process that seemed to actually work and stimulate their crea-
tivity. For instance, they found that having experts come and 
explain to the engineers how they developed their own patents 
was useful. However, this successful process was abandoned. 
As a consequence, little was achieved.
Various creativity initiatives were introduced and dropped 
without much heed to what worked and what did not. We 
might expect that such repeated failures would raise questions. 
3e surprising thing is that the managers were not so troubled. 
When something failed, they just moved on to the next thing. 
If there were promising signs, they also moved on to the next 
thing. 3is turned out a string of mediocre results with little 
clear learning in between. When managers sensed problems, 
they elected not to stir up too much trouble. Better to let sleep-
ing dogs lie. 3e lesson they learned was how to make their lives 
easier by turning a blind eye to things that did not bring posi-
tive feedback and not spending too much time exploring what 
happened and why. Making a show of creativity management 
seemed to count for more than actually doing something that 
seriously changed the way the engineers worked.
Knowledge is power, we are told. But at Technovation, 
knowledge was rather puny. In this .rm, and many others 
like it, knowledge workers seemed to prefer to avoid being 
too knowledgeable. In some cases, downright ignorance was 
ideal. Although the hi-tech .rm is just one organisation, it will 
be familiar to many people. 3e endless cycle of half-hearted 
managerial initiatives, ?agrant contradiction, confusing ambi-
guity and a reluctance to learn is all too common. Having 
heads in the sand is probably more common than having eyes 
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wide open. In this context, being knowledgeable can be a very 
dangerous thing indeed. Living a happy life in an organisation 
o"en requires a capacity to avoid trying to learn too much. 
Perhaps Friedrich Nietzsche was right when he wrote that ‘we 
have contrived to retain our ignorance in order to enjoy an 
almost inconceivable freedom, thoughtlessness, imprudence, 
heartiness, and gaiety – in order to enjoy life!’2
Intelligence
Why is it that organisations can be so unknowledgeable? 3e 
easy answer would be that people running companies are stupid 
– they have low IQs or are uneducated . But this is not usually 
the case. Most knowledge-intensive companies go out of their 
way to select smart, well-educated people. Intelligence tests are 
a routine part of recruitment rounds. Many of the .rms that 
claim to be the smartest in the world focus their recruitment 
on an extremely narrow set of elite universities. For instance, 
top US professional service .rms target only a few Ivy League 
colleges (Harvard, Yale, Princeton and ‘maybe Columbia’) 
when recruiting new sta>.3 3e irony is that it is precisely those 
.rms that are packed with high IQs and degrees from the very 
best schools who do some very silly things. Enron was .lled 
with people with degrees from elite universities who prided 
themselves on not just being smart but ‘fucking smart’ (as an 
ex-CEO put it in an interview). In the lead-up to the .nancial 
crisis of 2008, banks were crammed with high IQs and heavy-
weight degrees. A colleague told one of us how she worked in a 
department of an elite investment bank that created one of the 
most toxic .nancial instruments involved in the recent crisis. 
3e department was sta>ed almost exclusively by graduates of 
the French École Polytechnique, an elite school of science and 
engineering (motto: ‘For the Homeland, Science and Glory’) 
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that prides itself on nurturing people with the best analytic 
abilities in the world.
Some suggest that our obsessive focus on analytical 
intelligence (the kind that IQ tests measure) and academic 
quali.cations means we have overlooked other kinds of intel-
ligence that actually make people successful. To deal with this 
problem, management gurus like Daniel Goleman have argued 
that we need to look at ‘emotional intelligence’ (EQ).4 3is is a 
rather broad and ?uid concept that comprises a variety of dif-
ferent abilities and is hard to assess. Goleman and his many 
followers point out that while people in companies may be 
good at analysing a spreadsheet, they may be remarkably bad 
at dealing with emotions. Increasing emotional intelligence, 
we are told, is the road to career success and organisational 
?ourishing. Despite the wave of enthusiasm around this idea, 
the evidence fails to support it. Having high emotional intel-
ligence does not seem to make you much better at your job.5 In 
many cases people get caught up in a therapeutic mentality and 
overstress the importance of .ne-tuning the adaptation to and 
manipulation of people’s emotions.6
Our obsession with IQ (and more recently EQ) has meant 
we have overlooked practical intelligence. 3is is the kind of 
everyday know-how that people use in order to get things done. 
When studying .re.ghters, Gary Klein noticed that the most 
skilled crew leaders had an uncanny ‘feel for the situation’.7 
3ey made decisions under high levels of pressure without 
having all the information. What’s more, these decisions would 
usually prove to be the right ones. One very experienced .re-
crew leader talked of having ‘extrasensory perception’ and 
‘seeing around corners’. 3is seemed strange to Klein, but a"er 
spending lots of time with .re crews he realised that the ‘extra-
sensory perception’ came from repeated exposure to dangerous 
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situations. A"er the .re chief had seen thousands of .res, he 
developed a sense of how a normal .re should look, feel, sound 
and smell. He also had an intuitive sense of what would happen 
next. 3e .re chief also knew when things did not look right. 
3is deep on-site experience gave him a kind of muscle memory 
that seemed to bypass his brain. He knew when things felt right 
and when they did not. 3e big lesson for Klein was that relying 
too heavily on analytical intelligence measured by IQ tests can 
be a big mistake. If .re.ghters took time to do analytical prob-
lem-solving, they would be burned to a cinder. For a .re chief, 
being smart meant relying on your practical intuition.
Practical intelligence is easy to dismiss in corporate life. 
Quelling a .re is hard physical work requiring instant deci-
sions that have life-and-death consequences. Most o=ce work 
takes little physical prowess, beyond enduring boring meet-
ings. Most decisions can wait for a long time. 3e outcomes 
of one’s actions are o"en so remote that they are easy to forget 
entirely. Despite these stark di>erences, practical intelligence 
may be as important in an air-conditioned o=ce as it does in a 
raging inferno. Richard Wagner and Robert Sternberg, North 
American psychologists, noticed that tacit knowledge was 
nearly twice as important as analytical intelligence in explain-
ing why some managers succeeded and others did not.8 3eir 
conclusion: being analytically smart is important, but being 
street-smart o"en matters more. However, as with most other 
simple truths, things are not so straightforward.
People with deep expertise and repeated experience of situa-
tions have o"en developed deeply ingrained mental rules of 
thumb. 3ese rules can be remarkably useful – they help those 
with such expertise to reach the right decisions quickly, as in 
the case of the .re.ghters. But these same rules of thumb can 
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trip up the smartest and most experienced. 3e danger of street 
smarts is brilliantly demonstrated in a short experiment done 
by Daniel Isenberg.9 He asked experienced general managers to 
solve a short business case of less than one page. 3e case was 
presented to them in short snippets on cards they were shown 
one by one. Isenberg noticed that the experienced managers 
relied on their hard-won mental rules of thumb. 3ey began 
to solve the case and to o>er courses of action before they had 
seen all the cards. 3ey did not ask for further information: 
their experience helped them to get things done. But o"en they 
would ignore some crucial matter, and in many real-world situ-
ations, to jump into action before the facts are in can be fatal. 
Experience and street-smartness too can inculcate stupidity.
Where does all this lead us? 3e conclusion is that there is 
no easy way out of stupidity. People with a high IQ, EQ or excel-
lent practical intelligence are not immune. 3e only way out of 
doing stupid things is critical thinking and re?ection.
Cognitive biases
In the early 1970s, the question of why smart people, like the 
managers Isenberg studied, were so keen to avoid even the most 
basic protocols of rational analysis started to trouble two psy-
chologists. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, suspected 
that smart people were o"en not particularly methodical and 
rational in their thinking. To test out their suspicion, they dis-
tributed questionnaires to a group of people who had high levels 
of intelligence, but were not particular experts in the area in 
question. 3ey found that instead of relying on correct analyti-
cal procedures, they would use rules of thumb – something the 
researchers called heuristics. 3e outcome was o"en false results.
We might expect intelligent novices to make mistakes like 
this. What would experts do, Kahneman and Tversky asked, 
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and they handed the same questionnaire to people who were 
experts in predicting probability – mathematical psycholo-
gists. What they found surprised them. 3is group of experts 
would make the same kind of mistakes that novices did. 3ey 
relied on mental rules of thumb and avoided methodical 
rational thinking. 3is led Kahneman and Tversky to con-
clude that when ‘making predictions and judgments under 
uncertainty, people do not appear to follow the calculus of 
chance or the statistical theory of prediction, … they rely on 
a limited number of heuristics which sometimes yield reason-
able judgments and sometimes lead to severe and systematic 
errors’.10
One common heuristic we use is anchoring. 3is happens 
when the .rst piece of information we are shown shapes our 
gauging of other information. For instance, in one experiment 
people were asked to spin a roulette ‘wheel numbered 1 to 100 
which, unbeknown to them, was designed to stop at either 10 
or 65. A"er the rigged roulette wheel came to a stop, they were 
asked to estimate what percentage of nations in the United 
Nations were in Africa. 3e people whose spin of the wheel 
stopped at 10 estimated that 25 per cent of nations in the UN 
were African. 3ose whose spin stopped at 65 estimated that 
45 per cent were African.11 3is showed how an irrelevant piece 
of information (the number a roulette wheel stopped on) could 
shape estimations made about a completely unrelated ques-
tion (the number of African countries in the UN). Anchoring 
is by no means con.ned to the lab. Studies of negotiation have 
shown that the initial o>er tabled – even if outrageously low 
or high – can have a big impact on the eventual terms people 
agree to.12 3is means if the starting price in the sale of a house 
is eyewateringly high, then the buyer o"en ends up paying over 
the odds.
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A second heuristic that clouds analytical thinking is avail-
ability. We make assessments about the likelihood of an event 
based on how easy it is to think about examples. For instance, 
if asked ‘Is it more likely that a word randomly selected from 
the English language begins with the letter K, or that it has K 
as the third letter?’, people tend to overestimate the prevalence 
of words beginning with K. In fact there are about three times 
more words in English that have K as their third letter than 
those that start with K. 3e misjudgement happens because 
people .nd it easier to call to mind words that begin with K 
than they do words where that letter comes third.
Similar processes have been found in business. For instance, 
when investors were asked how they thought the S&P 500 
share-market index performed in 2009, 2010 and 2011, they 
tended to say that it was either ?at or had fallen. In fact, the 
index had posted record gains during each of these years. 
Why were investors so o> the mark? When they thought 
about these years, they recalled the .nancial crisis of 2008 and 
then assumed that shares would perform badly in subsequent 
years.13 Similarly, when economic forecasters were asked to 
make predictions about the future state of the economy, they 
tended to ignore well-known dynamics such as business cycles 
and instead made their judgements based on the current state 
of the economy. So if the economy was doing well, they pre-
dicted long-run growth; if it was doing poorly they had a much 
gloomier outlook.14 Once again, well-paid analysts gave more 
attention to information that was at their .ngertips and over-
looked well-known patterns.
A third mental habit that clouds rational thinking is 
overcon.dence. We overestimate our likelihood of success 
and underestimate the time it will take us to achieve it. For 
instance, when asked about their driving skills, 93 per cent of 
Stupidity Paradox.indd   53 07/04/2016   20:00
THE STUPIDITY PARADOX 54
US respondents and 69 per cent of Swedish respondents thought 
they were in the top 50 per cent.15 A survey of faculty at the Uni-
versity of Nebraska found that 68 per cent of respondents rated 
themselves in the top quartile of teaching ability.16 Ninety-three 
per cent of MBA students at the elite Wharton Business School 
thought they were in the top half of their group for academic 
performance.17 When Americans go about remodelling their 
kitchens, on average they estimate that it will cost $18,658. In 
reality it ends up costing $38,796.18 3ere are similar processes 
at work in organisations. When executives undertake a merger 
or acquisition, most report a high certainty that it will be a 
success. In reality, most mergers and acquisitions fail.19 When 
people start a new business, they tend to judge their chance of 
success as very high. 3e reality of course is that most ventures 
fail.20
A fourth mental habit is relying on how information is 
framed. For instance, if we are asked whether we prefer a treat-
ment that ensures that 90 per cent of patients will survive or 
one that means 10 per cent will die, most people go for the .rst 
treatment. 3e e>ectiveness of the treatment is exactly the 
same. 3e only di>erence is that the .rst sounds more positive: 
we tend to like options that emphasise surviving rather than 
dying. 3e business world shows similar e>ects. For instance, 
in one study di>erent groups were given exactly the same task, 
but it was framed in di>erent ways. Some groups were told that 
it would lead to a public good, while others were not. 3ose who 
were told it would lead to a public good tended to cooperate 
more than those who were not.21 In another study, researchers 
found that a police squad in London which had been told it was 
engaged in ‘terrorist prevention’ (rather than ‘routine surveil-
lance’) became much more likely to shoot and kill an innocent 
bystander.22
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3e .nal mental habit that clouds analytical thinking is that 
we are more in?uenced by losses than by gains. As a result we 
may o"en continue to invest in losing courses of action. For 
instance, gamblers will continue to put down money in the 
hope of ‘winning back’ their losses. 3e likely result is to end 
up losing more.23 Similarly, companies that might be pursuing 
a losing strategy will invest even more in this strategy in the 
hope of making it work (which most of the time it does not).24
Each of these cognitive short cuts is common. Smart people 
frequently end up throwing good money a"er bad, making 
decisions on the basis of how they are framed, being overcon.-
dent about their own predictions, focusing only on the obvious, 
and making decisions on the basis of the .rst piece of infor-
mation that comes their way. Possessing a high IQ and ample 
street smarts does not make you immune to cognitive biases. 
Indeed, it is likely to make you even more susceptible to doing 
stupid things.
!oughtlessness by design
So far, we have reviewed some cognitive shortcomings that stem 
more or less from individual cognitive psychology. Looking at 
various forms of intelligence as well as cognitive biases tells us 
what can make individuals thoughtless. But thoughtlessness 
can be a collective function, virtually designed into organisa-
tions, and all the more powerful for it.
During the twentieth century, many jobs that had pre-
viously been complex and given workers scope to use their 
minds were dumbed down.25 Tasks were broken down into ever 
smaller parts, a split e>ected between thinking work and doing 
work. 3is produced standardised products as well as stan-
dardised jobs. Henry Ford claimed that his great innovation 
was to create a work process that meant anyone – no matter 
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their level of skill – could be involved in making a Model T 
Ford. Recent research in economic psychology has shown just 
how right Ford was.26 If employees are put into ‘foolproof jobs’ 
(the kind that anyone can do because of a strict standard oper-
ating procedure), then their intelligence has little impact on 
their performance. You can have a whole factory full of people 
with low IQs and still churn out top-quality work at a very e=-
cient rate. 3is is not the case for jobs that call for judgement 
and rely on intimate connections among the members of the 
production process. Here the average IQ level can make a big 
di>erence to performance. 3e moral of the story: if you don’t 
want employee intelligence getting in the way of productivity, 
make jobs as foolproof as possible.
It might seem comforting to suppose that foolproof jobs are 
a product of twentieth-century industrialism, and now that we 
live in a knowledge society such jobs are drastically declining. 
However, as we saw in chapter 1, this is not so. If anything, there 
are now more foolproof jobs than ever. At the same time as 
there has been an expansion of knowledge-intensive work,27 we 
have also seen the ongoing McDonaldisation of working life.28 
3is process of specialisation and deskilling has continued 
apace. In place of workers on a production line we have deliv-
ery drivers who are guided by electronic systems. In place of 
secretaries working in typing pools we have call-centre workers 
saying the same few lines over and over again. In place of the 
highly specialised bureaucrat, we have consultants who have 
even more narrow specialities. While the quality of work might 
seem to have improved, many jobs remain as dumb as ever. 3e 
di>erence is that they have to be done with a smile.29
Bounded rationality
Stupidity is designed into many jobs in factories, call centres 
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and fast-food restaurants. However, there are many other jobs 
that give employees more discretion, enabling them to make 
choices about what they do, how they do it, and when. Yet 
despite the opportunity and encouragement to put their minds 
to work, the bulk of employees do not.
3is is something that Herbert Simon realised over seventy 
years ago. Simon studied economics at the University of 
Chicago. His studies drummed into him the idea that humans 
are rational utility maximisers. As part of his undergradu-
ate degree, Simon returned to his hometown of Milwaukee 
to study decision-making in the budget o=ce of a municipal 
authority. 3e experience le" him confused. ‘My economics 
training showed me how to budget rationally. Simply compare 
the marginal utility of a proposed expenditure with its mar-
ginal cost, and approve it only if the utility exceeds the cost,’ 
he wrote. But what he found in this Milwaukee o=ce did not 
match the models he had been taught in Chicago:
What I saw in Milwaukee didn’t seem to be an applica-
tion of this rule. I saw a lot of bargaining, of reference back 
to last year’s budget, and incremental changes in it. If the 
word ‘marginal’ was ever spoken, I missed it. Moreover, 
which participants would support which items was quite 
predictable … I could see a clear connection between peo-
ple’s positions on budget matters and the values and beliefs 
that prevailed in their sub-organizations.
Simon began to realise that decision-making in organi-
sations was not perfectly rational. Nor was it completely 
irrational. Rather, the decision-making process was what he 
called ‘boundedly rational’.
Simon used the term ‘bounded rationality’ to capture the 
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fact that while people in organisations o"en try their best to 
make rational decisions, they always face obstacles. People 
usually have limited access to the information involved, limited 
capacity to process it, and limited time to make decisions. As a 
result, decision-makers o"en do the best they can, rather than 
coming up with the perfectly rational solution. Simon called 
the process ‘satis.cing’. He won the Nobel Prize in economics 
for this idea. His work reminds us that far from being per-
fectly rational agents who are out to maximise utility, most of 
the time we simply do the best we can with the limited infor-
mation, time and capacity we have. Most decisions made in 
organisations are about coming up with satisfactory outcomes, 
not optimal ones.
Since Simon formulated his idea of bounded rational-
ity, much has changed. With the internet, almost anyone 
can tap into information that was not accessible to even the 
best-placed scientists or government o=cials in the past. 3e 
amazing advances in computing power mean that we can 
collect and process huge amounts of information very quickly. 
It might be tempting to think all this has helped us to overcome 
bounded rationality, but in fact it has made matters worse.30 
When making decisions today, we quickly .nd ourselves over-
whelmed by information. To cope with overload, we fall back 
into satis.cing behaviour. We try to do reasonably well, rather 
than strive for optimal solutions.
Mindlessness
One of the ways people manage their own intellectual limits 
is by following preset patterns. Bureaucrats working in the 
budget o=ce Simon observed would plod through very famil-
iar steps every year when developing a new budget. In the early 
1970s, two psychologists noticed similar processes among the 
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subjects in their lab. Ellen Langer and Robert Abelson realised 
that much of the time, we don’t think too deeply about our own 
behaviour. Instead we quickly slip into pre-programmed pat-
terns of behaviour that they called ‘social scripts’. We are like 
actors who dutifully follow a script we have been handed which 
tells us what to do and what to say.
To test their ideas out, Langer and Abelson got one of their 
assistants to ask people coming into their lab for help.31 Each 
request was the same apart from a few subtle changes. Half the 
time, the assistant seeking help presented themself as a victim 
by saying: ‘My knee is killing me.’ 3e other half of the time, 
the assistant simply said: ‘Would you do something for me?’ 
3ey found that when the assistant presented as a victim, they 
would be helped 75 per cent of the time. If they just asked for 
aid, they were only helped 42 per cent of the time. 3e reason 
why there was such a big di>erence in responses, Langer and 
Abelson thought, was that each request cued very di>erent 
scripts. Complaining about a sore knee cued a victim script – 
and the associated moral obligation to help a victim out. When 
we are asked if we will do something for someone else, we 
consult a di>erent script that is much more neutral. If we say 
no, we will not feel too bad. In both cases, the script does the 
thinking for us.
Langer and Abelson recognised that scripts have an in?u-
ence on our lives that reaches far beyond whether we decide to 
help someone else out or not. Scripts drive all sorts of mind-
less behaviour. For instance, they found that the way a man in 
a .lm was .rst introduced would change how an audience of 
therapists saw him.32 When the man concerned was introduced 
as a ‘job applicant’, the psychotherapists described him as 
‘candid and innovative’, ‘attractive and conventional-looking’, 
and ‘ordinary’. If the man was introduced as a ‘patient’, they 
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described him as a ‘passive, dependent type’, with ‘considerable 
hostility’, and su>ering ‘con?ict over homosexuality’. Chang-
ing the way the man in the .lm was labelled triggered di>erent 
scripts. When he was a job applicant, the psychotherapists 
looked for signs that he was normal. When he was a ‘patient’, 
they looked for signs that he was abnormal.
3e big insight that came from Langer and Abelson’s work 
was that much of the time, we mindlessly follow scripts. Faced 
with a novel situation, we look for clues about what script to 
follow. Once we decide the scenario, we slip into mindless 
script-following. We also start to ignore contextual informa-
tion. We grow rigid in our view of an issue, robotically adopting 
a familiar course of action.
3ink about a routine service transaction. When you walk 
up and ask for help, the person behind the counter quickly tries 
to work out what script applies. Once they have .gured this 
out, they are likely to grow more and more rigid about what 
they will and won’t do. If you make any special requests, the 
person behind the counter is likely to bat them away.33 It is not 
just routine service employees who follow established scripts. 
Large chunks of what goes on in organisations entail following 
scripts.34 Meetings are highly scripted behaviour that we mind-
lessly work through. Job interviews also follow a script. So do 
emails. Much of this is sensible and necessary but can easily 
lead to mindless routine-following behaviour.
One of us studied managers who claimed to do leadership. 
3ey said that having co>ee with their subordinates, listening 
to them or engaging them in small talk had a signi.cant impact 
on them. 3ey saw this as an exercise of leadership. If another 
person – say their secretary – had done the same thing, no one 
would have called it leadership, but the managers followed the 
scripts of leadership and saw trivial acts as full of impressive 
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in?uencing activity.35 3e script then said: if managers are 
doing something (however trivial) in relationship to subordi-
nates, it must be leadership. In fact, most of the tasks that make 
up the day of the average o=ce-dweller are highly scripted. 
Scripts do the thinking, people rehearse them.
Mindlessly following scripts can have some big advantages. 
Scripts set sta> pulling in the same direction. Script-following 
can also help make what people do look good to the outside 
world. But perhaps most importantly, script-following can help 
sta> to conserve their cognitive resources. Going along with 
the script means you don’t need to think too much. 3is can 
save time and e>ort.
Mindlessness also comes with some big dangers. Following 
scripts means that much of your work becomes about ‘going 
through the motions’. 3is can easily go wrong, particularly 
in large organisations that keep a whole library of scripts. As 
people observe these, they risk ignoring contextual informa-
tion, which means that they may become less vigilant. 3ese 
small oversights can create ideal conditions for big mistakes. 
Mindless rule-following also impairs authenticity. If a person 
working in a service job just goes through the motions when 
talking with customers, the customers o"en feel the interaction 
is hollow. 3is can annoy the customer, but also create a sense 
of deep dissatisfaction in employees who are forced to spend 
their days speaking phoney lines. Mindless script-following 
can also lay the ground for some signi.cant problems in the 
way that people make decisions. It can mean that decisions 
are made too quickly, crucial information is ignored, and the 
wrong lessons drawn from experience. Mindless script-follow-
ing can contribute to getting things done, but it can also create 
some signi.cant oversights and problems.
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Skilled incompetence
Mindlessness is not a quality you would usually associate with 
experts, but people are experts because they follow well estab-
lished scripts. 3ey know each step so intimately that they can 
take it with their eyes closed. A medical doctor knows all the 
steps of examining a patient. 3ey can do it without thinking. 
O"en the hardest part of the job for an expert is to work out 
which script is involved. Once they identify the right one, they 
can go on autopilot.
As we saw in the previous section, engaging cognitive auto-
pilot can o>er signi.cant upsides, but it also has downsides. 
3e most pronounced of these is what Chris Argyris has called 
‘skilled incompetence’. Instead of facing up to problems, Argyris 
noticed, skilled managers would fall back into what he called 
‘defensive routines’ – standard ways of behaviour that allowed 
them to ‘avoid surprise, embarrassment or threat’. 3ese rou-
tines gave smart managers a sense of comfort. 3ey made them 
feel good even in the face of a situation that would normally make 
them feel bad, by acting to defer dealing with problems. But the 
same issue tended to surface again and again. Problems were 
never completely dealt with, they were just temporarily parked.
Argyris gives the example of a young entrepreneurial 
company he knew well, which had been growing fast for a few 
years. As with most thrusting new companies, the .rm was ?ex-
ible and ?uid. However, the CEO thought it was time to make 
it more structured. 3e snag was that no one in the company 
knew how to do this. Sta> would go away to management 
retreats, list all the issues, but then would jib at committing to 
concrete action. 3ey kept postponing making a clear decision. 
When Argyris went along to some of the meetings, he saw these 
defensive routines in action. By avoiding making a decision, 
people felt good, but they also ducked the issue.
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One of the big problems with this kind of skilled incom-
petence is that it stops people from learning. 3ey become 
trapped in comforting routines that allow them to ignore trou-
bling issues. By mindlessly going through the motions and 
asking for ever more analysis, the sta> felt as if they were doing 
something when in fact they were not. Because these defensive 
routines made people feel good, they clung on to them. 3is 
was a natural response – breaking routine would bring them 
face-to-face with unsettling issues. But more disturbingly, it 
would mean that people would no longer feel skilful. Instead, 
they would have to face issues that made them feel incompetent.
Ignorance
Overlooking what is blindingly obvious can be a nasty side 
e>ect of professional obsessions. But there are also many cases 
when we ignore crucial information because it is in our best 
interests. 3e fact that we so o"en turn a blind eye to inconve-
nient facts can be seen in an experiment conducted by Joël van 
der Weele.36 He got groups of German university students to 
play a game where it paid to collaborate. Economists use this 
kind of game all the time to test out how people make deci-
sions about collaboration, but there were a few unusual twists 
to this experiment. First, one of the players could pick the rules. 
Second, they could choose to remain ignorant about whether it 
paid to collaborate. 3e researcher found that people were .ve 
times more likely to choose to remain ignorant when it was in 
their own interests. Further, he found that when people chose 
ignorance they were twice as likely to engage in sel.sh behav-
iour. 3e implication was clear: when it is in line with our own 
sel.sh interests, we o"en choose to remain ignorant, and when 
we pick ignorance we act sel.shly.
3is study was conducted in the rather arti.cial setting of 
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a computer lab in a university department. We might not be 
so surprised that students studying economics are willing to 
overlook information when it is not in their interests and that 
they act sel.shly. A"er all, economists are more inclined than 
others to maximize their self-interests.37 However, the kind of 
behaviour that Van der Weele discovered in the lab can be seen 
all around us in everyday life. People at high risk of contracting 
an STD o"en avoid getting tested; wealthy people avoid driving 
through poor neighbourhoods; investors monitor their port-
folios less when the market is declining.38 We tend to go out of 
our way to ignore crucial information when the results might 
be disturbing or not in our best interests.
Consider the scandal at Volkswagen during 2015, when it 
was revealed that VW had installed ‘defeat devices’ into over 
800,000 of its cars. 3ese allowed the cars to pass increas-
ingly stringent emissions tests through limiting the output of 
noxious gases only when the output was being tested. At other 
times the car would be up to .ve times more polluting. Senior 
executives at VW initially claimed that they had no knowledge 
of these devices.39 Although this is a matter of debate, in many 
ways it was in their best interests to remain ignorant. By not 
knowing about the covert technology, executives were able to 
claim unabashed that the cars their company made were clean 
and green, cheap to produce and also had high levels of per-
formance. When the bad news came out, they could also claim 
that he had no knowledge of these underhand means.
Usually we associate ignorance with having too little 
knowledge about a topic. Ignorance can be a great spur for 
unreasonable action. An excellent example of this is when 
senior managers adopt a new management technique such as 
TQM (total quality management). One study of the implemen-
tation of TQM found that managers were usually ignorant of 
Stupidity Paradox.indd   64 07/04/2016   20:00
NOT SO SMART 65
the technical details. As a result, they have unrealistic expec-
tations of its potential.40 Because they have little idea about 
the outcome, they are all the more keen to give the ideas a try. 
3is ignorance means most managements can charge head-
long into implementing new fads and fashions that they don’t 
understand.
Ignorance can be an important motivator. O"en it is people 
who are ignorant of the potential chances of success who are 
the keenest to act. One of the more curious reasons for this is 
the ‘Dunning–Kruger E>ect’. 3is is the tendency of people 
with very low levels of skill to systematically and unreasonably 
overestimate their abilities. 3is e>ect was identi.ed in 1999 by 
David Dunning and Justin Kruger, two psychologists working 
at Cornell University. 3ey were inspired by the unfortunate 
case of McArthur Wheeler, a man who robbed two banks dis-
guised only by lemon juice rubbed on his face. He believed this 
would make him invisible to security cameras. Dunning and 
Kruger wanted to know whether such delusions were unique 
to a few idiotic criminals or whether they were more common 
than we think. 3ey conducted a series of experiments where 
they asked people to rate their own skill at some basic tasks like 
humour, grammar and logic. 3ey also measured people’s per-
formances on each of these tasks. 3ey found that ‘participants 
scoring in the bottom quartile on tests of humor, grammar, 
and logic grossly overestimated their test performance and 
ability. Although test scores put them in the 12th percentile, 
they estimated themselves to be in the 62nd.’41 In other words, 
the least skilled were not just bad at the tasks, they were also 
bad at recognising their own incompetence and poor at asking 
for help.
We might expect ignorance from incompetent amateurs; 
we would hope for more from professionals. But the University 
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of Chicago sociologist Andrew Abbott thinks we might be 
too optimistic. In 2010 he examined research published in his 
own area of expertise: the sociology of the professions. He was 
struck by the amount of ignorance he found.42 3ere were many 
pieces of work by amateurs who blundered into the debates and 
made claims that were either patently wrong or excruciatingly 
obvious. Any area of knowledge or expertise will always have 
chumps who think they have discovered a great insight when 
in fact they are repeating a mundane point. 3e hearer learns 
to smile and switch o> when faced with such characters. What 
was more troubling for Abbott was a second kind of igno-
rance he detected among experts. He noticed that many people 
who should know better o"en overlooked vital or blindingly 
obvious points. It meant they were unable to see things that an 
outsider would readily perceive. It was o"en the experts’ own 
expertise that blinded them. Trapped within what they knew, 
they missed the obvious.
All too o"en it is useful to be able to profess ignorance about 
awkward facts. Knowing what to know – but also what not to 
know – is a crucial skill that people working in any organi-
sation pick up rather quickly. 3e sociologist Linsey McGoey 
has explored how this strategic ignorance works in a range 
of settings.43 For instance, in the wake of the .nancial crisis, 
many of the senior managers of large banks pleaded that they 
had been ignorant about what their employees were doing. In 
organisations, there are o"en subtle procedures of ignorance, 
where people avoid informing senior people about problems. 
3is is because senior managers do not want to face too many 
complicated issues. 3ey also want to be able to claim igno-
rance when ‘blame time’ arrives. 3is can of course be a pure 
blame-avoidance tactic, but normally it is good to actually 
be ignorant. You have a clean conscience and you don’t have 
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to think about issues that go on under the radar. If things go 
wrong, it is di=cult to prove that you really were told. 3ere is a 
tricky relation between being informed about things that must 
be managed and being ignorant about issues that may go away 
or never come to light. Junior people are o"en faced with a dif-
.cult choice: should they inform senior people and risk being 
seen as someone disturbing the peace by telling them things 
they prefer to be ignorant about, or do they want to leave their 
superiors in blissful ignorance and risk being blamed for not 
having informed them about a problem that may escalate?44
If we return to the managers at Technovation whom we 
met at the start of this chapter, we .nd an interesting case of 
ignorance at work. 3e managers of the so"ware development 
teams felt they had to support innovation and do ‘creativ-
ity management’. However, it was not really something they 
were required to do. 3eir main goals were improving details 
of products and minimising errors. Seduced by the images of 
companies like Google and Apple, they wanted to emulate 
these .rms by becoming more innovative and creative, but 
this turned out to be easier said than done. 3e various initia-
tives they tried did not always work very well, and rather than 
deal with these failures, managers largely ignored them. 3ey 
silently dropped initiatives, without looking into whether they 
worked or not. Not learning from experiences helped these 
managers to concentrate on doing something new. Ignorance 
was bliss. Managerial ignorance can allow you to continue your 
work without the pesky pressure of having to think and re?ect. 
Genuine learning sounds great, but it takes time and energy. 
It is tricky, complex and ambiguous work. It can also lead to 
hesitation, doubts and other costly downsides.
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Conclusion
Many contemporary organisations claim to be knowledge-
intensive .rms, but such claims can be thoroughly misleading. 
For sure, there are organisations that rely on intelligent, well-edu-
cated and creative people. Some organisations have units sta>ed 
by people who specialise in sophisticated problem-solving, and 
there are those who do this, but these activities tend to be rare. 
But most organisations are actually hothouses of non-knowl-
edge-intensive work. Of course a degree of competence is needed, 
and few jobs are entirely brainless, but supposedly knowledge-
intensive organisations are o"en crowded with people with 
limited emotional and practical intelligence. 3ese smart people 
may avoid careful analytical processes and instead rely on fast 
and frugal mental rules of thumb to get the job done. What’s 
more, many .rms actively encourage employees not to exert their 
intelligence overmuch. 3ey push smart people into dumb jobs, 
swamp sta> with information, enforce behavioural scripts that 
are followed mindlessly, encourage colleagues to avoid address-
ing tough questions, and incentivise experts and amateurs alike 
to be ignorant. As a result organisations can o"en help to encour-
age remarkably bright people to do stupid things. And people’s 
inclinations to use their brains in narrow, unre?ective ways lead 
to less wise decision-making and working practices.
We like to think that we as human beings are very intel-
ligent creatures, but there is also overwhelming evidence that 
we make fundamental cognitive mistakes. We are o"en much 
poorer information-processors than we believe. We engage in 
wishful thinking, jump to conclusions, overestimate positive 
outcomes. We are o"en guided by emotions, .xed ideas or 
assumptions. Work life is o"en more comfortable if it is carried 
out mindlessly. Ignorance o"en is bliss. All this enables us to 
avoid di=cult issues.
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Human psychology and the organisation of work can be a 
big impediment to our cognitive functioning. It can mean we 
don’t make full use of our intelligence, reach less than rational 
decisions, and even act in stupid ways. Normally we think that 
this is a bad thing, but it is only part of the picture. Being stupid 
has its upsides. In fact it is something that many organisations 
positively encourage. In the following chapters we ask how stu-
pidity can be functional.
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Varieties of stupidity
When we think about stupidity at work, the image that comes 
to mind is of a thoughtless chump who leaves a trail of disasters 
in their wake. 3is kind of corporate klutzing is a stock theme 
of slapstick comedy. In Charlie Chaplin’s classic portrayal of 
the factory, Modern Times, we follow a worker who is slowly 
driven mad by a production line that is relentlessly sped up. 
When Chaplin’s character .nally ?ips, he does all manner of 
stupid things, such as trying to tighten his co-workers’ noses 
instead of tightening bolts. Naturally this riles his co-workers 
as well as his boss. 3is crazy behaviour causes the production 
line to seize up. Work grinds to a halt. Chaplin’s portrait of stu-
pidity at work is .ctional, but there are many real-life stories of 
utterly stupid behaviour on company time. Ask anyone about 
stupidity in their workplace, and you will soon hear stories 
about the escapades of the departmental fool.
Tales of company klutzes stand out – their disasters are 
easily spotted but are, thankfully, infrequent. Most organisa-
tions have well developed systems and procedures for avoiding 
this. When disasters occur they are o"en the result of a com-
bination of unfortunate circumstances and poor judgement 
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rather than pure idiocy. 3e bulk of stupidity in the work-
place does not spring from utter thoughtlessness. It is hardly 
abnormal, and it does not cause sheer havoc. O"en stupidity is 
low-key, implicit, and has a mix of positive and negative out-
comes. Sometimes it can go undetected for years. O"en it is 
accepted and rewarded. Most stupidity in corporate life takes 
the form of functional stupidity. 3is involves narrow thinking 
rather than pure thoughtlessness, which is normal (in the sense 
of commonplace), and has functional consequences – at least in 
the short term.
!oughtlessness
Sheer thoughtlessness is an important marker of common stu-
pidity. 3oughtless individuals do not consider why they are 
doing something. 3ey remain oblivious to the consequences. 
When disaster strikes, thought does not ensue.
Sometimes thoughtlessness is actually encouraged by com-
panies. In an interview, the CEO of an auto-parts maker told 
the story of a water-cooler that made a huge mess in one of the 
company’s factories. A"er he met his employees in the plant, 
one operator approached him and asked him to take a look at 
an invention he had made that would eliminate the mess. 3e 
CEO pointed out that ‘for the .rst time, that fellow had begun 
to think about the e=cient operation of the business. I asked 
him why he didn’t think of this before. He said: “I didn’t know 
I was supposed to think.”’1 In this case, the employee had been 
actively encouraged, even directly instructed, not to think. ‘I 
asked him why he didn’t bring the idea up before,’ wrote the 
CEO. ‘He said he did, but he was told to shut up and do his job.’2
3is kind of total thoughtlessness is rare. More o"en than 
not, people are not completely thoughtless – they just are con-
strained in their thinking. Managers and subordinates follow 
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corporate cultures without paying much attention. Experts get 
obsessed with the detail and grow blind to the bigger picture. 
Followers willingly let their leaders do the thinking for them. 
Employees habitually avoid ‘negative thinking’ and look on the 
bright side. Professionals buy into systems that they suspect 
don’t work. Employees follow rules that they know create more 
problems than they solve. In each of these cases, people are 
thinking – but only in the most narrow and circumscribed 
ways. Outside the box lies thoughtlessness.
Normality
A typical feature of pure stupidity is that it is abnormal. Being 
stupid is o"en seen as doing something that is out of the ordi-
nary. It may be that someone with unusually low levels of 
intelligence has been hired. It may be that a sta> member has 
personality quirks, a psychological disorder or strange ideo-
logical obsessions. 3ere are many accounts of the dot-com 
crash and the .nancial bubble that show how extreme forms of 
stupidity were rampant. ‘Normal’ organisational processes and 
procedures were o"en abandoned. Extreme wishful thinking 
took over. Bizarre behaviour was rewarded. Failure eventually 
came, but it took some time. A"er the fact, people asked them-
selves: ‘How could we have been so stupid?’
But stupidity is not always abnormal. It can o"en be a 
normal part of life at work. Consider one employee’s account 
of his life in a recall department of the Ford motor company 
during the 1970s.3 A"er training as an engineer and spending 
a few years as a campus radical, Dennis Gioia got a job with 
Ford in 1972. He clearly impressed the recruiters, as his .le was 
marked with ‘crown prince’. Gioia’s job was to look at cars that 
had been recalled, scanning the .les for any patterns. He was 
constantly asking himself whether the problems he saw in one 
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returned car were also mirrored in other cars.
Part of investigating these cases involved going to what 
they called ‘the chamber of horrors’. 3is was a warehouse a 
few miles from their o=ce where burnt-out cars which had 
been involved in horri.c incidents were sent. In 1973 he visited 
the chamber of horrors with one .le containing a picture of a 
burned-out car. 3is is how he describes his visit: ‘You have to 
imagine what it’s like. Have you ever seen a burned-out – not 
a Pinto but anything? … It’s awful. It’s just awful. Especially if 
you use your imagination and remember that people were in 
it when it turned into that state. Everything’s melted. All the 
plastic, and there’s a lot of plastic. All of the wiring. Steering 
wheel is warped. I mean, it starts to rust in days. It’s repulsive to 
see that kind of thing.’ 3e sight of this burned-out car clearly 
shocked him. But this was stu> he saw every day, and he was 
trying to work out whether this was just a one-o> problem or 
whether there was something more systematic going on. At the 
time, he said, ‘I had bigger .sh to fry … Bigger, more imme-
diate problems to take care of.’ And not much changed: ‘3e 
whole time I managed the Pinto .le, I never got above .ve… In 
that context of everything else that’s going on, it’s that big.’ He 
parted his thumb and fore.nger.
When he returned to the o=ce, Gioia registered some 
concern with colleagues. 3ey didn’t take it too seriously. ‘I 
practically got laughed out of the o=ce,’ he said. Here is how he 
recalls the conversation that followed:
Well, come on, Den. We’re going to go in front of the execu-
tive panel with this evidence? What do you got? Two or 
three .eld reports? Why are we even discussing this?
Well, I just came back from the depot. You should see 
what I saw.
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Den. Come to your senses.
‘So I came to my senses … I realised, OK, .rst of all, I’d 
done what I trained myself not to do, make decisions on the 
basis of emotion. And, second, I realised, I had to prove it, and 
I couldn’t prove it.’ By ‘coming to his senses’ and deciding not 
to act to recall the car, he took a decision that probably con-
tributed to many more people dying before the Ford Pinto was 
.nally recalled in 1978.
3is is not a clear case of sheer thoughtlessness. Gioia tried 
to be observant and considered acting on his observations. He 
talked about this with other people. But then he gave in and 
neglected the issue. He adapted to the social norms: don’t raise 
problems and don’t tell people bad news they do not want to 
hear. 3is is standard in many companies.4 If there is a chance 
to avoid telling people bad news, people o"en take it. In this 
case, thinking too much was abnormal. You ‘came to your 
senses’ by putting the case aside and getting on with the job. 
3is kind of stupidity is a normal part of organisational life. It 
is o"en widely backed in organisations – starting with the top 
management and going all the way down the hierarchy.
Functionality
We usually assume that stupid people leave disasters in their 
wake. 3ose who are truly stupid don’t recognise the impact of 
their behaviour. 3e stupid person is usually seen as someone 
who bumbles into a situation they don’t understand, sets about 
doing all sorts of thoughtless things, creates a disaster and then 
simply walks away with a shrug of the shoulders. 3is kind of 
dysfunctional stupidity isn’t limited to slapstick comedies. 3e 
entire history of management is .lled with people who create 
problems and fail to learn from the last accident they created. 
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3ey think it is better to forget about it, hope others will not 
remember, and just move on. One is reminded of the cardinal 
rules that Robert Jackall uncovered among middle managers 
working for large US corporations – never stick around too 
long in one job, because something will inevitably go wrong, 
and it is better that someone else is blamed for it. ‘Always try to 
outrun your mistakes,’ one manager told Jackall.5
3ere are many cases where corporate stupidity can result in 
disastrous outcomes. 3ese are the obvious instances of stupid-
ity when something goes seriously wrong, and the consequences 
are there for all to see. But what is perhaps more surprising is 
the everyday forms of stupidity where people who act without 
thinking can create seemingly desirable consequences. A"er 
all, asking too many questions and spending too long re?ecting 
on a situation can make you unpopular. 3oughtfulness can 
be seen as time-consuming and a waste of valuable resources. 
3is is probably what happened when Dennis Gioia tried to 
talk with his colleagues about the problems with the Pinto. If 
you persist in asking tough questions, you are likely to cause 
problems for yourself. You will most likely upset the smooth 
workings of a group, threaten relationships with key people, 
and disturb existing power structures. All this could make 
being smart very costly indeed. Play dumb, and the status quo 
survives; team relationships continue unthreatened. All this 
allows you to focus on ‘delivering the goods’.
3ere are many other instances we will look at in the fol-
lowing chapters where selective stupidity can have some good 
outcomes for .rms and the people who work for them. 3e 
latest fashions produced by the leadership industries can seduce 
otherwise smart managers into believing in ideas that would 
not be out of place in a New Age commune. 3ese ideas can 
give managers a sense of purpose and drive. Placing one’s faith 
Stupidity Paradox.indd   75 07/04/2016   20:00
THE STUPIDITY PARADOX 76
in structures can lead people to overlook senseless outcomes, 
but it can help to calm anxieties and worries. Copying other 
organisations can mean .rms adopt processes and practices 
which are not right for them, but it also can give them a sheen 
of legitimacy. Focusing a .rm’s resources on brand-building 
and window-dressing can create unrealistic expectations, but 
it can also be a valuable self-esteem boost. Fostering a culture 
of relentless positivity can blind people to problems, but it can 
also help to hold people together. Sometimes, not using your 
full cognitive capacities can be a good idea.
A hint about how this process works can be found in a letter 
sent to !e Lancet, an in?uential medical journal, by a Swedish 
medical researcher.6 3e letter, entitled ‘Clever idiot’, described 
how the correspondent had spent his working day and his 
leisure time reviewing a scienti.c paper. Being a diligent fellow, 
he read the paper a few times and then spent a couple of hours 
looking into the data. Eventually he was satis.ed, and logged 
his review. Doing this kind of work was by no means out of the 
ordinary – he would write similar reviews about twice a month. 
Presumably most of his colleagues were doing much the same, 
so he did not give the purpose of his labours a second thought. 
3at is until a few days later when he read an article about how 
the company that owned the journal he was reviewing for had a 
turnover of over a billion dollars and a pro.t margin of about 30 
per cent. 3is got the researcher thinking – who bene.ted from 
all his hard work: reviewing papers as well as researching and 
writing for them? ‘First the institution pays me to do research,’ 
he wrote, ‘then I give away the copyright of the results to the 
publisher, then the library of the institution buys the right to 
print my paper back from the publisher. I cannot avoid wonder-
ing how the management of such publishing companies view 
myself and others who do research and who also accept review 
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commitments.’ Clearly doing all this reviewing and research 
(paid for by the Swedish state and funding agencies) seemed 
to be the right thing – it helped him to progress in his career, 
and more generally improve the quality of scienti.c knowl-
edge. Everyone else was doing it. But a little thought about the 
system revealed how idiotic it could be – it was a process that 
largely .lled up space in journals but – more importantly – in 
the pockets of shareholders. Not thinking too much about these 
things helps the researcher get along with his job. It keeps his 
employers happy. It makes the publisher very pro.table. 3e 
question that stays unanswered is whether it makes sense.
Functional stupidity
Spotting stupidity in corporate life can be both amusing and 
depressing. But before you start, we think it is vital to know 
what you are looking for. It is easy – if also quite rare – to .nd 
instances of pure stupidity in workplaces. 3ese are the people 
whose utter thoughtlessness singles them out from their peers 
and creates dysfunctional outcomes. Or who simply make slips 
that better judgement would have avoided. Sometimes clever 
people do idiotic things. Corporate executives using company 
jets to ?y themselves and their dogs to hunting resorts at the 
company’s expense are one good example. When it emerged 
that senior executives at the Swedish company SCA had done 
this, there was predictable criticism from the mass media, 
shareholders and the public.7 3is exempli.ed the worst of 
business greed and sel.shness. It also projected the image of a 
company that had low ethical standards. 3e errors are obvious 
and damaging.
We see this as an instance of pure stupidity. 3e fact that 
those who were involved were the elite of the Swedish business 
world, had .ne educations and probably high IQs, did not help. 
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What are a lot more common, but possibly harder to spot, are 
instances of functional stupidity. 3is goes on when it is normal 
for people to be excessively narrow and focused in their think-
ing and when it leads to largely positive outcomes.
3ere are three telltale aspects of functional stupidity: not 
thinking about your assumptions (what we call re?exivity), 
not asking why you are doing something (justi.cation), and 
not considering the consequences or wider meaning of your 
actions (substantive reasoning). Let’s look at each of these in a 
little more depth.
3e .rst aspect of stupidity is an absence of re"exivity. 3is 
happens when we stop asking questions about our assump-
tions. Put simply, it involves taking for granted what other 
people commonly think. We o"en fail to question dominant 
beliefs and expectations. We see rules, routines and norms as 
completely natural: they are just how things are. Members of 
the organisation don’t question these deep-rooted assump-
tions – even if they think they are idiotic. An example can be 
found in Robert Jackall’s study of life in large North Ameri-
can corporations.8 A"er interviewing many middle managers, 
Jackall found that they o"en lived in a morally ambiguous 
universe. 3ey did not re?ect on assumptions that prevailed in 
their .rms, even when they found them morally repugnant. It 
seemed that one of the hallmarks of an upwardly mobile execu-
tive was that they could stop thinking too deeply about issues 
and follow a few simple rules:
(1) You never go around your boss. (2) You tell your boss 
what he wants to hear, even when your boss claims that he 
wants dissenting views. (3) If your boss wants something 
dropped, you drop it. (4) You are sensitive to your boss’s 
wishes so that you anticipate what he wants; you don’t force 
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him, in other words, to act as boss. (5) Your job is not to 
report something that your boss does not want reported, 
but rather to cover it up. You do what your job requires, and 
you keep your mouth shut.9
Asking questions was clearly a dangerous occupation. One 
manager Jackall spoke with summed up the situation: ‘What is 
right in the corporation is not what is right in a man’s home or 
in his church. What is right in the corporation is what the guy 
above you wants from you.’10
A second aspect of stupidity is not seeking cause or a good 
reason. People stop asking ‘why’ at work. 3ey do not ask for, 
or o>er, reasons for their decisions and actions. A rule is a rule 
and it must be followed, even if no one is clear why it exists. 
Questions about why something should be done are either 
completely ignored, or dismissed with reference to rank (‘3e 
CEO wants it’), convention (‘We’ve always done it this way’) 
or taboos (‘We could never do that’). 3is happened at every 
turn in the companies Robert Jackall studied. He noticed there 
was ‘an amazing variety of organizational improvement pro-
grams’ which were linked with ‘the myriad of ideas generated 
by corporate sta>, business consultants, academics and a host 
of others to improve corporate structures, sharpen decision 
making, raise morale, create a more humanistic workplace 
… and so on’. 3ese initiatives were not important for their 
intellectual content. Nor did they matter because they led 
to real improvements in productivity (usually they did not). 
Rather, ‘these programs become important when they are 
pushed from the top’. Privately, managers o"en thought the 
programmes were nonsense. One described them as ‘elaborate 
rituals with no practical e>ect’, another as ‘waving a magic 
wand to make things wonderful again’. But publicly, managers 
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asked no questions. 3ey didn’t want to know why these ini-
tiatives happened. Instead, ‘managers on the way up adopt the 
program with great enthusiasm, participate in or run them 
with great enthusiasm, and then quietly drop them when the 
time is right’.
3e third aspect of stupidity is a lack of substantive reason-
ing. People stop asking about the wider consequences of their 
actions and their broader meaning. Instead, they focus on very 
narrow issues of how something is to be done. Technical ques-
tions about the most e=cient way to do something completely 
trump more basic questions, such as whether it should be done 
in the .rst place and what e>ects its practice might have. 3e 
way managers that Jackall studied did this was by focusing 
on what they called ‘playing the game’. Successful managers 
who rose through the ranks were those who could duck big 
questions. Asking those questions came with the risk of career 
suicide. If you wanted to survive in the corporation, you needed 
to ‘play the game’. Doing this involved ‘saying one thing and 
meaning another’.
[Y]ou have to come up with a culturally accepted verbalisa-
tion to explain why you are not doing what you are doing 
… you say that we had to do what we did because it was 
inevitable, or because guys at the regulatory agency were 
dumb, you say you won when you really lost, you say we 
saved money when we squandered it, you say something’s 
safe when it’s potentially dangerous … everyone knows 
that it’s bullshit, but it’s accepted. 3is is the game.
If we brie?y return to Pepsi, we see functional stupidity in 
action. People assumed that competition and masculinity were 
superior values. 3ey never raised questions about elaborate 
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corporate rituals or rigid adherence to hierarchy and career-
ism. Rather they saw these as set rules of the game. 3ey never 
seemed to seriously consider the overall purpose of their work. 
Functional stupidity ruled.
To spot stupidity we need to step back and ask whether 
people are fully using their cognitive capacities. Do they have 
at least some awareness of the assumptions they are making 
(re?exivity), are they willing to ask for and give reasons for a 
course of action (justi.cation), and do they show an aware-
ness of the consequences or broader meaning of their actions 
(substantive reasoning)? If people are re?exive, ask for and 
give justi.cations, and engage in substantive reasoning, then 
stupidity is likely to be absent. If they routinely avoid asking 
questions about assumptions, don’t seek justi.cations and give 
no thought to the consequences and meaning of their action, 
then stupidity threatens.
Forms of functional stupidity
Functional stupidity can come in di>erent forms. Perhaps the 
most obvious is closing down cognition. People get locked into 
a mindset. 3eir objectives are set. 3ey mistake modes of 
thought and intellectual frameworks for reality, stop looking 
past the boundaries of the models, and do not challenge them. 
3eir patterns of thinking freeze and are hard to shed.
3is happened to the quants that we met in the introduc-
tion. Trapped in the models of the market they had devised, 
they started to confuse their models with the real world they 
described. 3is was .ne when the .nancial markets were acting 
in step with the assumptions they built into their models, but 
it meant that they were blind to disparities. When .nancial 
markets outgrew their models, they ba@ed and overwhelmed 
the quants. Reality did not compute.
Stupidity Paradox.indd   81 07/04/2016   20:00
THE STUPIDITY PARADOX 82
A second form of functional stupidity is motivational 
defects, in the shape of a lack of willingness to use one’s cogni-
tive capacities. O"en this involves a lack of curiosity. Personality 
traits can play a role here. For instance, people who have low 
levels of ‘openness to experience’ (one of the .ve major person-
ality traits according to most psychologists) are likely to .nd 
it di=cult and disturbing to think about issues that are new to 
them. As well as traits, identities can also constrain people’s 
motivation to think beyond a limited range. 3eir self-image as 
an ‘organisation man’ or a ‘good professional’ can sti?e broader 
thinking, deter them from questioning issues or assumptions 
that might threaten their valued sense of who they are. Identity 
motivates us to consider certain things, but it can also demoti-
vate us from making full use of our intellectual powers. We are 
more drawn to con.rm our sense of self and our group a=lia-
tions than to re?ect upon them.
At Pepsi-Cola we saw that the executives were attached to 
seeing themselves as part of the business Marine Corps. 3is 
prompted them not to perceive the more negative aspects of 
their culture. As tough and competitive individuals, they were 
not supposed to think about broader issues such as work–life 
balance, or whether indeed the task they were so committed 
to was actually a worthwhile one. 3eir shared identity blind-
folded them. It stopped them from asking whether there were 
ways of acting beyond masculine competition.
A lack of emotional reasoning is a third aspect of functional 
stupidity. At the extreme, this means being unable to com-
prehend a range of emotions. More o"en, though, it involves 
a .xation on one particular emotion. If you are the proud 
developer of a product, then you may resist exploring its pos-
sible defects. Anxiety at work and personal insecurity may also 
reinforce non-thinking. Worries about the negative emotions 
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created by thinking outside the box can induce stupidity. Of 
course, in many situations people will think, but they won’t 
share their thoughts with others. You may consider something 
to be a problem, but you refrain from raising the issue or fol-
lowing the thought in your own actions. In many cases we 
tend to repress thoughts that lead to dilemmas. We o"en .nd 
it better to stop thinking rather than su>er a painful dilemma 
and the intense emotions that they bring.
One IT consulting .rm that one of us studied set store by 
being upbeat, positive and optimistic. Don’t mention nega-
tive things; try not to point at problems; frame topics to sound 
good. If they lost a client, then they would rationalise the 
event, even say things like ‘Glad to get rid of them.’ Within 
this can-do culture, its members drew a veil over anything that 
might disturb the general positive and upbeat mood. Most of 
the time this was OK, but it meant that anything that counted 
as bad news was ritually avoided. 3is had the e>ect of creating 
a false sense of positivity and unawareness of bad news. We will 
come back to this case in a later chapter.11
3e .nal kind of functional stupidity is moral at base. 3is 
happens when attachment to a given ethos limits thinking. 
3ose who are deeply committed to a moral scheme may resist 
or reject ideas that cut against it. If an organisation places a 
great value on loyalty, then people can avoid thinking for them-
selves. When loyalty is dominant, being a team player can be 
seen as a moral duty. 3e fear of deviation can fuel a moral 
compulsion not to think beyond the most narrow intellectual 
schemes.
An alternative media organisation that one of us studied 
was trapped by a strong moral scheme that centred on the value 
of ‘autonomy’.12 It celebrated non-hierarchical, ?uid and ‘hori-
zontal’ arrangement. Any attempt to instil arrangements that 
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were seen as creating formal authority and bureaucracy was 
fervently resisted. 3is helped to hold the organisation together. 
It provided a sense of identity. But it meant that attempts to 
introduce formal systems that created some minimal hierar-
chies were completely ignored. People found it di=cult to talk 
about the implicit hierarchical relationships that were lurking 
beneath the surface of the organisation. Ultimately, this taboo 
on hierarchy meant that members were unable to think about 
more formal and practically sensible mechanisms of organis-
ing. Eventually the organisation withered away.
3ese four aspects – cognitions, motivations, emotions and 
morals – are important for the understanding of functional 
stupidity. Many kinds of stupidity are less about cognitive 
shortcomings. Sometimes we can lack the motives to engage 
in thinking. At other times, our feelings take control. And our 
morals can trap us in exceedingly narrow patterns of thought. 
Much of the time, all four of these aspects of functional stu-
pidity work together. For instance, when we lack the cognitive 
capacity, have little motivation, are not emotionally engaged, 
and face moral issues, we are likely to stop asking questions, 
even if we have the feeling something is amiss. But more fre-
quently matters are a bit more complicated. For instance, we 
might have the cognitive capacities at our disposal, but we lack 
the motivation, the emotional drive and the moral inclination 
to put the serious question.
How does functional stupidity work?
Contemporary organisations are o"en engines of functional 
stupidity. It thrives in contexts where persuasion trumps 
substance. When playing with symbols is paramount, a gap 
can yawn between rhetoric and reality. In order to bridge it, 
organisations o"en foster functional stupidity. Adherence 
Stupidity Paradox.indd   84 07/04/2016   20:00
FUNCTIONAL STUPIDITY 85
to managerial demands is rewarded, and criticism or re?ec-
tion discouraged. Deterrents on thinking things through are 
embraced by employees themselves. 3ey steer clear of awkward 
questions and focus instead on narrow ways of thinking. 3is 
can help to push doubts aside. Ambiguities are repressed and 
the resultant false sense of certainty can boost morale as people 
avoid con?ict and focus on getting the job done. But it can also 
create some signi.cant problems. People overlook small prob-
lems that can fester and propagate. Eventually these problems 
can spark crises, which may in turn fuel spells of self-re?ection. 
3is can have the e>ect of corroding stupidity, and opening 
people up to deeper thought and re?ection.
Economies of persuasion
Developed economies have undergone an explosion of 
economies of persuasion. As the production of goods – and 
increasingly services – has moved o>shore, developed coun-
tries have confronted the pressing question: how to keep their 
population busy. 3e answer has been to develop economies 
that manufacture images.13 Large chunks of economies in many 
developed countries are now devoted to making things look 
good. According to one estimate, 30 per cent of the US economy 
now consists of persuasion activities.14 Obvious examples 
include advertising, public relations and the media, but there 
are many other sectors that trade heavily in images. Creating 
a good appearance is crucial in the world of professional ser-
vices.15 People working in routine service work also have to put 
signi.cant e>ort into presenting themselves in the right way.16 
Even in the public sector, organisations spend their precious 
resources nurturing the right brand. Non-pro.t organisations 
have also grown more and more consumed with image-polish-
ing exercises. Saying the right things, speaking in the right way 
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and dressing correctly are seen as crucial parts of many jobs 
and in particular, in senior, well paid, high status roles.
In an economy of persuasion, there is usually a huge over-
supply of goods and services. People don’t naturally want or 
need all the things that are churned out every day.17 In the US, 
40 per cent of the food is not even consumed.18 On a global scale, 
between 30 and 50 per cent of food produced is just thrown 
away.19 A recent survey in the UK found that the average piece 
of women’s clothing is worn only seven times before being 
thrown away.20 Two billion smartphones are sold every year.21 
To get rid of this growing stockpile of goods, people need to be 
convinced that they want all these things. Organisations must 
devote a large chunk of their resources to creating demand for 
the products and services they create. 3ey do this by in?ating 
expectations, creating seductive images and in?uencing con-
sumers’ desires. At .rst it was just the job of customer-facing 
employees like sales and marketing personnel to practise this 
image production, but slowly the logic of looking good has 
captured entire organisations. Work that is far removed from 
customers starts to be seen as part of a company’s image-build-
ing activities. Back-o=ce administrators are encouraged to 
become ‘brand ambassadors’. Shop-?oor workers are prodded 
to ‘delight the customer’ while screwing in bolts on the produc-
tion line. Even maintenance and cleaning sta> are required to 
be ‘on message’ with the company’s brand.
When looking good becomes job number one, the focus 
shi"s from substance to image. Sometimes image-creation can 
be targeted externally: branding, marketing and public rela-
tions become more signi.cant than the core service or product 
the organisation creates. But o"en it is focused internally. 
Employees keep learning how great their employer is through 
employee branding initiatives, corporate culture programmes 
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and CSR (corporate social responsibility) projects.22 People in 
organisations rely on increasingly hollow status markers such 
as grand titles and impressive-sounding initiatives that are 
completely disconnected from their actual job.
Today, many schools have fallen victim to image obsession. 
In the past, teachers had relatively high levels of autonomy. 
3ey concentrated their energies on educating students. But 
as a result of constant educational reforms, schools are now 
more and more focused on various auditing exercises. In the 
UK, the event that most head teachers worry about is the peri-
odic auditing exercise by the government schools inspector. 
When parents of prospective students visit a school, they are 
treated to lengthy PowerPoint shows with all sorts of tables 
detailing its performance in these auditing exercises. Schools 
spend time and resources working on the quality of leadership, 
how the school is branded, and its vision and strategy. Many 
window-dressing activities are set up to give an impression of 
‘excellence’. In Sweden, one of the overarching obsessions in 
many schools is getting their ‘grounding values’ right. 3ese 
values always look impressive – but they are also very vague. 
Once they have got the values right, school leaders assume that 
success will follow. What the school looks like seems to count 
for more than the actual education. 3e people who run schools 
end up allotting less time and resources to teaching and learn-
ing, and more to image-polishing exercises. Schools become 
machines for persuading others that children are getting a good 
education, rather than institutions for educating children.
Stupidity management
In organisations where manipulating images is the most 
important concern, managers focus their e>orts on shaping 
the mindsets of their employees.23 3is is nothing new. During 
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Henry Ford’s reign, the Ford motor company put great e>ort 
into creating model employees. Ford wanted to give his employ-
ees a moral education. Sociologists were employed to study 
worker’s lifestyles and redesign the communities they lived in. 
By minutely cra"ing the life of his employees, Ford hoped to 
encourage them to lead healthier and more moral lives, ulti-
mately making them more productive.24
In today’s image-obsessed organisations, executives also set 
out to manage their employees’ lives, shaping the way employ-
ees think about themselves, how they feel, and what their moral 
judgements are. In her account of the life of investment bankers 
working on Wall Street, Alexandra Michel shows how the values 
of hard work and competitiveness were hammered into all 
employees.25 In the .rst few years in the job, recruits were highly 
committed. 3ey spent sixteen hours or more at the o=ce. 3eir 
whole life became work. One young recruit described it as being 
‘like an arti.cial world. Instead of going home, a"er 5 pm people 
here just switch into leisure clothes, turn on the music, and the 
.rm orders dinner for you. Ironically, you end up working a lot 
more because it is so convenient.’ He thought it was ‘like a psych 
experiment where the light is always on’. In this world, employ-
ees’ sense of self was completely fused with the company. 3is 
got too much for many to bear a"er three or four years. Adapting 
to these conditions meant almost total surrender to a corporate 
regime with little heed paid to whether it made sense, even when 
employees were su>ering from serious health or psychological 
issues triggered by the gruelling hours. 3ey saw their sixteen-
hour days as just how things were.
A central, but o"en unacknowledged, aspect of making a 
corporate culture work is what we call stupidity management. 
Here managers actively encourage their employees not to think 
too much. If they do happen to think, it is best not to voice 
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what emerges. Employees are encouraged to stick within clear-
cut parameters. Managers use subtle and not so subtle means 
to prod them not to ask too many tough questions, not to 
re?ect too deeply on their assumptions, and not to consider the 
broader purpose of their work. Employees are nudged to just 
get on with the task. 3ey are to look on the bright side, stay 
upbeat and push doubts and negative thoughts aside.
Sometimes stupidity management can be forceful and 
direct. In extreme cases employees are asked deliberately to 
cultivate their stupidity. For instance, the director of an adver-
tising agency advised his copywriters never to visit the factories 
that produced the goods they were promoting: knowing that 
the truth about the manufacturing process and the products 
would make it di=cult to write the kind of copy (by his own 
admission, o"en super.cial nonsense) that needed to .gure in 
adverts.26 In an even more extreme example, the director of 
another advertising .rm asked his employees to ‘walk in stupid 
every morning’.27
Functional stupidity can also be encouraged in more subtle 
ways. For instance, managers can steer employees away from 
troublesome issues. We saw this happening at Ford when 
Dennis Gioia’s colleagues encouraged him not to look too 
deeply into the causes of .res in a few Ford Pintos. Manag-
ers in large corporations who raise ethical issues are seen as 
having ‘strange ideas’ and hence not altogether to be trusted. 
3eir views may be respected, but there is a stigma of lack of 
reliability. As a result, they are o"en given marginal roles and 
not awarded important tasks.28 Similarly, junior sta> in a man-
agement consultancy .rm who talked negatively about extreme 
work pressure resulting from understa=ng were seen as ‘show-
stoppers’ who spoiled the whole working process.29
Stupidity management can also work through powerful 
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people setting the agenda so that awkward issues do not even 
feature in the .rst place. 3ese are pre-emptive strikes within 
the .eld of stupidity management. For instance, corporate 
culture can encourage employees to have the ‘right’ outlook 
and attitude. Leaders can try to show others that it is wise to 
avoid being disloyal or deviant.
Ideology is also a weapon in the stupidity manager’s arsenal. 
O"en it is propagated purposefully. For instance, some organi-
sations explicitly celebrate the value of being action-oriented.30 
In-depth analysis is frowned upon, quick and spontaneous 
action is celebrated, employees will be asked to follow the cor-
porate cliché: ‘Stop thinking about it and start doing it.’ In one 
organisation enacting change programmes, careful considera-
tion of their outcomes was discouraged. Employees were to 
focus their energy on showing that things were being done. 
3is meant that changes were ‘pushed through by managers 
trying to make a reputation and a career, who do not stay on to 
see them through’.31 Of course, there are times when compa-
nies need to act quickly and decisively to deal with a clear and 
present danger. However, genuine emergencies are rare. Being 
action-oriented is usually driven less by a pressing situation 
and more by the ideological preferences of people in charge. 
And sometimes people respond to signals and act fast because 
it is easier than thinking issues through.
Self-stupidi"cation
Smart people quickly learn when it pays not to think more 
broadly. When this happens, they start to engage in stupidity 
self-management. Doubts are cast aside. Critique is culled by 
the internal censor. Complexity, contradictions and ambiguity 
are denied, negative aspects of corporate life airbrushed out. 
A sense of faith and optimism is generated. People carefully 
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nurture a sense that things are normal and acceptable. 3ey 
avoid asking serious questions. Eventually individuals start to 
instinctively sidestep situations where doubts might be kindled, 
criticisms o>ered or justi.cations called for.
Self-stupidifying starts to happen when we censor our own 
internal conversation. As we go through our working day, we 
constantly try to give some sense to our o"en chaotic expe-
riences. We do this by engaging in what some scholars call 
‘internal re?exivity’.32 3is is the constant stream of discussion 
that we have with ourselves. When self-stupidi.cation takes 
over, we stop asking ourselves questions. Negative or contra-
dictory lines of thinking are avoided. As a result, we start to 
feel aligned with the thoughtlessness we .nd around us. It is 
hard to be someone who thinks in an organisation that shuns it.
To avoid negative and disturbing thoughts, people o"en 
focus on the positive and ‘safer’ aspects of organisational life. 
3ey assume that the way things are done around them is 
natural. In some cases, they claim it is hard to imagine alter-
natives. 3e standard lines found in PowerPoint presentations, 
corporate strategy statements and CEO speeches become like 
intellectual comfort blankets. 3ey help employees ensure that 
their own internal re?exivity does not radically clash with the 
party line. Being on board with what everyone else thinks gives 
them a sense of security. 3ey can rest easy because they will 
not be the odd one out facing disapproval from authorities and 
peers. Instead, they are able to maintain a sense of being a good 
company woman or man.
Self-stupidi.cation might seem like the easy path, but it 
o"en clashes with the realities of work. Work can be boring, 
harsh, unethical and unproductive. 3is hardly suits the posi-
tive working demeanour most companies favour. 3e clash 
between upbeat image and downbeat reality all too o"en 
Stupidity Paradox.indd   91 07/04/2016   20:00
THE STUPIDITY PARADOX 92
creates a sharp sense of dissonance. It can fuel doubt, aliena-
tion, cynicism and activism among employees. In some cases, it 
can reduce people’s motivation, damage their career ambitions 
or even drive them out of the .rm. However, dissonance does 
not always light a revolutionary fuse. All too o"en, employ-
ees respond by growing more and more compliant. Stupidity 
self-management comes to the fore. In order to self-stupidify, 
employees try hard to ensure that the stories they tell them-
selves about work align with the positive tales that circulate 
through o=cial channels. 3ey edit their own experiences so 
that they match the optimistic vision promoted by others. By 
mentally erasing negative experiences, employees are able to 
maintain an a=rmative worldview. 3is enables them to hold 
on to the hollow ideas peddled by management.
Certainty and dissonance
Functional stupidity is a mixed blessing for organisations and 
the people working in them. It can have positive results, but 
also less desirable ones. Sometimes the positive aspects dom-
inate, sometimes the negative. O"en it is hard to assess how 
much functionality rules, and how much stupidity. Both factors 
will change over time.
On the upside, functional stupidity can provide a sense of 
certainty and faith. Don’t ask too many tricky questions, and 
disruptions can be minimised. Employees can shed the burden 
of doubt and sidestep the risk of overthinking things. Freed 
from the weight of enervating thoughts, employees can plough 
their energies into tackling the corporate greasy pole. Day-to-
day o=ce life and building one’s own career become much less 
tricky. Functional stupidity also gives people a sense of cer-
tainty about who they are, what they want and the steps they 
need to take in order to get on. If you are able to block out 
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experiences that trigger critical thinking, then you can avoid 
the vulnerability that comes with asking big questions.
Functional stupidity also provides a sense of community, 
certainty and order for organisations. Di=cult questions 
are discouraged, as are requests for substantive reasons and 
broader justi.cations for actions. 3is can be helpful: asking 
questions can be costly. It swallows up time and resources and 
may squander social capital. Organisations that are frequently 
called on to justify their actions have to put sizeable resources 
into creating and articulating reasons for their decisions. 3is 
o"en means that people spend more time building a case for 
doing something than actually doing it. When the actions of 
a .rm are hard to justify, it can breed doubt. 3is can under-
mine its perceived legitimacy and dissolve commitment among 
employees.33
By cultivating functional stupidity, organisations are able to 
avoid the costs of critical thinking. Sidestepping troublesome 
questions enables them to give their sta> a sense of order, trust 
and predictability. For instance, by encouraging civil servants 
not to think too much about the possible problematic conse-
quences of a proposed policy, a government department can get 
them focused on simply delivering the reforms.34
While functional stupidity is a key resource for an organisa-
tion, it can also do conspicuous harm. It can lead to meaningless 
and non-productive work being undertaken: writing plans, 
ticking boxes, endless meetings take over. O"en there is a stark 
clash between the o=cial version of events and the lived reali-
ties. For individuals, functional stupidity turns from a bene.t 
into a bane when it reduces autonomy, narrows the range of 
choices or becomes a source of dissatisfaction. It may also 
throw doubt on the meaning and purposes of the individual’s 
working life.
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Reducing critical re?ection may be reasonable sometimes, 
but at other times, glaring contradictions can be hard to ignore. 
When this happens, people are forced to face up to the question 
of whether they are willing to acknowledge these contradic-
tions or whether they just want to continue to turn a blind 
eye.35 Facing up to these tensions and trying to do something 
about them might be a sign of bravery, but as with any act of 
bravery, it comes at a cost. By pointing out blatant contradic-
tions, individuals lay themselves open to penalties. 3ey may 
be passed over for promotion, get less attractive assignments or 
.nd themselves the target of hostile comments. In some cases 
they may even be .red. 3is is a lesson many whistleblowers 
learn the hard way – speaking up about a problem has its risks. 
Even if they avoid obvious punishments, they are o"en ostra-
cised.36 People may admire whistleblowers at a distance, but 
within their own organisation or occupation, they can be seen 
as di=cult, rigid and disloyal.
When functional stupidity takes root, it can create problems 
for the whole organisation. When thinking is cut short, small 
mistakes can be overlooked. Questionable ideas, practices and 
priorities can ?ourish. When this happens, it can instigate 
much bigger problems. For instance, one of the most palpa-
ble drivers of accidents is an organisational or occupational 
culture that encourages people to avoid asking di=cult ques-
tions.37 One of the drivers of the 2008 .nancial crisis was an 
unwillingness to raise doubts about risky investment strategies. 
3is led many bankers to ignore increasingly large discrepan-
cies between their models and the reality of the market. 3e 
consequence of this generalised stupidity was the collapse of 
many .nancial institutions and a broader systemic crisis.
To repeat: functional stupidity is a double-edged sword. 
For instance, the norm of being positive can lead to functional 
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outcomes such as a good organisational climate. But it can also 
have negative outcomes such as suppressing the awareness of 
problems, reproducing received ideas and choking learning. 
Sometimes the positive aspects are more pronounced in the 
short run, while the risks are greater in the long term.
Self-reinforcing stupidity and re#exivity
Functional stupidity can become self-reinforcing. 3is happens 
when employees stop asking searching questions and are 
rewarded with a sense of (false) certainty. It happens when 
they are good team players, reliable followers and well adapted 
organisational members who do not threaten their manag-
ers or colleagues. It can create an optimistic narrative. People 
tell good-news stories. Sometimes there are rewards such as 
promotions, pay rises and pats on the back from people who 
matter. All this is taken as evidence that things are going well, 
and you should continue to follow the same course. 3is does 
not imply conservatism. More o"en than not, it means constant 
change and incessant trend-hopping.
3ere are times in organisations when the general positive 
vibe is threatened. 3is happens when hard-earned certainties 
are endangered. Naturally this preys on the mind of someone 
in thrall to functional stupidity. To protect themselves, they 
gradually learn to avoid thinking about disturbing things. 
3is can be comforting, but it can also reinforce their faith 
in o=cially sponsored stories. By retreating into cosy beliefs, 
organisational members rea=rm the continued smooth func-
tioning of the organisation as well as their own career paths 
within it. 3is creates a self-reinforcing loop: more functional 
stupidity begets more (illusory) certainty which in turn creates 
more functional stupidity. Intellectual laziness follows.
Functional stupidity isn’t just a vicious circle with no escape. 
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3ere are some cases when widespread functional stupidity can 
create dysfunctional outcomes. O"en these problems can be 
overlooked. However, there are times when they are so great 
that they become impossible to ignore. 3is prompts re"exivity. 
People start to ask deeper questions, search for justi.cations 
and engage in substantive reasoning. Sometimes this leads to 
the response: ‘How could I have been so stupid?’ But less drastic 
experiences are also common. For instance, professionals 
facing unemployment are o"en forced to ask di=cult questions 
about their own futures.38 Although such self-examination is 
painful, it can undermine functional stupidity. 3ere are some 
cases where organisations actually encourage individual re?ex-
ivity. For example, in an attempt to recruit Pepsi’s John Sculley, 
Steve Jobs at Apple asked him: ‘Do you want to continue to sell 
sweetened water for the rest of your life?’39 3is shook Sculley’s 
attachment to Pepsi. He started to ask himself what meaningful 
and important work actually is. Similarly, direct-selling compa-
nies recruit and motivate members by pushing them to re?ect 
on the dissatisfying ‘rut’ that they experience in their everyday 
working life.40 By doing this, they shake up people’s existing 
commitments and spark a process of internal re?ection.
Bad news can have profound implications for the whole 
organisation. Corporate disasters or .nancial improprieties 
sometimes prompt in-depth inquiries, and these in their turn 
can give rise to collective self-re?ection, substantive question-
ing and the search for broader justi.cations. For instance, 
during an inquiry into changes in an Australian public broad-
caster, senior people started asking questions about why the 
organisation existed, what its purpose was and how it should 
view itself.41 However, inquiries can also become forums where 
groups avoid deeper and more searching questions, sidestep 
fundamentally systematic changes, and ensure a speedy return 
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to ‘business as usual’. For instance, government inquiries into 
the failures of the UK banking sector during the 2008 global 
.nancial crisis frequently revealed that leaders of .nancial 
institutions sought to avoid responsibility and self-re?ection.42 
Public inquiries are by no means the only forums that can allow 
deeper collective self-re?exivity, the search for justi.cation and 
substantive reasoning. 3ere are many other spaces that can 
host stupidity-disturbing dialogue. 3ese include social move-
ments, insurgencies within organisations, the media exposing 
contentious issues to the wider public, and even leaders who are 
willing to encourage re?ection on fundamental assumptions 
within an organisation.
Conclusion
We are frequently told that .rms allow smart people to 
manufacture knowledge by using their superior intelligence. 
However, much of corporate life seems to be about manufac-
turing stupidity. If we take a look around nearly any workplace, 
we .nd that stupidity abounds. Although we are likely to focus 
on the most obvious instances of pure stupidity, many more 
such instances lurk in the shadows. 3ese are cases of stupidity 
which entail excessively narrow thinking that is seen as normal 
and has functional outcomes.
Functional stupidity is so widespread in most organisations 
that it is simply seen as normal. 3ere is much wishful thinking, 
following leaders without careful scrutiny, unreasoning zeal for 
fads and fashions, senseless imitation of others, change initia-
tives that lead nowhere, and use of clichés in place of careful 
analysis. When much of this is seen as ‘best practice’, spotting 
stupidity can be tough. But if you sharpen your senses and 
know what to look out for, it can happen. Important markers 
of functional stupidity include people being encouraged not to 
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think about the assumptions they are making, not giving or 
asking for justi.cations of their actions, and not thinking of the 
wider implications or meaning of what they do.
Given the prevalence of functional stupidity, it is vital to 
understand how it works. We have argued that it is common 
in contexts where image trumps substance. In a small factory 
or on a farm, there is clear feedback about what works and 
what does not. An ad agency, a support department in a cor-
poration or a government agency is likely to lack such direct 
feedback mechanisms. 3is is also the case in most work in 
large companies that are rife with complexities. Large parts of 
contemporary economies are short on clear links between work 
and ‘substantive’ outcomes. In these kinds of settings, people 
focus their energies on trying to make things look good rather 
than actually working on core tasks. O"en this can open a huge 
gap between the rhetoric and the reality. 3e message might be 
great, but what actually happens underneath it all can be much 
less appealing. To convince people, managers spend valuable 
time and energy on stupidity management. 3ey persuade 
otherwise intelligent people not to use their cognitive capaci-
ties outside prescribed frameworks. 3ey refrain from taking 
moral responsibility to think through issues. To begin with 
this is a challenge, but fairly soon smart people start to self-
stupidify. 3ey stop asking the di=cult questions and avoid 
deeper thinking. 3ey realise that re?ection is career-limiting 
and can lead to sleepless nights. 3e initial results can be posi-
tive: people avoid con?ict and are able to get on with the job. 
But in the longer term, it can create the conditions for much 
more disturbing problems, and even disasters.
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Part Two
Five Kinds of Functional 
Stupidity
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4Leadership-Induced Stupidity
!e curious case of Benjamin Booker
Benjamin Booker was recently appointed as the CEO of a 
publishing company. In the past he had directed a newspaper. 
During his time there, he developed a reputation as an excellent 
leader. His subordinates said he was trustworthy and honest. 
He put e>ort into nurturing good relationships with the people 
he worked with. 3ey thought he was great at understanding 
people. Unsurprisingly, he was well liked.
When asked about his own leadership style, Booker told us 
that ‘you have to be authentic because people will see through 
you otherwise. If you’re not authentic people see you as just 
playing, pretending, and then the leadership becomes wrong’. 
Booker thought that caring for his followers was a vital part 
of being an authentic leader. For him, it was important to do 
things like celebrate employees’ birthdays. His o"en-repeated 
mantra was ‘Faking yourself won’t work’. ‘You can create a 
positive corporate culture, but you have to be genuine,’ he said. 
‘3at’s absolutely the most important thing, that you’re honest’. 
He also celebrated his integrity and reliability. People can trust 
me, he claimed.
When Booker moved to his new role at the publisher, he 
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took his ideas about leadership with him. However these did 
not always go down so well in his new workplace. Someone 
who worked closely with him said: ‘I think that Booker exag-
gerates. All this recognition of others, it’s just a routine… 
there’s no thought behind it, it’s just shallow.’ His attempts to 
be an authentic leader were o"en seen as false. Rather than 
seeing Booker as someone who was committed to strong prin-
ciples, some colleagues felt he was a yes man: ‘He can’t do 
what he likes, the owners are keeping him on a tight leash. His 
wings are clipped,’ a member of the management committee 
told us.
Booker saw himself as an authentic leader who focused on 
genuine relationships and staying true to his personal values. 
3is seemed to work at the newspaper, but at the publisher 
it back.red. Many of his new subordinates thought he was a 
phoney. Despite these failures, he remained largely ignorant 
about how people saw him and resolutely committed to his 
approach to leadership.
Like so many other leaders, Booker celebrated a leadership 
style that might have worked in the past, but had run out of 
steam in his new workplace. He believed he was an authen-
tic leader, yet many of his new sta> thought he was a fake. 
Fortunately, Booker was able to conveniently overlook these 
contradictions and continue his work. By doing this, he could 
cling to a vision of himself that made him feel good. But this 
vision didn’t necessarily match reality.1
Holding on to an image of oneself despite evidence to the 
contrary requires a healthy measure of stupidity. Leaders – 
sometimes very good ones – o"en stop themselves from asking 
di=cult questions. 3ey cling to an idealised notion of leader-
ship that makes them feel good. 3ey avoid looking too closely 
at their own assumptions and ideas about themselves. 3ey 
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overlook the evidence and buy into empty ideas. As a result 
they stay .xed on an ideal image of themselves as a leader – 
even when it is doing themselves, and others, harm.
!e leadership delusion
It shouldn’t be surprising that leaders are o"en deluded. Much 
of the talk about leadership propagates misleading ideas, and 
these have built a huge leadership industry.2 Entry barriers 
are low and the opportunities high in this multi-billion-dol-
lar sector. Business people, academics, consultants, mountain 
climbers, sport stars, horse trainers, sexologists, spiritual 
guides and individuals from almost every background are 
willing to o>er their advice on leadership. 3is crew of self-
styled experts bombard confused, desperate and bored middle 
managers with self-con.dent statements and recipes for 
success. 3ey are o"en ready victims of the leadership indus-
try that specialises in selling seductive images to managers and 
other leader-wannabes.
Most ideas produced by the leadership industries rely 
on ?awed reasoning and pseudo-science.3 ‘Much of the o"-
repeated conventional wisdom about leadership is based more 
on hope than reality, on wishes rather than data, on beliefs 
rather than science,’ Je>rey Pfe>er writes.4 Sometimes ideas 
about leadership are harmless forms of corporate escapism. 
3ey allow stressed-out middle managers to feel like vision-
ary world-changers or profound thinkers for a few hours. But 
all too o"en, ideas about leadership can be really problematic. 
According to McKinsey, companies in the US spend $14 billion 
every year on leadership development initiatives.5 3e results 
of all this e>ort are woeful. According to one report, ‘there is 
scarcely any evidence that all this spending … is producing 
better leaders’.6 We have spoken with many individuals who 
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have devoted their careers to delusional ideas about leadership. 
We have heard employees talking about how their organisa-
tions have been decimated by leaders driven by misguided 
ideas.
3e image of leadership that haunts the popular imagina-
tion is usually very attractive. Leaders, we are told, push people 
to think and develop their capacity. Leadership is supposed 
to be about in?uencing subordinates through superior vision, 
values, ideas and emotions. Management, by contrast, is more 
about nuts and bolts: planning, coordination and control. We 
are o"en led to think that leadership is sexy, management is 
boring. According to popular wisdom people obey managers 
while they are empowered by leaders. 3ose who manufac-
ture ideas about management advise, the leadership industry 
preaches.
Sometimes the rhetoric of leadership matches reality. 
Leaders can motivate, transform and even serve their followers. 
But the great majority of leaders also cultivate stupidity. 3ey 
can do this by encouraging the subordinate levels to deliber-
ately dampen their thinking and eschew their autonomy. But 
perhaps most importantly, ideas about leadership can stop 
aspiring leaders themselves from thinking. It can encourage 
them to buy into persuasive ideas that are o"en based on little 
more than pseudo-science, or research guided by barely dis-
guised ideology.
In this chapter, we want to challenge the common assump-
tion that leadership is about mobilising superior intelligence, 
rationality or wisdom. Sometimes leaders are wise and exert 
valuable in?uence, but when they buy into ideas circulated by 
the leadership industries, they can stop themselves from asking 
broader questions, engaging in deeper re?ection and consider-
ing the wider consequences of their actions. But what’s more 
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surprising is that all this non-thinking can now and then have 
useful consequences – at least in the short term.
Big leaders?
‘Modern business leaders are knowledge workers of the highest 
order,’ we are told.7 We o"en assume that leaders have high IQs 
and great practical wisdom.8 Leaders should also have high 
levels of emotional intelligence, superior self-insights, and 
know how to deal with the emotions of others.9 3ey should 
be able to nurture their followers and help them to grow.10 
Leaders, we are told, should have the education, insightfulness 
and ability to see the bigger picture.
Wisdom, emotional intelligence, care and re?ection are 
certainly desirable, but these qualities are not that common in 
the real world. All too o"en ?esh-and-blood leaders fall short. 
Sometimes they are irrational and stupid – and convince their 
followers to be the same.11 Many are a mix of positive and nega-
tive abilities. Great leaders like Churchill and Jobs could easily 
furnish a book with examples of how not to do leadership.12 For 
every CEO who turns a company around there is another who 
has run a successful company into the ground. For every middle 
manager who inspires their team, there is another who alienates 
them. For every super-smart executive there is one with limited 
intelligence. But almost all attention goes to the heroic examples.
Over the past twenty years, we have followed dozens of 
leaders for extended periods of time. Most of these people were 
well educated, very experienced, and had great con.dence. 
Many worked in knowledge-intensive companies. We expected 
to .nd smart people harnessing the intelligence of their follow-
ers. What we found was quite di>erent.13
Consider the case of Bertram, a senior manager with a PhD 
working in a large pharmaceutical .rm. When we asked him 
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what he saw as the crucial component of leadership, he told 
us: ‘My view is that it is teamwork and everyone is important, 
everyone is needed.’ He then went on to point out that ‘key sci-
entists are important … we must be prepared to reward them 
in a wholly new way as compared to what we’ve done.’ If we 
look at these two views, we see a striking contradiction. On 
the one hand, Bertram thinks teamwork is important. On the 
other hand, he says that key scientists are vital. You may agree 
that both are important, but recognising and rewarding ‘key 
scientists’ could undermine an emphasis on the whole team. If 
some individuals are ‘key’, it’s not clear that everyone is equally 
important. It seems that Bertram supports contradictory prin-
ciples without noticing it.
Another example of these confusions and contradictions 
can be found in the story of Jen, a middle manager in a manu-
facturing company.14 She has taken part in many leadership 
courses and read a lot about coaching. Needless to say, she likes 
to view herself as a coach. She sees her job as participation and 
delegation, and takes a dim view of managers who claim to 
know best. But when we observed Jen over a couple of weeks, 
we found no signs that she was practising what she preached. 
She spent her days attending meetings, and telling people what 
they should do in a rather non-coachly way.
Both of these managers – and the many others that we have 
studied – talk the leadership talk, but their leadership ideas and 
practice do not hang together. Bertram has inconsistent and 
confused ideas. Jen’s ideal and practice moved in almost oppo-
site directions.
Managers say they want to provide a vision, engage follow-
ers, and do many other great things. But they rarely walk the 
leadership walk. 3ey o"en spend their days doing routine 
administration. 3eir jobs seem to be more about meetings and 
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emails than setting great visions. 3is should not be so surpris-
ing. Managerial work is tough. O"en organisational practice 
and the individual shortcomings of managers make it hard for 
ideals to be realised. But despite all this, most managers hold 
onto fantastic hopes about leadership – even despite so much 
evidence to the contrary.
Small followers?
A leader does not need to be completely superior, but on the whole 
we expect leaders to be ‘better’ than the people they lead. A"er 
all, why follow someone with lower intelligence, self-con.dence, 
knowledge and creativity than you? When the person who is 
supposed to lead is much more experienced, better-educated 
and has a better overview of the task, then their leadership might 
make sense, but when you study leadership over a long time at 
close range, it is o"en not so clear that leaders are much better 
than their followers. O"en people are promoted to managerial 
positions because of career interests, good contacts, political 
manoeuvring and seniority. Not because they have great poten-
tial as a leader. And even if the best are promoted, they may have 
been only marginally better than people around them.
To make managers with boring and stressful administra-
tive jobs feel better about themselves, organisations go out of 
their way to accentuate hierarchy and status and boost their 
identity. 3is is what fancy titles, large o=ce spaces, executive 
dress codes, formal meetings and special privileges are for. 
Managers are sent to expensive leadership-development pro-
grammes where facilitators do their best to help them feel like 
‘real leaders’. 3ese little tricks help to create an impression 
that managers are superior and should be treated as leaders. 
But impressions can deceive.
A problem for leadership in practice is that people in 
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subordinate positions o"en don’t see themselves as followers. 
O"en, inexperienced and weak people are happy to follow. In very 
stressful situations, being a follower may also be convenient for 
experienced people. And most people feel the need for a certain 
degree of order, including well functioning administration and 
division of labour. But it’s rare to .nd reasonably experienced 
people who really want to cultivate their followership. People 
prefer to see themselves as engineers, car mechanics, chefs, physi-
cians and tax inspectors rather than followers. For instance, one 
junior manager told us about his unwillingness to be ‘motivated’ 
by would-be leaders. ‘3e managers I struggle with most are the 
“motivating” types,’ he said. 3ese were people ‘who try to create 
energy and momentum, but only move back and forth without 
keeping a clear direction’. Another person we spoke with told us 
that ‘my work has seldom received much leadership. Something 
which I appreciate! I have had pretty much carte blanche from 
the beginning. Sometimes this can be tricky, but mostly I .nd it 
stimulating. I am directed by goals and dislike being told what to 
do. So who or what should I say is leading me?’15
Managers trying to lead need followers, but much of the 
time their supposed followers don’t feel that they need leader-
ship. Managers are just as happy to view themselves as leaders 
as most other employees are unhappy to see themselves as fol-
lowers. Non-managers like to have autonomy and work with 
people as peers. O"en they are sceptical about high-pro.le 
leadership e>orts. 3is o"en means there are leaders .red up 
by mythologies of leadership who anxiously roam the hallways 
of organisations, looking for followers.
Leadership as a source of stupidity
Of course all managers want their subordinates to do their 
work in a competent way. Very few like thoughtless people 
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around them. Some leaders try to encourage their followers to 
use the full range of their cognitive capacities some of the time. 
But usually this isn’t the case. All too o"en leadership involves 
the active cultivation of functional stupidity.
Leaders o"en encourage followers to avoid thinking too 
much. 3ey ask them to buy into narrow assumptions, not 
ask too many questions and avoid re?ecting on the broader 
meaning of their actions. By corralling followers’ cognitive 
capacities, leaders try to limit how followers de.ne, think 
and act. Encouraging stupidity through leadership can create 
functional outcomes – for followers, for leaders and for the 
organisation as a whole. It helps people avoid wider discus-
sions and simply get on with the job. It can dampen con?ict 
and create a shared sense of meaning. In this sense, selective 
thoughtlessness is the bedfellow of leadership.
3e relationship between leadership and functional stupid-
ity is complex. At one extreme are organisations that demand 
very high levels of compliance from their followers. In military 
organisations, the lower ranks have unthinking compliance 
drummed into them.16 3ey learn not to think freely, avoid 
using their own judgement, and sidestep re?ection. 3ey learn 
to execute commands – no matter how stupid they seem. Some-
times, such unthinking compliance can lead to disasters, but 
it can also be absolutely central to the normal functioning of 
these organisations. Imagine an army in which the troops criti-
cally re?ected on their orders before carrying them out.
At the other extreme are contemporary workplaces where 
leaders are encouraged to think about themselves as buddies, 
therapists or saints.17 3ese forms of more humanistic lead-
ership may displace some of the stupidities that come with 
command and control, but this does not necessarily mean the 
decline of stupidity per se. 3e assumption persists that leaders 
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are morally, spiritually or socially superior to their followers. 
New forms of facilitative leadership emphasise dependence and 
lack of autonomy: the leader sets the path, creates enthusiasm, 
builds a feeling of belonging, provides employees with the right 
ideas and orchestrates personal growth. 3e follower is sup-
posed to be a recipient of superior coaching from the leader. 
3is creates an unequal relationship. 3e more leadership there 
is, the more subordinates are led. 3e more therapeutic the 
leader (scoring high on EQ), the more clientlike the follower is 
encouraged to become.
Sometimes acknowledging one’s relative stupidity can be 
sensible. When there is a clear imbalance of ability, expertise 
and overview between leaders and followers, it is .ne if the fol-
lowers don’t ask too many questions. But this can change. New 
circumstances may weaken a leader’s authority. Subordinates 
can quickly grow out of being rookies. When this happens, stu-
pidity can cease to be functional.
Continuing to believe in leadership when the circumstances 
don’t warrant it may not be particularly wise. In many cases, a 
would-be leader may not be a head above their subordinates. 
When this is so, the very idea of a leader leading and followers 
following may be rather stupid. But it can still yield some posi-
tive outcomes: having a leader around (even if they are not so 
smart) can reassure people: It can give them a sense of order, 
someone to turn to when there are problems, and someone to 
blame when things go wrong.
Devoted to leadership
3e idea of leadership has a devoted following. Millions of 
people around the world read books on how to enhance their 
leadership abilities. Organisations spend billions trying to 
develop leadership. Governments assume that any problem 
Stupidity Paradox.indd   110 07/04/2016   20:01
LEADERSHIP-INDUCED STUPIDITY 111
– no matter how tricky or di=cult – can be solved with more 
leadership. 3ousands of courses on leadership are run around 
the world every day. Many business people love leadership. In 
many ways our faith in leadership has made it into a kind of 
secular religion.18 3is religious quality is obvious in the idea 
of servant leadership. Robert Greenleaf ’s foundational essay on 
the topic talks about ‘prophecies’, ‘seekers’, ‘healing’ and ‘faith’. 
Leaders, Greenleaf claims, need to have almost divine qualities 
such as ‘a sense of the unknowable’ and the ability to ‘foresee 
the unforeseeable’.
Transformational, charismatic and authentic leadership 
also has religious qualities.19 Transformational leaders are said 
to be able to create ‘conversion’ experiences for their followers. 
Jesus Christ is frequently seen as an early archetype of a charis-
matic leader. Authentic leaders are encouraged to connect with 
their deepest beliefs and nurture their spiritual side.
3e secular religion of leadership has many devotees. We 
suspect that the leadership industry has many more commit-
ted followers among managers than among their subordinates. 
3is global community of believers shares a common faith in 
the innate goodness of leadership. 3e faithful are naturally 
eager to preserve some idealised notion of the leader. To do 
so, a measure of stupidity does not come amiss. It helps them 
overlook the contradictions and confusions, the vagueness and 
idealisations, the lack of evidence and the poor reasoning that 
is such a staple of many ideas about leadership. In particular the 
popular ones that make managers so keen.
Like religion, leadership promises moral order. It gives 
supplicants a sense of reassurance. Relatively mundane admin-
istrative activities come to be seen as genuinely heroic and 
meaningful actions. Managers start to think that their trivial 
acts may have important e>ects.
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One devotee we met was called George. He was a middle 
manager in a hi-tech .rm. Most of his days were spent doing 
mundane things, but he always tried to see them as very special. 
When we asked him about his leadership style, George told us: 
‘I base my leadership on respect for those who are really close 
to the actual work. I do not have any tendency to tell people 
what to do. Instead, I base my leadership on trust, respect and 
open dialogue with all my subordinates. 3ere are no hidden 
agendas on my part.’ George clearly expected that being open, 
honest and considerate and not telling them what to do would 
make a big di>erence to how others saw him. ‘I’m quite sure 
that they think that I am open and that I am very inviting,’ he 
said. ‘I tell them about my private life and I say what I can and 
cannot do. I hope they have caught that.’20
Other managers we have studied believe they are doing 
leadership when they engage their subordinates in small talk.21 
Sometimes they think this can have a dramatic impact on their 
followers’ self-con.dence, satisfaction and morale. It seems 
that when a manager does what many would think is common 
behaviour in the workplace – being respectful, talking about 
private matters, drinking co>ee together – they think they are 
doing ‘leadership’ and something remarkable is happening. 
However, most subordinates don’t respond to co>ee with their 
unit head in the same way as to having tea with the Queen.
Despite these assumptions, most people are not on the 
lookout for leadership. George’s subordinates do not care much 
for his leadership. Like most people, they are actually more 
interested in their work tasks, having stimulating colleagues, 
developing their abilities, .nding career opportunities, receiv-
ing their salary and protecting their working conditions. Most 
people appreciate an open, honest and e>ective manager. 3ese 
are qualities they probably also appreciate in other people they 
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encounter. But much of the time, this does not particularly 
matter. 3ey just want to get on with the job. 3ey are o"en not 
so interested in ambitious leadership that promises to trans-
form them with superior visions, values or meanings.
Leaders as stupidity managers
How does leadership produce stupidity? Perhaps the most 
obvious way this happens is through demanding absolute com-
pliance from followers. Authoritarian and cultish organisations 
are built on a strong di>erentiation between leaders and follow-
ers. 3ose in subordinate positions are pushed to refrain from 
thinking outside the box. 3ey should assume that their leader 
has the big picture and knows best.
Strict authoritarianism is not very popular in today’s 
workplaces, at least not in the West. Followers are now rarely 
required to show absolute compliance. Virtually all organisa-
tions expect members to use some degree of initiative. Even the 
military encourages junior sta> to use their own judgement at 
times. But this does not mean the end of stupidity.
One way that leaders stupidify their followers is through 
transformational leadership. It assumes that ‘leaders transform 
followers’ and that ‘followers are changed from being self-cen-
tered individuals to being committed members of a group’.22 
Transformational leadership is a kind of moral improvement 
scheme. Bad, self-centred followers are turned into good, 
loyal group members. All thanks to the right leadership. 
Transformational leaders are thought to give their follow-
ers individualised consideration, intellectual stimulation and 
inspiration. 3is is said to boost their self-con.dence, enthu-
siasm and identi.cation. Instead of being cajoled, followers 
enthusiastically comply.
3e very idea of transformational leadership means that 
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leaders position themselves as superior .gures who have a clear 
vision and can transform their disappointed followers into 
much better organizationally committed people.23 ‘Visionary’ 
leaders, we are told, make their followers less self-centred. 3is 
of course assumes that followers are happy to be transformed. 
To insist on critical thinking would be counterproductive. It 
would hamper the leader’s work of transforming their followers. 
A"er all, the task of a transformational leader is to encourage 
followers to switch o> their independent thinking and commit 
themselves to a leader’s vision.
SuperLeader saves the day?
Transformational leadership has proved popular. However, 
recent years have seen the rise of more ‘democratic’, ‘authentic’, 
‘distributed’ or ‘facilitative’ forms of leadership.24 3ese portray 
the leader as a humble .gure who tries to have a positive impact 
on followers. Facilitative leaders try to encourage their follow-
ers to grow. 3ey do this by giving their followers meaningful 
space to develop.
One of the many new labels for this is ‘the SuperLeader’. 
3is is a person who ‘focuses primarily on the empowering 
roles of helping, encouraging and supporting followers in the 
development of personal responsibility, individual initiative, 
self-con.dence, self-goal setting, self-problem solving, oppor-
tunity thinking, self-leadership, and psychological ownership 
over their tasks and duties’.25 SuperLeaders should learn from 
mistakes, listen more, talk less, create independence and inter-
dependence, and avoid dependence. 3eir role is to support and 
coach rather than create a vision and give direction.
Followers who enter organisations as raw and moderately 
competent are developed by the SuperLeader. Sometimes 
this happens. But more o"en than not it mis.res. Otherwise 
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competent followers become people seen as needing improve-
ment. 3e developer leader calls for followers who want to be 
developed. 3is can encourage a certain form of attachment to 
the leader which is not actually required.
3rough playing their facilitation role, leaders o"en create 
needy followers who want support, coaching and counselling. 
By representing themselves as .gures who help followers to 
grow and improve, leaders can reinforce their subordinates’ 
passivity and dependence. O"en this can be about leaders 
building up their own sense of self-esteem rather than doing 
anything for their followers.26
When people are not being mesmerised by the idea of 
leadership, they can downplay the role of the manager.27 One 
senior manager we spoke with told us that ‘mostly it is them 
[the subordinates] that contact me when they need help with 
some issue … 3ey need a leader that is su=ciently technically 
skilled in order to be able to give them support, but generally I 
do not think they need or want any interference from the boss.’ 
In this case, subordinates used a wide range of others sources 
for problem-solving, including work-groups, colleagues and 
network contacts. 3e leader was only a relatively peripheral 
part of the picture.
3is is quite common. 3ere is usually some manager 
hanging around, but most people turn to colleagues and friends 
to deal with technical problems, emotional issues, and requests 
for help. In many workplaces employees meet their manager 
only infrequently. Much of the time, their boss is sitting in 
meetings with other managers. But in the world of leadership 
fantasies, managers spend most of the time leading their com-
mitted followers.
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Reality bites
Leadership sounds great. It seems much sexier than manage-
ment. Leaders do exciting things like persuade and seduce. 
Managers do boring things like planning, organising and con-
trolling. It’s not surprising that a common cry in the corporate 
landscape is ‘We need leaders, not managers’. Many managers 
assure us, and themselves, that they are ‘a leader, not a manager’. 
So far so good. But the reality is quite di>erent. Most people ask 
for leadership but actually want management.
Organisations, particularly large ones, are full of admin-
istrative tasks. 3ese call for lots of management and little 
leadership. 3ere are budgets, IT issues, personnel planning, 
.nancial reporting and customer demands to take care of. 
Making sure things are delivered on time is o"en more impor-
tant than trying to transform followers into better people. One 
former hotel manager we spoke with described his job as franti-
cally running around and dealing with various acute issues. He 
had little, if any, time to do leadership.
3e reality for most managers is administration. 3ey spend 
most of their time sitting in meetings, dealing with emails and 
.lling in forms. 3ey do budgets, .nancial reporting and o=ce 
space allocation, comply with human resource policies and 
much more. As a result, managers generally feel that they do 
not have enough time to do leadership.28 A"er all, transform-
ing people into better human beings is time-consuming. It is 
hardly done through a few minutes’ small talk. It is hard to 
.t Superleadership around the relentless stream of brief and 
abrupt episodes that makes up a typical day for a manager.29
Let us return to George, whom we have already brie?y 
met. He suspects that despite his liberal use of small talk, his 
subordinates do not care that much about his leadership. And 
he is right. When asked about George’s leadership, one of his 
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subordinates describes their relationship like this: ‘Hmm … 
what do we do really? We go to his meetings and answer his 
questions, and beyond that …’ 3e silence speaks volumes.
When asked about what leaders should do in their organisa-
tion, one of the engineers who works for George said: ‘It should 
be someone who makes… parties and such.’ Managerial ‘enter-
tainment’ seems to be in demand in this company. 3is has 
certainly in?uenced George’s view of his role as a leader. When 
we asked what he did to lead people, he told us: ‘I walk around 
the corridor at .ve to nine and tell people “Breakfast is served”. 
I think it is appreciated.’ In addition to breakfasts, George also 
introduced beer-tasting just before Christmas, something else 
he thought was ‘very appreciated’ by his subordinates.
George’s entertainment activities aside, his subordinates 
were not that interested in his leadership. George admits that 
he .nds it hard to lead because he does not understand what his 
subordinates do. 3ey work on their own and can be ‘secretive’ 
with how they spend their time at work. ‘Mainly they sit at their 
desktops and write code,’ George said. ‘3ey don’t interact that 
much with each other under normal circumstances … What 
they are working with is among the most complicated things 
you can do as a so"ware developer. 3erefore it is extremely 
hard to comprehend and understand.’
3e complex and solitary nature of engineering work 
combined with a shared unwillingness among George’s sub-
ordinates to see themselves as ‘followers’ made his work as a 
leader di=cult. Doing ‘leadership’ becomes about arranging 
parties, serving breakfast and doing administration.30 George 
dreams about doing leadership, but there is little demand for it. 
3e engineers who work for him want autonomy, not leader-
ship. Of course, they are not alone.
3ere are many would-be leaders like George. Organisational 
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reality o"en does not o>er fertile soil for them. Spending time 
hosting parties and serving breakfast between bouts of relent-
less administration is o"en the best they can hope for.
Manufacturing stupidity
Stupidity is not created by leaders alone. 3e leadership indus-
try plays a vital role. 3is is made up of business magazines, 
publishers, business schools, management development insti-
tutes, management gurus, consultants and others. Virtually 
all of them promise leadership improvement. It is the business 
world’s response to Hollywood – a dream factory for manag-
ers and other leader-wannabes. 3is multi-billion-dollar sector 
works by launching new recipes for leadership success every 
single day. By encouraging public enthusiasm for leadership, 
the industry inspires people from all walks of life to adopt what 
are o"en seductive but also very questionable ideas. While 
the leadership industry claims to be about manufacturing 
wisdom, it can also do the opposite. Members of the indus-
try subtly – and sometimes not so subtly – discourage people 
from thinking more broadly or deeply about many of the o"en 
utterly ridiculous ideas about leadership. In this respect, the 
leadership merchants are also stupidity merchants. 3ey get 
people enthusiastic about idealised and o"en very unrealistic 
understandings of themselves.
One way the leadership industry does this is by investing 
extraordinary signi.cance in leaders. According to some, all 
global problems, including wars, ecological disasters and eco-
nomic turmoil, are due to poor leadership.31 Others are more 
measured. For instance, Ronnie Heifetz and Donald Laurie 
point out that ‘a leader is responsible for direction, protection, 
orientation, managing con?ict and shaping norms’.32 3is 
may sound uncontroversial, but this apparently pedestrian 
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statement implies that followers are not responsible for these 
basic aspects of organisational life. It simply makes them 
into people who implement the leaders’ direction, receive the 
leaders’ protection, have their con?icts managed by leaders, 
and whose sense of what is normal is manipulated by leaders. 
Non-leaders are reduced to recipients of leaders’ impressive 
work.
3e leadership industry also mysti.es leaders. 3is happens 
when leaders are seen as having superhuman abilities. If you 
look at some best-sellers on the topic you will .nd individu-
als who have amazing vision, extraordinary stamina and 
unmatched levels of empathy – all in one. Such a faith in the 
innate goodness and transformative power of leadership means 
that people shy away from considering the more mundane 
mechanics of getting the job done. It also means they stop 
asking whether leadership is actually necessary at all.
3e leadership industry projects a sense of moral superiority 
onto leaders.33 Put in the crudest form, it is assumed that a real 
leader is always really good. If he or she is bad, then they are 
not a leader.34 Steve Jobs, for instance, was an extremely in?u-
ential and successful person, but he also acted in psychopathic 
ways sometimes.35 3ose sta=ng the leadership industry prefer 
to ignore such contradictions and preserve more idealised 
images of well-known leaders. To their minds, good leadership 
is simply good: it is transformational and authentic. 
From good to great, or from mediocre to stupid
Jim Collins’s book Good to Great is probably the most in?u-
ential leadership book of the last two decades, selling over 2.5 
million copies around the world. It promises to o>er the secrets 
behind lasting excellence and asks why a number of .rms have 
maintained an above-average performance over a long period 
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of time. Collins thinks the big di>erence was the quality and 
characteristics of the .rm’s leaders. 3ese fantastic .gures were 
leaders who appeared to be unremarkable and saw themselves 
as such. 3ey attributed success to their co-workers. Accord-
ing to Collins this was wrong. 3e true secret was their style 
of leadership – what he calls ‘level 5 leadership’.36 3ese level 5 
leaders stuck to their way of doing business, they worked hard 
and they gave their subordinates a lot of credit.
As with most books that o>er to unveil the secrets of 
business miracles, Collins provides an oversimpli.ed and mis-
leading recipe. Of the eleven companies he examined, many 
did not do so well in the years a"er the study and two went 
bankrupt. 3is dented the credibility of Collins’s claims that 
the secrets of leadership he had uncovered were ‘built to last’. 
3e idea that you might be able to produce and run an excellent 
company by just applying self-evident management principles 
should be a source of great suspicion.37
Collins’s explanation for lasting success has a feel-good 
e>ect on managers who hope to be great leaders but are wary 
of charismatic ideas about leadership. Being professional, hard-
working, persistent, modest, sticking to a success formula and 
giving credit to co-workers seems quite easy. Most managers 
can imagine themselves doing that. If they suddenly learn that 
by doing it they become a ‘level 5 leader’, then naturally they 
will feel good. A"er all, it would mean promotion from being 
good to being great. To .nd out that what are o"en viewed as 
mediocre abilities are not just good but actually great can help 
to boost the egos of wannabe great leaders.
Self-stupidifying leaders
During unruly and turbulent times, status anxiety runs riot. 
3is means that managers are eager to .nd status and self-esteem 
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boosters. One way to do this is by becoming a ‘leader’ – being 
a follower is far less appealing. Naturally, some resist it, but 
many are seduced. It allows subordinates to see themselves not 
as mundane workers carrying out boring administrative or 
operational tasks, but as part of a great enterprise. Humdrum 
activities become about performing a ‘mission’ or an oppor-
tunity for self-development. 3e result is that ideas about 
leadership get incorporated into the way both leaders and fol-
lowers see themselves. As these ideas are so closely connected 
with narratives of oneself, they come to be jealously guarded by 
many leaders and some followers.
We o"en over-attribute both positive and negative results 
to leaders. 3ey are held responsible for any kind of signi.cant 
outcomes, good or bad. 3is responsibility can far exceed what 
can be reasonably expected from a person.
When we over-attribute powers to leaders, we fall victim to 
well-known cognitive biases, including some of those addessed 
in Chapter 2.38 One is the fundamental attribution error: we 
are likely to overvalue our own internal characteristics and 
downplay the in?uence that situations have on our behaviour. 
Cultural attribution biases also interfere. People from individu-
alistic cultures like North America are more likely to look for 
individual causes of behaviour. 3is means they grow obsessed 
with the role of leaders in creating success and failure – some-
thing which blinds us to the fact that 70 per cent of corporate 
performance is driven by situational factors rather than CEO 
characteristics.39 Finally there are self-serving biases: indi-
viduals are more likely to credit their successes to their own 
individual talents. As a result, leaders are likely to reinforce 
the importance of their own contribution and undervalue 
what others bring. By focusing on leadership, both leaders and 
followers are able to short-cut much of the di=cult thinking 
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and ambiguous information required to make more accurate 
assessments of why .rms succeed or fail.
Consider the case of Jim, a sales manager in a global hi-tech 
company. When we spoke with one of Jim’s sales agents called 
Ralph, he praised Jim’s ability as a leader. ‘He has turned the 
ship around,’ he told us. ‘He has the best results in the [360 
degree evaluation] survey and he has the best .nancial results 
in the whole EMEA [Europe, Middle East and Africa].’ At last 
a manager who is really e>ective, we thought, and decided to 
study this star closely. But quite a di>erent picture appeared 
when we spoke with Steve, another of Jim’s sales agents. ‘When 
we [the sales agents] talk we all agree that these .gures we could 
have done without Jim,’ Steve said. ‘He is totally o>side! 3e 
only thing he says is: Full speed ahead!’ Others shared Steve’s 
view, but some thought the good results indicated that Jim had 
some good qualities that were di=cult to grasp. If we compare 
these two accounts of Jim’s leadership abilities, we can start to 
see how the contributions of a leader can be quite ambiguous. 
For some, the success of the division is down to Jim’s great work. 
For others, Jim’s only contribution is to utter empty phrases. It 
seems that much is in the eye of the beholder.
People enthused by ideas about leadership are o"en faced 
with contradictory information. Sometimes leaders do good 
things, sometimes bad things. Most people are unwilling to see 
Hitler as a transformational leader, even though he had many 
of the features of such a leader.40 Celebrated .gures like Steve 
Jobs or Winston Churchill have many bad traits, but we see 
them as all good. Such con?icting information does not usually 
lead people to abandon their belief in the importance of good 
leadership. Rather, they disregard contrary evidence and focus 
only on the information that con.rms what they think at the 
outset. 3ey look for the good and overlook the bad. As a result, 
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we are o"en willing to provide irrational levels of support for 
leaders who appear to be charismatic. A study by Francis Flynn 
and Barry Staw found that investors were more willing to put 
money into companies with charismatic CEOs – even if their 
performance was the same as .rms with non-charismatic 
CEOs.41 3is reminds us that most people develop consistent 
yet simpli.ed understandings of leadership. Investors are even 
willing to put their money on it. 3is kind of Disneyland rea-
soning about a beautiful and harmonious world of leadership 
is reassuring, but not particularly insightful.
!e mixed blessings of mindless leaders
Buying into ideas about leadership can sometimes be stupid, 
but it can also be e>ective. It can help to bolster fragile self-
esteem, enable simplistic modes of attribution and reduce 
cognitive dissonance. All this can help individuals avoid the 
ambiguity and anxiety that are endemic in complex organisa-
tions. 3e sense of purpose that comes from being a leader who 
inspires and motivates others is quite di>erent from being a 
manager who does administration.
To con.dently say ‘I am a leader, not a manager’ is not just 
good for self-esteem, it is great for impression management. It 
makes it easier to be perceived as a person on the way up. To 
appear – in talk, dress and manner – as a leader, without any 
signs of doubt, hesitation or self-irony, can create success. To 
show ambivalence and doubt can be a career-stopper. Re?ec-
tion o"en messes things up for people.
Promotion calls for ‘leadership skills’. A person eager to 
progress in their career is wise to be enthusiastic about lead-
ership. In many cases, this can be pure pretence, but that 
doesn’t matter too much. Doubt about leadership is a source of 
uncertainty and distraction. It can lower self-con.dence and 
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diminish a person’s commitment to work. Being able to bypass 
doubt in favour of a strong commitment can help individuals 
make their way through the organisation.
Buying into notions of leadership can also help the organi-
sation as a whole. Individuals are encouraged to put aside 
disruptive and di=cult criticism of individual leaders or ideas 
about leadership more generally. 3is can help to get people 
enthusiastic about the visions of a leader. By doing this, they 
can build commitment to a course of action. Although the 
premises of action may be suspect, the very idea of leadership 
can help to make things happen.
Actively encouraging leadership-induced stupidity is, 
however, a mixed blessing. For individuals, an irrational com-
mitment to leadership means they can easily become separated 
from the realities of management. 3e gap between ideals and 
performance can become obvious when an individual leader 
promises signi.cant personal transformation but creates 
something far less lustrous. Frustration o"en follows when 
individuals who are striving to become leaders prove to be inef-
fective. 3e clash between the idolisation of leadership and the 
imperfections of organisational life will sooner or later come to 
light.42 3e result is jilted leadership junkies.
To deal with these disappointments, some simply move on 
to the next fad or fashion o>ered by the leadership industry. 
Others become bitter cynics who .nd it hard to buy into any 
ideas about leadership at all – even when leadership may actu-
ally be needed. Still others become virulent anti-leadership 
activists who oppose all attempts to wield leadership.
By mindlessly buying into ideas of leadership, organisa-
tions can become overcommitted to practices that do not work. 
3is happens when organisations cut short broader re?ection 
and discussion about when leadership is useful, how much 
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leadership is needed and what kind of leadership they may 
need. For instance, an untrammelled attachment to ‘facili-
tative’ ideas of leadership can cause organisations to devote 
signi.cant resources and time to quasi-therapeutic rituals. 3is 
can mean they become unable to respond adequately to press-
ing emergencies. Real work gives way to psychobabble.43 As a 
result, production, customers and markets receive less atten-
tion than they deserve.
Finally, an overriding belief in the importance of leader-
ship can mean that followers ignore many other forms of 
coordination that can take the place of leadership. Bureau-
cracy, self-managed teams, professional coordination and 
other control mechanisms are ignored. 3is can create one-
dimensional organisations where no matter what the problem, 
leadership is seen as the answer.44
Conclusion
Leaders are o"en thought to be superior characters who possess 
cognitive prowess, creative intelligence and practical wisdom. 
3is idea is popular, but it does not capture the entire picture. 
In this chapter, we have argued that leadership is o"en inti-
mately related to stupidity.
3e quasi-religious belief in leadership all too o"en o>ers a 
Disneyland vision of organisations. It is unrealistic and naïve. 
But it is also comforting and hopeful. Far from being a nega-
tive thing, selective stupidi.cation can sometimes prove to 
be functional. Reducing independent thinking and re?ection 
can yield positive outcomes. Common thinking, shared values 
and a sense of order can all be outcomes of an obsession with 
leadership. Leadership can spare individuals the anxieties of 
thinking for themselves.
While functional stupidity may take hold through an undue 
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emphasis on leadership, there is another side to the story. 
Sometimes ideas about leadership may not be as powerful as 
we o"en assume. E>orts to do leadership o"en simply means 
highfalutin talk, which the audience treats with a mixture of 
mild amusement, disdain and boredom.
3ink about the quintessential leadership act – ‘commu-
nicating a vision’. In many organisations, subordinates can be 
actively hostile to these visions. Instead of seeing the vision as 
profound, many think they are ‘corporate bullshit’.45 Others 
.nd such visions to be a mild distraction or even completely 
irrelevant. Still others might entirely miss the vision. A"er all, 
organisations are full of messages that easily get lost. In most 
organisations, leadership is not as potent as most people seem 
to believe.
Attempts to do leadership do not always have the intended 
impact on followers. Rarely can (aspiring) leaders cook up their 
favoured recipes for leadership. For this reason, the real stupid-
ity may lie in the belief that leadership has any large impact on 
organisational life. Perhaps leadership talk actually stupidi.es 
the people who are most committed to it – the members of the 
large and expanding leadership industry. Some may be cynical, 
but most sincerely believe what they are preaching. And taking 
these ideas so seriously can call for a powerful dose of func-
tional stupidity.
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5Structure-Induced Stupidity
Routine thoughtlessness
A couple of years ago one of us took part in a workshop with 
about twenty personnel managers who worked for a large 
municipality. Some preliminary results from a study of Human 
Resource Management (HRM) work were presented and dis-
cussed. One .nding from the study result was that members 
of the HRM profession o"en felt they were not appreciated 
and had a low level of status and in?uence in their organisa-
tions. 3ey wanted to do more work with strategy and less 
with service. However, people from other departments wanted 
the opposite from HRM professionals: less strategy and more 
service. One person in the group suddenly felt that she should 
give the others some feedback. She had once worked in HRM 
but had recently shi"ed to a position as a unit manager. 3is 
led her to realise the sheer amount of steering documents that 
existed which all units were supposed to consult and follow. It 
was a shocking experience: ‘Friends,’ she told the group, ‘you 
don’t know how many documents we have developed and we 
are supposed to relate to in our work. We must change the way 
we work.’
3e audience did not respond to this provocation. 3ey all 
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put on their poker faces, signalling that such strange comments 
were best passed over unnoticed. At the end of the workshop 
we brought up this topic again and urged the audience to take 
the feedback seriously. Perhaps they could elect some of their 
number to explore reducing obstructive HRM bureaucracy. 
Given the negative reputation of the HRM function, this 
appeared to be an ideal opportunity to take an initiative. 3e 
response? Total silence.1
We are frequently told that we live in post-bureaucratic 
times. It is common to hear that organisations are not run by 
hierarchies, rules and regulations any more, but by vision, lead-
ership, organisational cultures and networks. But if you take a 
careful look at any organisation, bureaucracy is as strong as it 
ever has been.2 In the HRM function of the municipality we 
discussed above, the central task seemed to be to create bureau-
cracy, though by another name. More and more pointless forms 
now require .lling out. 3e di>erence from the past is that 
much of this work has to be done online. Rigid plans, rules 
and procedures continue to be features of working life. In most 
industries there is more regulation than ever. 3ere are many 
whose sole job it is to create plans, rules and procedures, and 
even more who spend their working life ensuring that these are 
followed. Other employees .nd that ever-larger chunks of their 
days are taken up with following rules and procedures.
3ese bureaucratic processes have their advantages – they 
can provide order and impartiality. But they are o"en a source 
of disorder. Bureaucratic structures can be practical, but they 
can also breed impracticality. Rules can sometimes force us to 
think, but more o"en than not they foster thoughtlessness.3
People at work are regularly pushed to conform with 
bureaucratic imperatives that free them from thought and deci-
sions. At the very same time they are told that bureaucracy is 
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bad. Now and then we may get angry with a particularly trou-
blesome rule, but mostly we mindlessly comply. We stop asking 
questions and thinking for ourselves. We just go along with the 
rules and routines and hope that they make our lives easier.
Most of the time, structures, rules and routines do the 
thinking for us. We give them no thought, and mindlessly 
carry them out. 3is can be practical and e=cient. Spared 
from the e>ort of assessing what needs to be done, and how 
and why, instead we can simply focus on the procedure. When 
you just have to tick boxes, then you don’t have to think outside 
the box.
In this chapter, we look at how rules and routines in organi-
sations create stupidity. We will argue that sometimes a deep 
faith in structures is due to the existence of stupid jobs. 3ese 
are roles which are designed to be as simple as possible and 
allow very little space for individual initiative or re?ection. But 
another driver of our faith in structure is an explosion of pro-
fessional idiots. 3ese are experts who .nd it hard to see beyond 
their own professional obsessions associated with specialisa-
tion and division of labour. 3is potent mixture o"en promotes 
an unquestioning faith in structures. Employees assume that 
such structures are good, even when there is strong evidence 
to the contrary. In some cases this can yield highly functional 
outcomes, for the individual as well as the organisation, but 
just as o"en, mindless rule-following can breed chaos. 3e 
result of all this is what we call a society of super.cial scrutiny: 
a world where almost any organisational activity is the subject 
of oversight. As people focus more on complying with the rules, 
substantive issues remain unaddressed.
Smart people doing stupid jobs
Breaking up tasks in a detailed and regimented way can make 
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things more e=cient, but it can also make them more stupid. 
One aspect of this that we discussed in an earlier chapter is 
‘deskilling’.4 Breaking up complex tasks into simple activities 
has been common in industrial production lines for over a 
century. One of the early champions of the creation of stupid 
jobs was the industrial engineer Frederick Winslow Taylor. In 
his famous ‘pig iron’ experiment he broke down an already 
simple task (carrying blocks of iron and loading them onto a 
cart) into even more simple parts. According to Taylor, ‘one 
of the very .rst requirements for a man who is .t to handle 
pig iron as a regular occupation is that he shall be so stupid 
and so phlegmatic that he more nearly resembles in his mental 
make-up the ox’. Due to the supposed ‘stupidity’ of the pig-iron 
handler, ‘he must consequently be trained by a man more intel-
ligent than himself into the habit of working in accordance with 
the laws of this science before he can be successful’.5 For Taylor, 
the task of the industrial engineer was to design complex tasks 
to enable people he assumed to be stupid to do them. (3e irony 
here is that Taylor’s supposedly stupid pig-iron handler was not 
so stupid. 3ough Taylor referred to him as Schmidt, his real 
name was Henry Noll. During his spare time he built his own 
house and was also a volunteer at the local .re department.)6
Although scienti.c management is unfashionable today, 
large parts of the service sector use techniques that Taylor 
would .nd familiar. 3ink about the call centre where opera-
tives follow a script, the delivery industry where drivers rely 
on a computerised GPS system for directions, or fast-food 
restaurants where chefs cook by numbers. To become a reg-
istered black cab driver in London, it takes years to gain ‘the 
knowledge’.7 Now anyone can turn their car into a taxi by 
registering as a driver with an electronic guidance service like 
Uber. In each case what had once been smart jobs requiring 
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continual thinking have been made into relatively thought-
less tasks.
We might assume that routinisation is only the fate of low-
level highly routine service jobs. It is not. Many professionals now 
follow routine steps when delivering services. Medical doctors 
have to go through a series of steps when they see patients to 
ensure that they have done everything correctly. Similarly, the 
work of a teacher is increasingly dictated by detailed ‘education 
systems’ that tell them what to do and when. Some consultants 
talk about their work being like working in McDonald’s – they 
serve up standardised products by following routine processes.8 
More generally, the sociologist George Ritzer has pointed at the 
McDonaldisation of society – the spread of the principles of the 
fast-food industry into all aspects of society.9
At the same time as the number of highly routinised jobs 
is expanding, there are also rising numbers of people with, on 
paper, high levels of education who expect their jobs to o>er 
plenty of scope to exercise their intellect. As a result, many of 
these aspiring knowledge workers feel frustrated. Sometimes, 
this can translate into cynicism or even outright hostility.10 In 
other cases, jilted knowledge workers just withdraw from their 
work and look for intellectual stimulation elsewhere: reading 
the newspaper online, playing video games or working on other 
personal projects during work hours.11
3is creates a problem for many organisations: how do you 
get smart people (with high levels of education and matching 
aspirations) to endure ‘stupid’ work (highly repetitive, and 
o"en requiring skills that can be acquired in a few days) with a 
happy demeanour?
One way organisations try to solve this problem is by 
using labels that frame mundane jobs in more upli"ing ways. 
In?ating job titles is a popular trick. A secretary becomes an 
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executive assistant; a bookkeeper becomes a .nancial manager; 
a publisher’s sales representative becomes a senior higher edu-
cation consultant; an in-house training coordinator becomes 
a strategic human resource development leader. A mid-level 
banker becomes a vice-president, promoted some years later to 
senior vice-president, even if the job remains the same. 3ese 
grandiose titles help people to feel that their rather trivial jobs 
are actually quite sophisticated. 3e titles can help them ignore 
the boring bits of their job and focus on the exciting parts. Even 
if they do routine work, they can tell their friends and family 
they have a smart-sounding job. ‘I manipulate spreadsheets’ 
sounds much less impressive than ‘I am a senior analyst.’
Professional idiots
3e great majority of people in the knowledge economy do 
routine work, but there are also many experts. In fact, the past 
three decades have seen an explosion of experts on almost 
every imaginable issue, from di>erent sub-diseases and parts 
of the human body to all aspects of human life, from diversity 
management to sexual therapy. 3ese experts are o"en given 
lots of autonomy within boundaries, yet they are marooned in a 
very narrow universe. 3ey usually have a standardised educa-
tion, follow a set career path and spend their days tied up with 
other experts. 3ey o"en live their entire working lives within 
a speci.c sub-tribe: Human Resource Management, Commu-
nication, a speci.c branch of Law, Branding, X-ray Medicine, 
Mechanical Engineering, whatever.
3ese tiny professional worlds o"en narrow people’s 
outlook. 3ese experts can struggle to think outside the well-
de.ned perimeters of their own hard-won knowledge. 3ey may 
do their particular job well, but they do it without much heed 
to the broader issues. 3is is illustrated in a recent laboratory 
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study which showed that when individuals were prompted to 
think they were experts, they became more closed-minded 
and dogmatic.12 3is meant they were less likely to consider 
the views of others. A similar process seems to prevail with 
real experts: as they pour all their intellectual energy into spe-
cialised work, they can become what Germans call Fachidioten 
– roughly, professional idiots. 3ey know a lot about a speci.c 
issue, but are clueless beyond their very narrow domain. 3ey 
also become rather rigid and negative about what does not .t 
into their worldview.
Increased professionalisation has pushed the ideal of the 
specialist to an extreme. Each specialism has splintered into 
clans of sub-specialisations. Consider contemporary medicine. 
Once doctors specialised in a particular part of the body, such 
as lungs, or a speci.c disease, such as cancer. Now they can 
specialise in a single treatment or a very rare disease. 3e same 
goes for the business world. We once had accountants, logistics 
specialists, human resource specialists and so on. Now there 
are multiple specialisms in each of these areas. In the .eld of 
human resource management there are specialists in how to 
administer personality tests, how to advertise for new employ-
ees, how to pay people, how to keep track of employees’ records, 
how to promote them, how to deal with them if they are angry, 
how to .re them and how to manage their diversity. It seems 
that they cover almost any eventuality.
Of course, the days of the universal genius are long gone. In 
many technical and scienti.c .elds, specialisation is necessary. 
However, the construction of ever-narrower sub-specialisms is 
o"en less about solving complex technical problems and more 
about allowing a specialist to work in a very narrow area they 
have a nerdish fascination with. 3is can have some important 
bene.ts for the specialist. It can help them build an identity 
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in a world already crowded with experts. No longer do you 
have to say: ‘I work in accounting.’ Instead you announce: ‘I 
am an expert in forensic accounting for mergers and acquisi-
tions transactions.’ Rather than: ‘I’m a human resource o=cer’, 
you can say: ‘I’m an expert at executive remuneration in the 
insurance industry.’ In our own little world of research we o"en 
come across scholars who say they are specialists in applying 
one aspect of one theory to one industry using one method. 
In fact, many courses which are designed to coach doctoral 
students in developing their careers o"en leave them with 
the impression that an exceedingly narrow focus is an excel-
lent strategy for building a thriving career. 3e advice seems 
to boil down to this: do the same narrow thing over and over 
again and you will become a world expert in it – no matter how 
mediocre your ideas or technical abilities are.
By claiming a narrow sub-discipline, you can exude an aura 
of technical expertise. 3is can give the would-be specialist a 
sense of power, status, and self-con.dence. It can also have the 
lucrative side e>ect of helping them carve out and defend what 
can o"en be very lucrative market niches with few competitors.
In many cases, strong specialisation has taken a step too 
far. People may sub-specialise even if they could, in principle, 
master a much broader terrain. In social science, for example, 
there is a growing tendency for researchers to focus narrowly. 
It increases their productivity, but also leads to predictable and 
boring research and only marginal improvements in knowl-
edge.13 In the natural and biological sciences researchers are 
o"en encouraged to narrow their focus down to just one or two 
minor issues.14 3is is potentially damaging because innova-
tion gains from a broader outlook, an ability to see potential 
connections between di>erent sub.elds, the capacity to ques-
tion assumptions and to think di>erently. An over-emphasis on 
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expertise and sub-specialisation hinders this. When specialism 
rules, we get the problem of people who only have a hammer 
in their toolbox, and as a result are inclined to treat everything 
as if it were a nail.
As a consequence, organisations are full of specialists who 
work on problems as they know them. However, most prob-
lems are not isolated. Having many experts each working 
away on their own little aspect of a wider problem can create 
many unforeseen problems. For instance, organisations can 
.nd themselves expanding because there are more experts 
employed. Inevitably these experts will start to develop plans, 
procedures, rules, routines and activities and demand com-
pliance from everybody else. 3e result is o"en to multiply 
bureaucracy, with an organisation’s core work su>ering as 
people are forced to spend time responding to the experts’ 
demands. As well as being costly in itself, the division of labour 
and the inclinations of all these people not just to be support-
ive but also to demand responses to all their initiatives and 
requests can be very resource-intensive.
With specialisation and division of labour we get a lot of 
boxed-in thinking. Few people have a comprehensive under-
standing of the situation. 3ey do not make connections. 
Di>erent groups specialise. Top management seldom has a full 
overview and doesn’t understand what units and people are 
doing. 3is is o"en a breeding ground for functional stupidity.
Faith in the system
A few years ago one of us did a study of a global manage-
ment consultancy .rm we will call Excellence.15 In this .rm 
we found many young, hopeful consultants, eager to learn and 
build a .ne career, who had been promised great opportunities 
for career development. ‘3is is a feedback culture,’ a senior 
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manager told us. ‘Sta> are taken care of, given advice about 
their performances as well as their strengths and weaknesses.’ 
3e new recruits were promised a wealth of opportunities to 
develop and progress. Much was made of education, seminars, 
a wide variety of assignments, frequent mentorship, careful 
assessment and promotion. 3e new consultants were told that 
signi.cant time and resources were devoted to this. 3e .rm 
seemed to be an ambitious young person’s dream.
However, when we examined what was actually happen-
ing in the .rm, a rather di>erent picture emerged. 3ere was 
a strong discrepancy between the claims of senior people and 
how things actually worked. Despite all the talk about this 
being a meritocracy that developed its sta>, we noticed di=-
culties. 3ere were tight time constraints, it was tough to assess 
what people actually were doing, judgements were frequently 
clouded by bias, and politics o"en trumped productivity when 
it came to promotions.
One particular issue of concern was how people were 
assessed. One partner told us: ‘3e problem is that sometimes 
there is a lot of in?ationary grading. You participated in a rea-
sonably successful project, and you think that you have worked 
with somebody who was really great, and tend to give them 
good grades. And then when you look at the whole population, 
if we should just look at the grading, everybody would have 
been promoted and we obviously can’t do that.’ Problems with 
the assessment system were also a concern for junior people. 
One consultant told us: ‘I wrote my own assessment sheet again 
on a project. I’ve even written the evaluation, both contribution 
and summary. 3en the project manager edited it somewhat. It 
is not supposed to work this way, but it does.’
Given these problems with the performance-management 
systems, the art of getting ahead in the .rm seemed to be less 
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about ability and more about politics and networking. One 
consultant confessed that ‘the art of surviving here is to team 
up with a superior who has already teamed up with his or her 
superior. 3en you work together.’
3e fact that a large professional service .rm was driven 
partly by politics, and that .ne structures and procedures were 
seldom followed, came as a surprise to the naïve new recruits. 
3ey had been told that high levels of performance was all that 
counted, yet they learned that the people who got new projects 
or were promoted were those who concentrated on build-
ing good relationships with important people. But what was 
perhaps even more surprising was that despite this insight into 
the harsh realities of life in a professional service .rm, they still 
maintained a strong faith in the human resource management 
system.
Many members of the .rm said that the .rm’s excellent 
HRM explained its people’s good reputation. ‘Our reputation is 
very good concerning our employees,’ one manager said. ‘If you 
have .ve years at Excellence on your CV, then they don’t look 
at your degree. 3ey practically don’t care to look at anything 
at all, they just say: “Okay, here is the job if you want it.” 3ey 
know that the quality of the people we hired is assured, and that 
we have trained and developed them. 3is makes our employ-
ees very attractive.’ A more junior consultant con.rmed this 
view. Other .rms ‘know that we have rigorously tested them 
[the employees] before they were o>ered a job and that we also 
have developed and educated them,’ he said. ‘Our people are 
very attractive.’
Because people had a faith in the system, they identi.ed 
strongly with the .rm, worked exceptionally hard and rated it 
highly to the wider world. But for all this to work, it was nec-
essary for employees to suspend their doubts. People’s strong 
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beliefs in the HR system meant that they o"en did not believe 
their own experiences. When they came across a moment when 
the system was not working as it should, they simply dismissed 
it. 3e system was sound, they thought. 3ese snags were just 
unfortunate exceptions. Shit happens, they would say.
If employees gave more thought to their own experiences, 
they would easily see that the HR system didn’t work as it was 
supposed to. But such a realisation would bring problems. It 
would probably undermine faith in the wider HRM system. 
It also might make it less likely for people to comply with it. 
To avoid such a sticky situation, most people working for the 
.rm seemed to prefer to remain ignorant and thoughtless, 
overlooking their own experiences in order to preserve a faith 
in the system. 3is allowed the .rm to go on claiming that it 
was recruiting, developing and promoting the best and the 
brightest.
Another important aspect of the HR system was that it 
made employees feel like they were part of an elite. One con-
sultant we spoke with told us: ‘3e Excellence brand stands for 
professionalism. It means that I’m serious and professional in 
my work.’ He went on to say: ‘I like the aura of the Excellence 
brand. I know that I was recruited to an elite group and that I 
am still considered to be worthy of an organisation that recruits 
the best students, has the best clients, and makes a lot of money. 
We hire one out of a hundred who apply for work here. We have 
long and trying tests and evaluations and I have passed them 
all. Excellence is successful.’
Seeing oneself as part of a professional .rm that develops 
the best and the brightest is great for business. People feel good 
about themselves and the .rm they work for. 3ey have self-
con.dence. 3is comes across when they speak with clients and 
to other external parties. It reinforces the .rm’s good reputation 
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and promotes recruitment, commitment and sta> motivation 
– if I belong to a selected group of the best and the brightest, 
I am strongly inclined to demonstrate my worth. It also helps 
the .rm to sell services. But keeping up this self-con.dent front 
requires people to overlook the many instances where the best 
and brightest don’t get ahead.
3e success of Excellence, and many other professional 
service .rms like it, is based on a culture of functional stupid-
ity. People working in these .rms are happy to believe in the 
myth of promoting only the best and brightest, despite signi.-
cant evidence to the contrary. When people can overlook these 
contradictions, they are able to preserve an image of themselves 
as the best and the brightest. So even if the systems at Excel-
lence did not work as intended, the faith in the systems did.
Of course, o"en it does not fully work like this, and con-
tradictions are too obvious to be denied. An interesting case 
is the Danish hearing-aid company Oticon. Its CEO, Lars 
Kolind, was a visionary leader. His vision was to ‘develop a 
truly knowledge-based company, which could make a di>er-
ence in the form of a breakthrough in user satisfaction with 
hearing aids. 3is not only requires a creative combination of 
technology, audiology and psychology, but also a much closer 
cooperation between the di>erent professionals involved in the 
actual selling, .tting and .ne-tuning of the hearing aid to the 
needs of each individual user.’
Kolind tried to abolish formal hierarchies. O=cial job titles 
were avoided and a ?exible work space established. Employees 
were encouraged to buy into a set of corporate values: trust, 
empowerment, open communication and respect for the indi-
vidual. 3ey put in place challenging goals and supported 
individual development. Employees were encouraged to ‘think 
the unthinkable’. 3ey were also asked to challenge managers’ 
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views and always eliminate any activities that didn’t add value 
to the customers.
Kolind wanted to empower his subordinates. He told them: 
‘When in doubt – then do it. If it works, it’s good, if not, you’re 
forgiven,’ and: ‘It’s easier to be forgiven than to get approval.’ 
He encouraged his employees to think about themselves as part 
of a ‘football team where each individual knows the objectives 
and the strategy and can kick the ball immediately without 
having to look up the rules and ask why’.
Kolind’s bold vision seemed to pay o>. Oticon became a 
great success story. It was widely reported in the media around 
the world as ‘the Spaghetti organisation’. 3e case became 
standard fare in many business schools.
For a time there was a good match between the write-ups 
that appeared in the media and what was actually going on in 
the .rm. But a"er a while, the company’s practices started to 
sharply diverge from the glowing image. 3e Spaghetti organi-
sation soon existed in nothing more than name. One employee 
described how ‘the magic has gone. It has become a more ordi-
nary workplace … Of course, we still have open-space o=ces 
and we can still move our shelves-on-wheels around, when we 
need to – but then that’s it.’
Despite these changes, the media continued to tell upbeat 
stories about the Spaghetti organisation, its originality and 
progressive nature. People who worked there recognised that 
what was being reported might be misleading, but they did not 
correct it. 3ere was some disquiet, but on the whole people 
liked the upbeat image and continued to play up to it. 3ey had 
become engrossed in a story about who they were that did not 
stand up to reality.16
As in Excellence, people in the .rm became absorbed in the 
image to the point of supporting a narcissistic faithfulness to a 
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narrative that did not match reality. 3is was a way to cling to 
peace and happiness, even though people sometimes chafed at 
their experience of the gap. To fall in love with the public image, 
when it is positive and narcissistically gratifying, to stick to it 
as closely as possible and minimise both recognition and com-
munication about its false nature, can help a lot to smooth over 
the bumps created by discrepancies between what people like 
to think and how it really is.
How structure creates turmoil
A strong faith in a system can o"en produce positive outcomes, 
both for the people employed and for the organisation as a 
whole. At Excellence, we met employees who had a strong faith 
in a system that didn’t work, yet this faith created some good 
outcomes: belief that they were part of a world-class meritoc-
racy helped them to sell the .rm to clients. But all too o"en a 
strong belief in systems can create negative outcomes. 3is is 
what o"en happens when people get too excited by a formal 
system and lose touch with the day-to-day realities of work. It 
happened at Costen Elementary school when a new principal, 
Mrs Kox, took over.17
Costen Elementary is a relatively large school with ninety 
teachers. It is located in a state in the US which had problems 
with its schools system. To deal with these problems, the school 
board decided to standardise the curriculum and instructional 
techniques. 3ey hoped that if schools followed standards, 
performance would improve. 3e state established clear – 
some would say rigid – benchmarks for student progress. It 
also threatened to close down poorly performing schools. In 
this context, Mrs Kox was seen as a rising star. As an assistant 
principal at an improving school, she attended an education 
programme run by an elite business school and an education 
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school. Kox loved the programme because ‘business people 
have a di>erent orientation to improvement’, she said. ‘3ey 
have a better sense of urgency.’ She was particularly enthusias-
tic about the idea of accountability.
3e board of Costen Elementary thought that Kox was a 
great candidate for the role of principal. Her enthusiasm for 
accountability appealed. ‘She’s very opinionated and has very 
high standards,’ one board member said. She was seen as 
‘very tough’ and had a ‘no-nonsense’ approach. A"er she was 
appointed, the board continued to see Kox as a strong leader. 
She guided the school into the new era of accountability, had 
exhaustive knowledge of education policy, was tireless, and held 
.rm to her convictions. Her results were also decent, at least to 
start with. 3e school’s test results were above the city average – 
but they fell short of Baxter Elementary, Costen’s sister school. 
Senior management continued to give Kox outstanding reviews 
and they enthusiastically renewed her contract. She seems to be 
a success story. Yet if you scratch the surface you .nd a rather 
di>erent picture.
For a long time, before the arrival of Kox, Costen responded 
to the diverse student body by given teachers lots of autonomy. 
3e teachers described the previous principals in glowing 
terms: ‘3ey hired good people who let them do their jobs,’ one 
teacher said.
When Kox arrived, all of this changed. Accountability and 
standards became central to how the school operated. 3e 
teachers had been ‘running the school without a principal for 
six months’, Kox said. ‘Everyone took full advantage of running 
in every direction that they chose to. Well, that’s not going to 
happen with this administration.’ Kox liked to work in a hands-
on way and give clear directions. She ?eshed out her ideas about 
accountability through strict surveillance of the classroom. She 
Stupidity Paradox.indd   142 07/04/2016   20:01
STRUCTURE-INDUCED STUPIDITY 143
instituted new student-management and grading systems, as 
well as curriculum and instruction reforms. While the previous 
administrations had rubber-stamped grades, Kox scrutinised 
them carefully. She now said that teachers were ‘panicking’ and 
that one was ‘very worried because she had never seen anyone 
review her grade book for the last 26 years’.
Teachers felt frustrated by Kox’s reforms. 3ey claimed they 
were being micro-managed and exposed to rigid controls, and 
felt that their work was being standardised. 3is created a sense 
of turmoil. One teacher described how ‘I’m constantly defend-
ing what I’m doing in my classroom’; another said: ‘You’d have 
to be psycho to stay here more than one or two years.’ Unsur-
prisingly, many teachers resigned. 3ose who remained started 
to mobilise against her. 3ese e>orts were spearheaded by Mrs 
Drew, who gathered a large number of complaints into a 119-
page document with the title ‘Turmoil at “KOX”sten School’. A 
campaign began to get Kox .red.
Some might see Kox as a dreary slave to accountability, others 
as an empowered entrepreneur who brought accountability to 
Costen, a task-oriented despot (the teachers’ view), or an intrepid 
leader (the board’s view).18 We see Kox as a typical example of 
someone with an unre?ecting commitment to structural solu-
tions. She rigidly stuck with the system and had little sensitivity 
to the local culture. She focused on policies and procedures and 
ignored the impact her system had on the sta>. 3is created prob-
lems: many teachers described the school as being ‘in turmoil’. 
Many sta> le". Results began to decline. But despite all this, Kox 
continued to have strong backup from the school board.
Kox’s behaviour may appear to be rigid and lacking in sensi-
tivity, but we live in a society that is more and more focused on 
accountability and scrutinising organisations. Massive amounts 
of resources are wasted on checking whether organisations 
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have the correct formal structures in place. In this sense, Kox 
was a paradigm of the society of super.cial scrutiny.
!e society of super"cial scrutiny
‘Formally speaking we have done everything right. We complied 
with the rules. We are looking at our procedures.’ Today, this 
has become a standard formula for managing organisations.
Complying with formal regulations is sensible, but more 
o"en than not the sheer weight of externally imposed rules 
means that people put more e>ort into ensuring all the boxes 
have been ticked than actually getting the job done. In sectors 
like social services, health care and education there are so 
many standards and formal regulations to be complied with. 
Organisations dig deep into precious resources to ensure that 
regulatory requirements are met. Less and less time is devoted 
to serving vulnerable groups, caring for patients or educat-
ing students. 3ere is little assessment of the substantive work 
done. 3is is viewed as too complicated. Instead the focus is on 
super.cial scrutiny.
We live in a society of super.cial scrutiny, of constant checks 
to see whether we comply with some arbitrary standard. 3is is 
something that Mike Power recognised over twenty years ago 
when he coined the concept of the ‘audit society’.19 What has 
changed is that now many of these checks are only skin-deep 
– stage a routine of complying, and that su=ces. Compliance 
becomes all about image-creation. Organisations get geared to 
live up to what is scrutinised.
To show that they are doing the right thing, many organisa-
tions simply copy what others are doing. 3ey imitate others not 
necessarily because it is the best thing for them to do, but rather 
so as to reduce reputational risk. If you have been copying eve-
ryone else and something goes wrong, it is unlikely you will 
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be singled out for blame. Blame becomes di>used, so you can 
point out that everyone got it wrong. Government inspectors 
and special-interest groups who closely monitor organisations 
and punish deviations also play a big part. 3e media are also 
happy to chip in when there is an instance of rule-breaking. 
And of course there are lawyers on hand to see everything done 
‘by the book’.
3at is what has happened in the medical sector in the UK. 
Doctors .nd they are increasingly exposed to an ever-expand-
ing range of legislation, regulations and protocols. Many of 
these measures are what Gerry McGivern and Michael Fischer 
have called ‘spectacular regulation’20 – these are the policies 
cooked up to deal with the media fallout from a high-pro.le 
scandal. Spectacular regulations are not primarily designed to 
work. 3ey are designed to shut the media up and placate the 
public. As doctors .nd they are subjected to more and more of 
this spectacular regulation, they feel ‘guilty until proven inno-
cent’. Naturally they .nd this stressful – dealing with pointless 
regulation takes time, and always feeling like a potential culprit 
is a big psychological challenge. 3e main group that gains 
from this system is an ever-growing blame business of lawyers, 
regulators, the media and patient advocates who .nd ever more 
opportunities to ‘hold doctors to account’.
3e disadvantages of all this are obvious. It contributes to 
inertia, hyper-caution and weak results. Organisations develop 
a planning fetish. Error minimisation becomes the primary 
job. Education, health care, the police and many other sectors 
devote ever more of their time to ensuring that their docu-
mentation is done correctly. If anything goes wrong, they have 
chapter and verse: all procedures were correctly followed.
By carefully following all the right rules and routines, 
people are able to avoid greater responsibility for the substantial 
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practices or outcomes. Even when people in an organisation 
do things that everyone recognises as da", they are approved. 
For instance, it is preferable to have an anti-bullying plan and 
‘follow routines’ rather than deal directly with a bully in the 
workplace. If a hospital has a problem with cleanliness and 
hygiene standards, it might be enough to show that you have 
a ‘strategy’ to deal with it. Actually obliging people to wash 
their hands or properly cleaning wards is o"en an a"erthought. 
Making an e>ort to follow the rules and routines is good 
enough. It enables the hospital to avoid blame.
What this gives rise to is increasingly ine=cient organisa-
tions that are more and more costly to run. While they might 
be weak at delivering on their core purpose, they are strong 
at doing everything formally right. 3ey say the right things 
and look good to the external world, yet they .nd it hard to do 
their central tasks. 3e driving force here is to rule out errors. 
Courage, creativity and good results grow less important. A 
safer strategy is to ensure you have ticked all the boxes, fol-
lowed procedures and have formally ‘done the right thing’.
In a society of super.cial scrutiny the media, regulators and 
interest groups all carefully monitor whether organisations are 
living up to norms. 3ey check that everything is done ‘cor-
rectly’. However these checks go only so far. 3e more they 
monitor plans, routines and documents, the further they stray 
from the practical work being done. Typically the only thing 
all this super.cial scrutiny is guaranteed to produce is more 
super.cial compliance. In the words of a municipal director: 
‘A"er having done all the plans and have the documents in 
order, you don’t have time to work with them.’
A typical example of this is a social welfare director of a 
municipality. Following the annual inspection by the social 
services regulatory body, the agency received about twenty-.ve 
Stupidity Paradox.indd   146 07/04/2016   20:01
STRUCTURE-INDUCED STUPIDITY 147
comments. A"er the following year’s inspection, the director 
received no remarks from the regulator. When we asked him 
if they had changed anything substantive, the director replied: 
‘No, but we’ve written down twenty-.ve new routines.’
Legislators push for stronger or more detailed regulations to 
solve problems. 3e media and pressure groups call for ‘some-
thing to be done’. Regulators monitor those who actually do the 
work and ensure that correct procedures are followed. Managers 
comply with what regulators want by implementing new plans, 
policies and practices. Professionals follow these routines. Eve-
rybody seems to bene.t from this process. 3ey all feel they do 
things correctly. 3e only problem is that as people dutifully 
ensure that boxes are ticked, the organisation may be run badly. 
3ose supposed to bene.t from all this box-ticking o"en end up 
su>ering, but this happens below the radar: super.cial scrutiny 
focuses on structures, routines and procedures. Are they there? 
Are they followed? Yes, .ne. Do they lead to something good or 
bad or nothing at all? Well, it is hard to say. So who cares?
Conclusion
Formal structures, rules and routines can be a source of signi.-
cant stupidity in organisations. 3ey are necessary, but many 
organisations overdo them. Structures are o"en mistaken for 
guarantees of quality, productivity and reliability. Far-reaching 
division of labour encourages tunnel vision and box-ticking. 
Most people have a limited overview and do not make much 
e>ort to carefully look behind surface structures.
At the apex of organisations, senior executives are supposed 
to integrate all these specialists, but top managers o"en focus 
on rules, regulations and routines as well as on the most easily 
manipulated performance indicators. 3ey live in their own 
world, spending their time meeting other managers. 3ey rely 
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on PowerPoint presentations and carefully massaged numeri-
cal indicators to sum up what is happening down below. Many 
senior people have very little real knowledge of what goes on in 
their organisations. 3is is fortunate, because they o"en don’t 
want too much knowledge. Knowing too much can be frustrat-
ing and stressful. Wilful ignorance is a good practice.21
Further down the organisational hierarchy, most people are 
encouraged to just focus on their work and not think about 
the broader picture. 3ey end up doing narrow, specialised 
work and avoid looking into its outcome. Increased specialisa-
tion creates problems for organisational functioning, but this 
is not an issue for those safely located in their functional stupid 
worlds. Normally problems are not clearly understood or com-
municated. Widespread thoughtlessness can feel comfortable 
for experts and senior executives alike. But it can also create 
a lot of problems that remain undetected and misunderstood.
A strict division of labour is reinforced through the mush-
rooming of experts in ever narrower areas of speciality. 3ese 
experts o"en become good at rigour and rationality within their 
own narrow world. However, they frequently lack a wider view 
of problems. 3ey become smart and stupid at the same time. 
3ey can solve some problems, but they o"en create others.
3e mixture of narrowly focused experts, myopic senior 
managers and routinised workers creates organisations where 
rule-following trumps good results. People develop a faith in 
processes and procedures – even when they don’t necessarily 
deliver the goods. In the short term this produces many good 
things: it helps individuals build a career and organisations to 
operate smoothly. It looks good on the surface. But it can also 
be a source of many problems in the longer term. Instead of 
focusing on doing the core tasks, an organisation becomes more 
focused on super.cial compliance with rules and regulations.
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Following the crowd
In the middle of the twentieth century most US corporations 
saw themselves as an unrelated portfolio of di>erent activities. 
3e largest corporations typically owned a wide range of dif-
ferent businesses which had little to do with each other. At the 
time, business leaders assumed that these loosely related busi-
ness conglomerates were the best way to operate a .rm. It gave 
.rms the advantage of being able to manage risks across di>er-
ent sectors and countries, it helped them share resources, and 
it brought ample opportunity to grow.
By the late twentieth century this had all changed. 3e idea 
of the conglomerate operating in multiple business areas had 
gone out of fashion. Firms began to radically restructure them-
selves by selling their unrelated businesses. 3ey focused on 
what they thought were their ‘core competencies’.
What caused such a radical shi"?
3e typical reason provided is that a focus on core com-
petencies was simply better. Companies that concentrated on 
activities where they had a genuine edge were more likely to 
survive and thrive. Capital tended to ?ow towards those .rms 
that had a genuine advantage in a particular sector. Hence 
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resources would not be tied up in substandard operations.
However, a more careful look reveals a quite di>erent 
picture.1 O"en companies decided to focus on core compe-
tencies because other organisations were doing the same. 3e 
concept was popular, and like any bandwagon, people wanted 
to jump on it. 3ere were also many in?uential people from 
management gurus to academics and consultancy .rms calling 
for .rms to refocus their operations in this way.
One particularly in?uential group who championed the 
idea of core competencies were securities analysts. 3ese are 
the people working for large .nancial institutions who rec-
ommend whether investors should buy, sell or hold shares in 
a particular company. 3ey estimate how much a company is 
worth. O"en these estimates can have a big in?uence over how 
much companies’ shares will actually be traded for.
Analysts are o"en seen as people who make objective 
assessments of the value of a company, but their judgements 
o"en depend on prevailing fashions. During the tech boom, for 
instance, analysts rallied to overvalue the shares of technology 
companies. 3is also applies in the case of core competencies. 
When the idea came into fashion, analysts started to system-
atically overvalue the shares of companies that claimed to be 
refocusing their business to that end. 3is gave companies big 
incentives to follow the herd and engage in corporate restruc-
turing around core competencies. If they did this, they would 
probably get positive recommendations from analysts, the 
companies’ shares would go up, and the CEO’s bonus along 
with them.
3is all sounds .ne in the short term, but in the longer 
term it would o"en create problems. Many of the predictions 
about the bene.ts of refocusing companies did not come true. 
Restructuring a company around core competencies sometimes 
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produced superior returns, but o"en the .nancial results 
would be disappointing. As a result, the analysts’ predictions 
were o"en wide of the mark. You might think this was a big 
problem for them, but mostly it was not. If an analyst followed 
the crowd and made similar predictions to everyone else, then 
they would not seem so stupid. However, if they went against 
the crowd and showed independent thinking, then they would 
stand out – and much of the time this was not desirable. 3ey 
might be viewed as making chancy predictions and .nd their 
career prospects dwindling. It should come as no surprise that 
recent research has found that the most successful investment 
analysts are usually people who make recommendations with 
only moderate levels of novelty.2 Real independent thinking is 
usually dangerous for an analyst’s career prospects.
Systematically rewarding companies that focus on core 
competencies (despite the fact they had low returns) is just one 
example of a form of functional stupidity widely practised by 
many organisations: imitation. All too o"en companies do 
things not because they produce the best results, but because 
everyone else is doing it. By following the crowd, they avoid 
thinking too much and sidestep di=culties that might come 
from having an idiosyncratic position. 3is kind of thoughtless 
herd-following is o"en richly rewarded, but it also creates risks 
of pursuing the crowd o> a cli>.
When image is everything
Executives who control modern organisations – in particular 
large and public ones – are eager to show they are up to date. 
3ey do this by adopting the latest practices, whether it be cor-
porate social responsibility, social media, authentic leadership 
development, branding, balance scorecards, talent manage-
ment or whatever else is hot at the time. 3is means that new 
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initiatives abound, sometimes e>ective and sometimes not. 
Most of the time it is impossible to know. One study of Ameri-
can corporations found that .rms that implemented popular 
management fashions did not have on average better .nancial 
performance than other .rms.3 3e only signi.cant di>erence 
the researchers found was that a"er implementing the manage-
ment fad in question, the CEO’s pay tended to go up. 3is gives 
us cause to be suspicious about management fashions. All too 
o"en doing the same as others means doing something that 
technically or economically just does not make sense. While 
these new practices might create a mix of problems, advantages 
and ambiguities, they come with a signi.cant advantage: they 
make the organisation look good.
Copying what others are doing can create problems. It can 
further entrench received ideas of how things should be. It can 
undermine the e=ciency of an organisation’s operation. It can 
also mean that organisations adopt practices which are unsuit-
able because they are seen as ‘normal’, ‘appropriate’, or the 
‘right thing to do’. Of course, it may be smart to adopt some 
practices. In embracing the fashion, an organisation appears 
to be respectable. 3is can attract resources: it can become per-
ceived as an attractive business partner or gain access to key 
opinion-makers.4
But what about substantive issues like performance? Is it not 
good to identify ‘best practice’ and then implement it? Some-
times this is true, but there are problems. ‘Best practice’ is o"en 
the airbrushed version of a business practice that is peddled by 
pop management authors, the business press and consultants, 
but is not durable enough to be moved between organisations. 
3e many recipes for corporate greatness which have seduced 
numerous executives have proved to have a limited shelf-
life. Japanese management was very popular among Western 
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executives during the 1980s, but as Western executives were 
searching for inspiration in Japan, and piles of books cel-
ebrating Japanese-style management appeared, the Japanese 
economy started to falter. When the Spaghetti organization 
of Oticon was celebrated in mass media, the .rm had already 
started to abandon it. What .ts one successful company (or 
industry, or even a nation) does not suit another. Best practice 
is o"en a matter of local speci.city and is hard to cultivate. 
What may work is dependent on context, networks, organisa-
tional culture and local competences. Imitation is o"en very 
di=cult. You may install formal structures and practices that 
try to replicate the admired source .rm, but outside the context 
they came from they can operate quite di>erently.
It is sometimes smart to manipulate surface-level images, 
but more o"en than not, to do this involves signi.cant func-
tional stupidity. If positive results are lacking, it may go 
unnoticed or only be recognised a"er a long delay. When this 
happens, bad corporate memory, shi"ing careers and intense 
indi>erence to learning can make super.cial imitation quite 
acceptable.
Jumping on the bandwagon
Copycatting is an important skill in corporate life, but one that 
needs disguising. It is much easier to follow others than think 
for yourself. 3e desire to keep up with fashions and the fear 
of lagging behind others plays a major role in corporate life. 
Deviation from the crowd is fraught with problems. Fortu-
nately, bandwagons keep you safe.
We o"en assume that senior executives are independent, 
strong-willed, rational people who on the whole make wise 
decisions. Jan Wallander thinks otherwise. Wallander was for 
many years one of Sweden’s most highly respected business 
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leaders. He sat on the boards of many companies and was the 
key .gure behind the development of Handelsbanken into one 
of the most admired .nancial institutions in Europe. Wallander 
thinks that senior executives are largely driven by a desire to 
be in tune with their time. Uneasy to diverge from the crowd, 
they readily follow new management trends and fashions. 3is 
means they may shuttle between ideas, o"en with little to show 
for it. ‘Business leaders are just as fashion-conscious as teenage 
girls choosing jeans,’ Wallander wrote. ‘3ey are like a herd 
of sheep munching at the grass. If they hear that the grass is 
greener on the other side of the hill, they rush away, and then 
all the others follow.’5
Wallander has proved to be right. Managers o"en make 
decisions in the manner of sheep in a ?ock. 3ey just troop 
along with what others in their industry are doing. 3is is 
exactly what James Westphal and his colleagues found when 
they looked at why hospitals in Texas started using Total 
Quality Management techniques.6 3e idea of TQM was devel-
oped largely in the manufacturing sector. At .rst it was not 
completely clear that the techniques used for building a car 
could also be used for treating a patient, but in the mid-1980s 
a few hospitals in Texas began to run experiments. 3ey found 
that the techniques needed to be tailored to their own organisa-
tions, and spent some time on making modi.cations.
A"er about 400 hospitals had adopted some kind of TQM 
system, duly customised to their needs, other hospitals started 
to follow suit, but instead of going into detail, and tailoring in 
line with local needs, they just followed the ?ock and copied 
what others were doing. Quite soon two thousand hospitals 
had implemented some kind of TQM system. If past studies are 
anything to judge by, it was likely that these latecomers would 
not get the same e=ciency gains from applying these systems. 
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So why apply them? 3e answer seemed to be, that everyone 
else was. If a hospital was directly linked with another that had 
adopted TQM, then it would be more likely to do it. By tagging 
along, hospitals ended up with a new management technique, 
but perhaps more importantly, they contrived to be seen as 
legitimate by their peers, and by others who mattered.
3ese dynamics in Texan hospitals are almost exactly like 
the teenagers shopping for jeans that Wallander describes. 
Daring .rst movers try out a new style and customise it. 3en 
the mass starts to copy the .rst movers – o"en with little 
thought and no customising. Peer pressure rules – if people 
you are close to have the new jeans, then you should too. O"en 
the new style of jeans doesn’t .t everyone – on some they look 
positively awkward. But no matter – looking good is not the 
point. 3e teenagers are buying the new jeans to .t in and gain 
approval by their peers. It was the same with the Texan hos-
pitals: implementing a TQM system might not make much 
di>erence, but it did align them with their peers.
One of the main reasons senior executives are so fashion-
conscious is that corporate life is plagued by uncertainty. O"en 
managers do not know for sure whether a new practice works. 
Cost–bene.t analysis is o"en little more than guesswork. 3e 
only thing we know about the future is that we don’t know it. 
When uncertainty is high, it o"en is safer to go where the rest 
do. 3en you avoid too much blame. 3ere are always business 
gurus, consultants and professionals willing to tell you what 
everyone else is doing or what they plan to do. Executives, like 
the rest of us, are o"en eager to hear positive news. 3e promise 
of quick .xes is appealing. Falling behind the times can ruin 
careers.
Over thirty years ago, two sociologists recognised that 
many organisations were trapped in an iron cage of their own 
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making. While looking at many sectors, Paul DiMaggio and 
Walter Powell noticed that most organisations were much 
alike.7 3ey had similar organisational structures, similar strat-
egies, HR systems, and brands. If you asked people within each 
company, they would say they were unique, but look at each 
company in a sector, and they were to all intents and purposes 
the same. Powell and DiMaggio asked themselves, why is there 
so much similarity? 3ey came up with three reasons: regula-
tion, shared thinking and common norms.8
3e .rst reason for so much similarity is regulation. Firms 
were o"en subject to the same rules and laws. In responding to 
these regulations, companies tend to generate the same kind 
of rules and internal policies. For instance, in many countries 
around the world companies are legally required to ensure that 
they are not damaging the natural environment too much. 
Accordingly, companies have developed policies, instituted 
procedures and employed sta> whose task it is to see that the 
.rm is in compliance. With globalisation, many rules and laws 
have gone international. 3is means that companies world-
wide face increasingly similar laws. One result is that they have 
started to look increasingly similar – on a super.cial level. For 
instance, large banks across the world have had to respond to 
the Basel regulations on liquidity. In response, they have taken 
a more and more uniform approach to managing the amount 
of capital they have on their balance sheets.
3e second reason why companies can be so similar is 
shared thinking. As we have seen, executives are o"en very 
uncertain, groping to know what makes a company successful. 
To deal with this uncertainty, they o"en simply look at what 
other successful .rms are doing and try to do the same. For 
instance, many companies conclude that they need to be more 
innovative. To increase their rates of innovation, they look at 
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.rms well known for being innovative, such as Google, then 
dispatch their executives to Silicon Valley to visit tech com-
panies’ corporate campuses in the hope that they will learn 
something. 3ey o"en ignore the fact that Google is an entirely 
di>erent sector to them, and the lessons in view probably of 
limited value. 3ey also overlook that even if they do learn 
something, actually implementing it within their organisation 
is likely to be di=cult, if not impossible.
3e .nal driver of copycat behaviour that Powell and 
 DiMaggio identi.ed is normative pressure. 3is involves pres-
sure to follow along with social norms prevalent in an industry. 
To appear well adjusted, a .rm needs to echo all the rest. 3ey 
should adopt the same structures, processes, policies and lan-
guage as other .rms in the .eld. You prove environmental 
awareness by introducing paper recycling in the o=ce. You 
show that you are concerned about your employees’ wellbe-
ing by providing a company gym. You show you are ‘strategic’ 
and ‘ambitious’ by presenting a corporate vision that states you 
will rival the best in the world in your industry by some date 
way in the distant future. To show concern with gender equal-
ity, you appoint two female board members. To show concern 
with racism you set up a diversity o=ce sta>ed by one of the 
few obviously non-white people in the company. You show you 
deplore child labour by doing an ethical audit on your supply 
chain. Sometimes a high moral tone even leads to a company 
forbidding employees from using hotel chains that show erotic 
.lms. Small .rms may be let o> the hook, but large, well-
known organisations in the glare of the media spotlight .nd 
themselves under pressure to comply.
What one company does can o"en be highly idiosyncratic. 
Outsiders o"en .nd it hard to understand exactly what is going 
on inside a .rm, and this will make it di=cult to copy. So when 
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companies try to imitate one another, it is o"en very super-
.cial. Genuine, ‘in-depth’ imitation is another matter. For 
instance, many companies have some form of CSR activity. 
However, there is a huge degree of variation in what goes on 
under this label – even within the same industry. Some .rms 
have environmentally friendly buildings, others get their sta> 
to read to impoverished children. Fortunately, super.cial labels 
are sometimes enough to make people happy.
3is super.cial learning can lead companies to make 
dangerous assumptions. One reason for this is that when 
companies want to learn something, they o"en look only at 
the best-known companies. 3ese are usually the winners in 
a particular industry, and we tend to like success stories. But 
the problem with focusing only on winners is that you learn 
from a very biased sample.9 You ignore the great majority of 
companies which have either gone out of business or are still 
limping along. Looking at these companies could presumably 
tell you something insightful – even if it is what you should 
not be doing. By only looking at winners, you rule out many 
of the painful lessons you could learn from people who have 
tried and failed. But there is another trap lurking. By focusing 
only on winners, you are picking a sample of .rms which are 
likely to have followed risky strategies. 3ese are the ones that 
got lucky and made it. 3ey could just as well have failed. What 
this means is that all the .rms in the world who are trying to 
copy Uber’s business model are making a big mistake. 3ey are 
focusing on only one example that happened to make it in a sea 
of many hundreds that failed. If a .rm really wants to learn, it 
should look at failures too.
As well as being misguided, attempts at imitation can be 
rather ham-.sted. Consider the adoption of total quality man-
agement by the Swedish armed forces. In one regiment, an 
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o=cer instructed to describe a new operational control system 
to her colleagues talked about ‘main processes’, ‘support pro-
cesses’ and ‘leadership processes’. 3is whole system, she 
said, would result in ‘process development’. Sensing a scepti-
cal response, she went on to explain why the Swedish military 
should implement the control system: ‘3ere is presumably a 
good reason, because the business sector has implemented ISO 
9000 certi.cation in a great many companies and they require 
their subcontractors to be certi.ed. And this is presumably 
something you bene.t from, since this is what they do in the 
private sector.’10 Strong reasons indeed: as the private sector 
may bene.t from this, then we should do the same. 3is is 
functional stupidity in concentrated form.
Looking organised
During the mid-1970s, the Stanford sociologist John Meyer 
was studying schools. He noticed that schools in the United 
States were rather strange.11 On the one hand they claimed to 
have particular organisational structures. Each of the schools 
he looked at claimed to follow a standard model. But when he 
looked a little more carefully, he noticed that the structures a 
school laid claim to were quite di>erent from how they actu-
ally worked. Why was there such a big di>erence between how 
schools claimed to run themselves and how they actually ran? 
Would it not be much better if formal structures and practice 
were in tune?
To answer this question, he and one of his doctoral stu-
dents, Brian Rowan, looked at whether there was a big split 
between what they called ‘legitimizing structures’ and the 
underlying organisation of work.12 3e legitimising structures 
were the public face of the organisation. 3ey were how the 
schools claimed to be organised. 3e work organisation was 
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the nuts and bolts of how the schools actually got the job done. 
3ey also realised that the public face of the organisation was 
mainly a ceremony: it was about putting on a show. But like any 
ceremony, this was largely unrelated to everyday life. 3e way 
things got done was something else altogether.
But what Meyer and Rowan found most striking was that 
large parts of organisations like schools are largely protected 
from immediate practical demands. Instead of focusing on the 
actual work process, schools spend most of their time on cer-
emonial activities. 3ey develop plans, set up meetings, write 
reports, develop policy statements, prepare presentations and 
all the other things a ‘proper’ school is supposed to do. All this 
ceremonial activity o"en had little or no impact on the imme-
diate work process. In fact most of the time it was a distraction. 
But this did not mean it was a complete waste of time. Making 
sure that the ceremony was up to scratch was actually a key 
part of ensuring that a school kept going. If a school performed 
the ceremony well, and satis.ed people’s expectations, then it 
would be rewarded. Important stakeholders would be more 
likely to give it resources, or at least to leave it alone. But if the 
school did not go through the ceremony, then it was likely to 
be punished.
Soon Meyer and Rowan realised that this insight did not 
apply just to schools. 3ey also played out in many other 
modern organisations with objectives that were hard to pin 
down. 3is is a common characteristic of human service 
organisations such as hospitals, prisons and care homes, as well 
as of schools and higher education institutions. Here, it is cer-
emony that counts. 3e entire organisation can grow obsessed 
with getting the ceremony right, even when it undermines its 
wider purpose.
One common ceremony in human service organisations 
Stupidity Paradox.indd   160 07/04/2016   20:01
IMITATION-INDUCED STUPIDITY 161
is accumulating quantitative indicators. Hospitals track the 
number of hospital beds occupied, schools monitor the grades 
students achieve, universities measure the number of papers 
sta> publish and how happy students are with their courses, 
police measure the number of alcohol tests carried out, and 
airport authorities count the number of passengers who are 
‘delighted’ to have their bags searched. But all too o"en this 
measurement back.res. Ensuring that all hospital beds are 
occupied can mean delaying patients’ release. Ensuring that 
students get high test scores can mean they are taught how 
to pass exams, but little else. Carrying out lots of breath tests 
can mean that motorists are breathalysed at inappropriate and 
inconvenient times. Making sure that passengers are delighted 
may mean you do not scan all their luggage. As a result, ful-
.lling the overall purpose of the organisation can easily take 
second place to producing nice-looking statistics.
3e question of what the actual goals of an organisation 
are can be hard to answer, particularly in the public sector. As 
a result substantive goals matter less and impressions matter 
more. One result of this is rousing vision statements that say 
great things about what an organisation sets out to achieve, but 
usually these are just an interchangeable collection of man-
agement buzz words cooked up on some senior management 
retreat and then .nessed by a communications consultant. 
3ere is o"en little, if any, real relationship between these 
empty words and the actual goals of an organisation.
Charles Perrow, a sociologist at Yale, realised this was the 
case.13 He asked himself what public-sector organisations, in 
particular in human services, are actually steered by. One thing 
he thought was important was what he called the ‘external 
function’ of these organisations. 3is was all the unrecog-
nised services they provided to the external community. For 
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instance, schools keep young people occupied and o> the 
street; universities help to keep young people out of the unem-
ployment statistics; social service organisations employ people, 
including many coming out of an overin?ated higher educa-
tion system. Perrow also thought there were some important 
internal motives within these organisations. 3ey included 
maximising resources, making working conditions as com-
fortable as possible, preserving peace and harmony, avoiding 
open con?icts and scandals, and conveying a good impression 
to outside audiences. 3ese functions and objectives o"en take 
the upper hand, partly because there are no clear indicators 
of how successful organisations are in substantive terms. It is, 
for example, o"en unknown what a university accomplishes in 
terms of improving the intellectual functioning of their stu-
dents. All we know is that a certain percentage graduate. As we 
saw earlier, many of the graduates do not get any brighter from 
their education.
3e uno=cial drivers of an organisation do not necessarily 
contradict o=cial objectives. Sometimes they can even help to 
achieve them. But if managers took these objectives very seri-
ously, they would quickly face an arduous task. Changing the 
allocation of resources irrespective of established precedents, 
rede.ning areas of responsibility irrespective of existing 
claims to roles, changing people’s goals without considering 
their interests – these are things that will not be met with 
open arms. Doing what appears to be rational rather than 
following set conventions will o"en lead to amazement and 
dismay. Too much thinking for yourself is likely to prompt 
hostility. Following formal rituals, avoiding con?icts and not 
risking negative publicity is o"en the safer option. A strong 
faith in formal structures and procedures creates problems 
through complicating matters, but having a belief in these 
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formal structures makes life easier for managers and others 
involved.
Corporate window-dressing
Window-dressing is a vital part of running any organisation, 
whether in the public or in the private sector. 3is involves 
attempts to make the public face of an organisation look good. 
Policies and practices are adopted to impress external groups 
like activists, customers, politicians, the media and public 
authorities. It matters very little whether some new policy 
actually makes the organisation run more smoothly. What is 
vital is that it makes things look that way – even if they are 
not.
We o"en hear that the hard commercial facts of the private 
sector mean that image cuts no ice if you can’t create prod-
ucts and services that customers want. While this is sometimes 
the case, many private-sector organisations are no less image-
obsessed than their cousins in the public sector.
3e concern for image-preening has fuelled a spectacular 
expansion of the corporate beauty industry. Decorative sur-
faces in the form of architecture, premises, letterhead design, 
brochures, posters, PowerPoint presentations, company uni-
forms and attractive employees are on the rise. For instance, we 
were told about one well known French company that recently 
remodelled its o=ces in central Paris. 3e o=ce was huge and 
stood in the city’s most prestigious district, but it housed hardly 
any employees. Most of the sta> were located at o=ces on the 
outskirts of town where land was cheaper. When the .rm was 
asked why it had this expensive facility with no employees, 
their response was: it creates a good impression.
Whether the public or customers bene.t or lose from this 
corporate beauty contest is hard to tell. It may be pleasing 
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to watch, but it also means that resources and attention are 
taken away from core processes. 3is can mean that as the 
organisation looks more beautiful from afar, it looks much 
less appealing close up. Consider the example of banking in 
the United Kingdom. Many of the large banks have devoted 
greater shares of their resources to window-dressing activi-
ties. 3ey have redesigned branches, run expensive advertising 
campaigns, instituted CSR initiatives and much more. Yet at 
the same time customer satisfaction ratings continue to be very 
low. It seems that as banks have built impressive images, their 
customers have become increasingly grumpy.
Promising rainbows
Diversity management is something most organisations are 
eager to champion, particularly if they have a prominent 
public face. Organisations originate diversity policies, create 
mentorship (or reverse mentorship) programmes, build a=n-
ity networks, implement unconscious bias training and much 
more. All this work can be a positive step towards changing 
discriminatory workplace practices, but o"en this does not 
happen. Sometimes diversity management is more symbolism 
than substance. It is about publicly signalling that a company 
takes diversity really seriously and is doing something about it. 
By showing that they have put systems and procedures in place, 
organisations can ‘prove’ that they are good employers. Little 
may have changed in terms of who does what in a corporation, 
or how ‘minority’ employees are treated, but doing diversity 
management ticks the box.
3e demand for diversity-management policies has created 
a multi-billion-dollar industry in the United States.14 Compa-
nies active in the sector need to continually assure their clients 
about the value of their services and products. One client, a 
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personnel manager in a Canadian oil company who was respon-
sible for diversity training, justi.ed his choice of consultant 
because ‘they were not into the same old ideas – you know the 
hippie images of the seventies. 3ey are real professionals, and 
are willing to change their programs to give us something new 
each time.’15 3eir assumption seemed to be that ‘something 
new’ means ‘something better’ – or at least that it will look 
better. Consultants also stressed the importance of coming up 
with something new. One of them said: ‘3at old sensitivity 
training stu> has no selling power any more. You’ve got to give 
it [diversity] more management appeal – link it to e=ciency or 
performance, somehow connect it to saving money. 3at’s the 
feeling of the times.’16
Coming up with something distinct is important: it needs to 
be presented as clearly di>erent from ‘the old stu> ’, and needs 
to be well packaged. Diversity experts also monitor other com-
panies and imitate their latest initiatives. 3ey try to link their 
activities with other fashionable themes such as teamwork. 3e 
sales message is that diversity pays. Diversity is usually sold 
by using appealing images like ‘rainbow cultures’ and ‘mosaic 
workplaces’.
3e pro.table, harmonious and beautiful world of diversity 
promised by consultants and craved by clients is not so easily 
achieved. One problem is that the local relevance of diversity 
programmes is o"en limited. For instance, a study of diversity 
management in the Canadian oil industry found there was a 
mismatch between what companies provided and what course 
participants wanted. Many of the leading companies in North 
America were o"en based in North Carolina and Georgia and 
in?uenced by themes relevant for African Americans and 
middle-class women with jobs. However, for people working 
in the Canadian oil industry companies, diversity issues were 
Stupidity Paradox.indd   165 07/04/2016   20:01
THE STUPIDITY PARADOX 166
o"en linked with quite di>erent matters such as ‘francophones’ 
– French-speaking Canadians from Quebec. 3is created a per-
ception that the content of diversity programmes on o>er was 
barely relevant.
While diversity was o"en presented using images of 
harmony, participants were aware that this did not always 
.t the facts. A"er participation in one such programme, a 
manager said: ‘It really is a feel-good exercise. You know, we 
can all feel good that we are this happy multi-colored family – 
that’s going to bring in all this money for the .rm. 3e truth is 
quite another matter. If people are really di>erent, they don’t 
get along that easily, they want to do things di>erently, and they 
get upset about how they are told to do work.’17
Oil companies o"en have a bad reputation for being con-
servative and backward, yet they want to give the impression 
that they are forward-looking and up-to-date. Large and well-
known consultancy .rms o>ering the latest programmes were 
engaged to do the job for them, but this had a mainly cosmetic 
e>ect. Fashionable, standardised programmes did not win over 
sta> at the local level. 3ey merely made participants sceptical. 
In the end it meant that diversity-management programmes 
were more about chasing rainbows than delivering practical 
change.
Sceptical responses from some participants could com-
plicate things. If expressed widely and honestly it might 
undermine the ambitions and hopes of such initiatives. Luckily 
the risk of this happening is low. Participants are o"en hesitant 
to spell out their scepticism. 3ey may worry that these kind of 
remarks could mark them out as someone who is ‘o> message’, 
‘out of date’, or who ‘doesn’t get it’. Top management are o"en 
more concerned to convey that they are doing something than 
worried about what the outcome actually is. O"en participant 
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compliance and executive ignorance rescues meaningless cor-
porate activities from extinction.
Conclusion
Many aspects of organisational life are not about making 
things function more e=ciently. Instead they are about creating 
the right external image and complying with broadly shared 
expectations of how an organisation should be. 3is is because 
managers and others in organisations are o"en conformists – 
they aim to do what everyone else is doing and avoid standing 
out from the pack. 3ey imitate others and follow fashions as 
fervently as any teenager. Structures and formal practices that 
look good are adapted. 3is interest in looking good is o"en 
most pronounced in public-sector organisations, but compa-
nies are also increasingly scrutinised on the basis of whether 
they live up to a formula of what a good .rm should exhibit: 
corporate strategy, outsourcing, CSR, branding campaigns, 
HRM policies and strategies, diversity management and much 
more.
An increasingly important part of work is just about polish-
ing the image of the .rm. O"en this comes with problems. A 
disconnect between the rosy images a company tries to project 
and sharper practices can lead to frustration, low commitment 
and cynicism. 3is can o"en be bad business. So many organi-
sations try to convince themselves – and others – that what 
looks good actually is good. If this is not the case now, then 
perhaps it will come in the future. 3is eagerness to have faith 
in, and be proud of, window-dressing structures and to deny 
that one is a fashion-following conformist is signi.cant. It helps 
to boost identity and self-esteem. Avoiding sceptical think-
ing about all this is vital for morale. It also helps to encourage 
people to commit to exhibiting the right surface and maintain 
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the belief that this matters. In a surface-loving society, this is 
not as hard as it seems.
3e current fascination with branding helps a lot. In the 
next chapter we explore this goldmine of functional stupidity.
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A damn "ne omelette?
Some years ago, the Swedish military decided it needed to 
change. Compulsory service had been dropped a few years 
earlier. No longer was the force made up of lots of foot soldiers 
who provided the brawn for defending the country. Instead 
it was sta>ed by a smaller number of professional military 
personnel who were supposed to provide the brains to run 
peacekeeping missions. However, some thought there was a 
problem. 3e image of the military lagged behind the times. 
What was needed was a rebranding campaign.
3e idea of rebranding the armed forces would have seemed 
ridiculous only a few decades ago. A"er all this was a non-pro.t 
out.t and there was hardly any need to di>erentiate it from 
other organisations. 3ere was – and is – only one military 
force in Sweden. Nevertheless, the Defence Forces wanted to 
show that they were up to date, so they persevered. A smart new 
communication director was hired. He set out to ‘rebrand’ the 
Defence Force, hoping to rejuvenate it, and put it in tune with 
the times. 3is meant changing the logo. 3e generals liked the 
notion of being up to date, so the communication director got 
a green light.
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What the new brand actually looked like was uncertain. It 
had been classi.ed. However there was reassurance that the new 
logo would be similar to signs on Sweden’s military aircra": 
‘three yellow crowns on a blue background with a yellow ring 
around it’. In a ‘spring-clean’ this new logo was to be applied 
to ‘everything from billboards, websites, letterheads down to 
the ashtrays. All the old guns and badges will be removed.’ 3e 
communication director realised that this would be a major 
move. ‘You have to break eggs to make an omelette,’ he said. ‘It 
is clear that some will think it’s tough along the way, but it will 
be a damn .ne omelette.’
3e rebranding project was announced to the mass media, 
who inevitably kicked up a fuss. 3e cause of their interest 
was not the brilliance of the branding. Rather it was triggered 
by poor timing and a clash of priorities. Replacing all the old 
signage with new ones would cost a lot. At the very same time 
the military had become aware of budget problems and had 
cancelled a big planned manoeuvre. 3is looked bad: spending 
money on a new logo when there wasn’t enough for basic opera-
tions was seen by many as stupid. An added complication was 
that the great majority of the military personnel were attached 
to the old logo. 3ey protested at its removal and supplanting 
by something they saw as inferior. Other stakeholders were also 
upset. 3ey felt that Swedish heritage was being denigrated. An 
employee of the Swedish national archives spoke to a national 
newspaper, pointing out that ‘in one sweep this wipes out the 
use of the heraldic weapons, many of which have centuries-old 
traditions. It would be a very unfortunate development for the 
heraldic heritage.’
Faced with all this negative publicity, the Defence Force 
decided to abolish the project and keep the old logo. 3e direc-
tor of defence forces admitted: ‘We have made mistakes.’1 It 
Stupidity Paradox.indd   170 07/04/2016   20:01
BRANDING-INDUCED STUPIDITY 171
seems that a combination of strong resistance and bad timing 
meant that this damned .ne omelette was never cooked.
Another notable case was that of British Airways when 
it sought to rebrand itself as a global rather than a British 
company. 3is seemed a good idea, top management thought. 
A"er about half of all the aircra" had been repainted to re?ect 
this new global look, the harsh reaction from customers forced 
the company to issue di>erent orders: repaint the planes to look 
as they did before they went global.2
Nevertheless, branding remains a hot topic. BA’s top man-
agement and the generals in Sweden are not the only people 
that have found themselves swept away by this enthusiasm. 
In some parts of the economy an interest in branding makes 
sense, rather as the cattle-owners branded their cows to dis-
tinguish them from their neighbours’ and discourage thieves. 
But o"en the urge to apply the hot iron to everything does not 
lead to success.
3ese two cases speak volumes about the stupidities that 
can be set in motion by the brand-obsessed times we live in. 
3e Defence Force is an organisation that has no call to di>er-
entiate itself, but still the top people felt compelled to undertake 
an expensive and disruptive branding initiative. When the 
idea was ?oated within the military top brass, people seemed 
to go along with it. Most other bodies seemed to need peri-
odic shi"s of branding; why shouldn’t the defence forces do 
the same? At .rst sight this looked like a good idea – it showed 
that the military was up to date and part of the contemporary 
world. However, the repolished image clashed with deeper 
underlying realities. 3e new logo undermined centuries of 
traditions within the military, creating a wave of resentment in 
the process. But perhaps more worryingly, the rebranding ini-
tiative showed that senior .gures in the military seemed more 
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ready to devote their resources to image warfare than to core 
business. Eventually these problems became too much to bear, 
and they returned to their old logo. Something similar can be 
said about British Airways.
Such a fatal fascination with rebranding is by no means 
unique to the Swedish military and BA. It has captured almost 
all sectors of society. Routine branding and rebranding initia-
tives can be found in companies, public services and non-pro.t 
organisations. 3ese kinds of initiatives easily attract the 
enthusiasm of marketing and top managers. It is easy to be 
seduced by the idea that a new logo, a coat of paint and an ad 
campaign will transform and rejuvenate an organisation. It 
appeals to hubris and wishful thinking. In reality, it is not so 
easy to re create a company with a touch of branding magic. 
Don Watson reminds us just how silly it can sometimes be: 
‘branding frequently means changing an impossibly mundane 
name into a marvellous new one: National Bank of Australia to 
National Australia Bank and Australian Opera to Opera Aus-
tralia, for example’.3 At one level these initiatives seem entirely 
stupid, achieving little or nothing. But looked at more care-
fully, branding initiatives do achieve things: they show that an 
organisation is actively doing something, and they keep mar-
keting o=cials and senior executives busy.
!e dancing brand-name
When Karl Marx wrote about capitalism in the late nineteenth 
century, he claimed that society had become gripped by a 
dangerous a@iction he called ‘commodity fetishism’.4 When 
people saw something like a table, all they saw was a com-
modity. 3ey o"en overlooked many important features of the 
table – who made it, how it was made, what wood it was made 
of, where that wood was grown and so on. 3ey did not think 
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about how useful it might be. Instead, what they saw was the 
price tag.
Times have changed. 3e average furniture shopper today 
certainly looks at the price. 3ey are usually happy to overlook 
complicated questions about the source of the materials it is 
made from and who actually made it. But they are seized by a 
new kind of fetishism – brand fetishism.5 O"en the .rst ques-
tion that many people ask about an item – whether couscous 
or a car – is what brand is it? If a piece of furniture carries 
the brand of a famous designer, then buyers assume at once 
that it must be excellent. With a well-known brand attached, 
they are o"en willing to waive more searching questions like 
how was it made, how good are the materials, and even is it a 
decent price.
3is is not true just for people who buy products in private 
life – it happens in business life as well. Displaying a well-
known brand on the front of a consultancy report means that 
the advice is o"en taken more seriously. A common piece of 
back-room wisdom in the corporate world is: ‘No one ever got 
.red for hiring McKinsey.’ It is not the contents of the report 
that count: the brand outranks them.
Our attachment to brands can make people incapable of 
looking at products, services, or the organisations that produce 
them in a sober way. Too o"en we .xate on the brand and ignore 
the rest. 3e reason we have grown so myopically focused on 
brands, according to one expert, is that:
In an extremely complex, noisy, almost insanely competi-
tive world when there is much that is so familiar to choose 
from, where choice based solely on rational factors is now 
almost impossible in most .elds, brands make choice 
easier. Brands are the device we use to di>erentiate between 
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otherwise almost indistinguishable competitors. Without 
clear branding, in some .elds we literally could not tell one 
product or service from another.6
In some parts of the economy an interest in branding makes 
sense. Every market is ?ooded with similar mass-produced 
products. Whether it is a new pair of trousers or a total quality 
management system you want, you will .nd hundreds of vari-
eties available. Naturally, we .nd it di=cult to distinguish 
between so many products and services. 3e choice can make 
our heads spin and rouse anxiety. To deal with these unpleas-
ant feelings, we o"en just focus on the brand. Di>erences are 
played up and we attach distinct meanings to indistinct prod-
ucts. Massive similarities are hidden by massive marketing 
e>orts.
Branding e>orts are by no means new. In 1956 a leading pro-
ponent of corporate image creation explained that ‘What you 
are trying to do is create an illogical situation. You want the 
customer to fall in love with your product and have a profound 
brand loyalty when actually content may be very similar to 
hundreds of competing brands.’ To create this illogical loyalty, 
he said, the .rst task ‘is one of creating some di>erentiation in 
the mind – some individualization for the product which has a 
long list of competitors very close to it in content’.7
3is form of illogic has now spread. It is no longer manu-
facturers of fast-moving consumer goods who try to make 
indistinct products seem di>erent. People in all kinds of 
organisations are preoccupied with brand. When this happens 
they come to be seduced into loving speci.c products, services 
or even entire organisations, despite their lack of remarkable 
qualities. Name recognition and reduction of uncertainty is 
one thing. Finding meaning and paying a he"y premium for 
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a product due to branding is another. 3e latter is what most 
business and communication people want, but o"en this is 
hard to achieve outside high-status and symbolically loaded 
contexts.
Absolut bullshit?
Today, most people see brands as an undisputed part of life, 
but take a look back at their history and you see how strange 
they are. Brands were initially used as a tool for marking cattle. 
Today they are used by people to mark themselves. Most of the 
time this is metaphorical but in some cases it is literal. 3ere are 
people who proudly have their favourite brands – say Harley 
Davidson or Nike – tattooed onto their bodies.8 Some compa-
nies have even encouraged their employees to advertise their 
logo on their bodies. One Manhattan real-estate .rm o>ered 
an immediate 15 per cent raise if employees tattooed the .rm’s 
logo onto their body. Forty people took up the o>er.9
Branding o"en involves small variations on the same basic 
product. VW’s and Porsche’s sports utility vehicles are basi-
cally the same SUV. 3e di>erence is the brand and the design. 
However these relatively insigni.cant di>erences are ampli-
.ed. 3is strategy is known as ‘gold-plating’. ‘To sell a basically 
standardised thing, the seller will magnify the value of minor 
di>erences quickly and easily engineered, so that the surface 
is what counts,’ writes Richard Sennett. ‘3e brand must seem 
to the consumer more than the thing itself.’10 3is is o"en a 
question of a 10 per cent di>erence in content and 100 per cent 
di>erence in price.
Paying a massive premium for what is almost the same 
product does not appear to be particularly smart. Of course one 
can – and many do – buy things for status reasons. A person 
can simply expect that there is a pay-o> from consumption 
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of highly symbolic goods. But o"en building a sense of status 
or impressing others is not the only motive. Branding o"en 
works when people start to look for ‘meaning’ and even ‘love’ 
in relatively indistinct products. 3is search is helped along 
by functional stupidity: people stop asking serious questions 
about an underlying product or service and focus only on the 
super.cial brands.
Today, consumer goods o"en have a completely arbitrary 
relationship to the meanings attached to them. Absolut vodka 
is a revealing example. According to the manufacturer, the 
‘core values of the brand are Absolut clarity, simplicity and 
perfection’. 3e company tells us you can experience these 
qualities simply by looking at the bottle. 3e clarity and sim-
plicity are emphasised by the absence of a label, while the 
perfection is clearly linked to ‘rinsing the bottle with some-
thing absolutely pure’ before .lling it with vodka.11 Absolut’s 
market strategy is about minimising the importance of the 
product by stressing ‘a blank bottle-shaped space that could 
be .lled with whatever content a particular audience most 
wanted from its brands: intellectual in Harper’s, futuristic in 
Wired, alternative in Spin, loud and proud in Out and “Absolut 
Centerfold” in Playboy.’12
3e clarity, simplicity and perfection that the Absolut brand 
is claimed to embody o"en pass the consumer by. In most cases, 
clarity and perfection are not the outcome of drinking vodka. 
Believing in ‘these core values’ – as a producer as well as a con-
sumer – probably requires you to turn your intelligence down, 
but a dose of intelligence minimisation can be rewarding: you 
can feel that you .t in, you may feel better about yourself, and 
you might even feel clear, simple and perfect.
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Sacred toothpaste
Brands are supposed to accomplish all sorts of remark-
able things. We are told they can evoke deep emotions like 
love, envy, joy and even sadness. 3ey can give people’s most 
mundane activities meaning – cleaning the toilet or withdraw-
ing money from your bank can become a deeply signi.cant 
experience. 3ey boost people’s sense of self. 3ey create a sense 
of value around the intrinsic qualities of a product or service. 
Don’t they?
Many of the overblown claims about the impact of brands 
come from a limited number of companies and products that 
are status symbols with a long history, global reach or cult 
status. Unfortunately for brand enthusiasts – but perhaps 
luckily for the rest of us – most brands are not status symbols, 
they don’t have a long history and they lack special cultural 
cachet. 3e reality of brands is o"en much more mundane. 
Some products trigger a semi-religious emotion in consumers. 
But in many cases, the enthusiasm for brands is very modest 
indeed.
One context where we saw the sacred beliefs in branding 
meet the mundane realities of business life was a pharmaceuti-
cal .rm that sold, among other things, toothpaste. 3e people 
we spoke to introduced themselves as brand managers. 3ey 
were lyrical about brands and branding, and grew particu-
larly animated when talking about well-known and successful 
brands: ‘Adidas. 3eir “Impossible is Nothing” campaign. I 
don’t think anything’s come close to being as good as that, to 
be honest,’ one brand manager told us. ‘3e language that they 
use is so speci.c to a person like me. It’s quite inspirational. 
It’s quite motivational.’ Apple, Nike and Coca-Cola sparked 
similar enthusiasm, as when another brand manager informed 
us: ‘When you have a Coca-Cola, you’re experiencing – you 
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could say maybe – happiness.’ 3e shared wisdom in this group 
was that brands were a deeply existential issue. ‘We live and die 
by them,’ one of the brand managers told us.
3e picture the brand managers painted of their work 
seemed impressive. We were told they worked with life, crea-
tivity, emotions, expressiveness and value creation. Who could 
ask for more? 3ere was only one problem: the customers did 
not really care about the existential aspects of toothpaste. Cus-
tomers mainly cared about prices. 3e company focused almost 
exclusively on short-term sales: 50 per cent of products were 
sold as part of some kind of deal. 3is le" very little room for 
upli"ing branding. 3e focus of brand managers was actually 
on much more mundane things. One of the brand managers 
admitted that her work was about making the products visible 
and ensuring they were properly placed on shop shelves. It was 
about ‘the pack, what the pack looks like. How it looks on shelf. 
How it stands out.’
One source of frustration for these brand managers was 
that consumers did not .nd their work so important. ‘3ey 
don’t really understand it,’ one person told us. ‘3ey’ll just 
pick up anything on shelf that’s on promotion.’ Another 
brand manager admitted that ‘People aren’t really interested 
in toothpaste.’ 3ey realised that consumers were really largely 
motivated by price. ‘Loyalty to the product is really, really low,’ 
we were told.
3e customers, the product and their work fell short of 
their own fervent beliefs in branding. 3is could mean that 
the naïvety and thoughtlessness about ‘brand value’ would be 
solely dysfunctional. However, they dealt with this depressing 
reality in two ways that allowed them to rescue their brand-
ing ideas, and create some sense of hope and happiness. First, 
they held on to the ultimate signi.cance of the brand. Sooner 
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or later they hoped that the dream of ideal branding will come 
true. One brand manager told us that ‘For our consumers, our 
shoppers and, really importantly, for our customers, there’s an 
intangible thing they can’t do without.’ 3is mystical intangible 
thing is presumably the brand. Another told us that ‘A lot of it 
is sold on deal and that’s one of our ongoing challenges but, 
without our brands and our branding, we wouldn’t sell what we 
do.’ 3e message seems to be that even though price is seem-
ingly all that matters, brands are important too – even if the 
customers don’t know it. 3ere is a mystical, hidden brand force 
out there somewhere.
3e other way brand managers justi.ed their beliefs in the 
face of mass indi>erence was by claiming that branding is 
useful for selling your ideas inside the company. 3ey thought 
that brands could be used to market products to senior manag-
ers (for resources) and to sales forces (who ?ogged the stu> to 
shops). Creative campaigns, amusing events and other displays 
of success were seen as an important way of catching other 
people’s attention in the company. ‘You’ll see people sending 
emails out [saying], We’ve won this award. Look how fantas-
tic we are,’ one brand manager told us. ‘You’ve got to market 
internally. You’ve got to market yourself and your brand as 
well.’13
3e glamour and joy of brands can help to make the 
working lives of marketing people more remarkable and upli"-
ing. Rather than focusing on selling a very respectable, healthy 
and necessary product they can pretend that they are doing 
something much more grandiose. 3is ambition seems hard 
to live up to – particularly when you are selling a mundane 
product like toothpaste. But the brand managers we spoke with 
had become adept at overlooking these problems and reassur-
ing themselves about the vital nature of branding. By doing 
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this, they were able to maintain the idea that they were doing 
something much greater than ?ogging toothpaste to price-
driven, indi>erent and disloyal customers.
A sceptic may think that marketing toothpaste is unlikely to 
be particularly meaningful. One may of course say that selling 
sugary water like Coca-Cola would be an even less likely can-
didate for all the fuss. But let us leave this issue aside. What 
happens when the product being marketed is something that 
is more important? Like for example a leading university, 
where good students spend years (and huge sums of money) 
and leading academics spend their careers (o"en working sixty 
hours per week or more)?
Say it like you mean it
Midshire is a leading university in the United Kingdom.14 It 
has an excellent reputation, at least among people outside the 
academic community, and usually comes out in the top ten 
in national ranking exercises. Surely this temple of intelli-
gence should be a source of excellent organisational practices? 
Perhaps not.
Recently, the university attempted to improve its brand. It 
redesigned its logo – a process that cost £80,000 and prompted 
much displeasure among students (4,000 of whom signed a 
petition protesting about it). 3e university also implemented 
an internal branding initiative it called the ‘Midshire tone 
of voice’. One day, academic sta> at the university received a 
message in their inbox about this new initiative. Attached was a 
document explaining how ‘Midshire is a place that fundamen-
tally rejects the notion of obstacles – a place where the starting 
point is always “anything is possible”. 3is can be best com-
municated using the language of what could be and a phrase 
“what if”.’
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Having laid down this upbeat theme, the document 
continued:
What if there were a place of in.nite possibilities, where 
your only boundaries were the limits of your energy, imag-
ination and potential? Comfortable with breaking new 
ground and taking risks, the people around you would be 
the very best and their focus would be to make you the very 
best too … What if you were to work somewhere every day 
so di>erent, you might never want to leave? Where lines 
of command were short and you were empowered to act 
on ideas, provided they were .rst class. And if you were to 
move on, your distinct approach would successively in?u-
ence the people and organisations around you. So what if 
all these things existed in one place? We think they do: the 
University of Midshire. What if?
Having established this visionary message, the document 
continued, providing sta> with clues about how to develop a 
‘Midshire tone of voice’. 3ese included looking to the future, 
keeping positive, starting dialogue, being proactive, and saying 
it like you mean it. It even gave examples of how the would-be 
user of the tone of voice might talk with people – including tips 
for starting a sentence. Naturally, the phrase ‘what if ’ featured 
prominently.
For some, this was an excellent example of internal branding 
that could help the university to stand out. Many others agreed 
– it helped the university stand out – but almost for entirely 
negative reasons. A common response when reading this was 
summed up by one academic who forwarded the ‘voice’ docu-
ment to us: ‘Should I laugh or cry?’
All the clichés are there: look to the future, keep it positive, 
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sound upli"ing, do the impossible, be proactive and so on. But 
it all sounds very unrealistic, simplistic and – yes, quite stupid. 
Many people .nd this kind of empty rhetoric lightweight and 
super.cial. 3e ‘very best’ in the academic world are likely to 
be allergic to such clichés.
3e ‘Midshire tone of voice’ says that ‘we’, the top manage-
ment of the university, know what is best. We know how you 
ought to express yourself. Your tone of voice is not for you to 
decide. We don’t trust the judgement of the ‘very best’ who 
are supposed to populate Midshire University. And as for the 
.nal principle of ‘say it like you mean it’, it may be wise not to 
‘say what you mean’, at least when those behind the tone-of-
voice principles are monitoring you. But it is unlikely that you 
will actually mean what the Midshire tone of voice suggests 
(or commands). Some people may go along with the belief that 
they are ‘the very best’ and work in a place with ‘in.nite pos-
sibilities’. But doing so requires a serious lack of re?ection.
Given that the impact of the tone of voice on academic sta> 
is likely to be limited, we might ask what motivated the people 
behind this initiative. It must have required the work of many 
people. It was presumably signed o> by Midshire top manage-
ment. So how can the ‘best and the brightest’ do this? How can 
we explain the tone-deafness of the ‘Midshire tone of voice’?
Many senior managers and sta> spend time cloistered in 
their own little professional worlds. 3eir days are taken up 
with meetings, giving talks, working with policies, plans and 
PowerPoint presentations. 3ey can easily grow detached from 
the reality of what happens in the rest of their organisation. 
Fine-sounding formulations, impressive images and wishful 
thinking o"en take over. When senior managers start to live in 
their own world, they are liberated from the everyday challenges 
and frustrations that make up so much of organisational life.
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In an age where branding dominates, there is a growing 
expectation that the corporate world should be packaged and 
presented in impressive ways. We live in a world of grandios-
ity. Any chance to beef up stories of who we are, what we do 
and what we will do in the future is enthusiastically embraced. 
Primitive fantasies like ‘in.nite possibilities’ become attrac-
tive. 3ere is all too o"en a naïve hope that with a vision, some 
inspiration, the right values, and the courage to embark on a 
‘journey’, surely great things lie in store. We can become excel-
lent, world-class, the very best. Say it as loud and as o"en as 
possible, and it might just come true. At the very least, you 
might start to believe it.
Functional stupidity is a must if you want to understand this 
kind of empty rhetoric about the future. What exactly does talk 
of ‘in.nite possibility’ mean? Won’t it make people feel embar-
rassed? Will it not seem ridiculous? We suspect that most of the 
target group will answer ‘Yes’. But the good people at the top of 
Midshire seem to have a great talent for putting these questions 
aside. 3ey don’t seem so worried about the meaningfulness or 
integrity of the Midshire tone of voice. Instead, they seem to be 
seduced by positive thinking and the fantasy of standing out as 
an institution where everyone talks in a similar tone of voice.
Manufacturing consumers
Most people in the developed economies live in a post-a@uent 
society. 3e central economic problem has shi"ed from one 
of scarcity to one of abundance. It is not that we don’t have 
enough. It is that we have too much. 3is means the big issue 
is not about producing more. We already have signi.cant 
overproduction of goods and services. Rather the challenge 
becomes creating demand for all these products and services 
that are produced. Marketing becomes an important way to do 
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this. Enormous resources and talents are invested in trying to 
convince people that they need all the products and services 
which are created every day. 3is is the core of what we brie?y 
addressed in Chapter 3 as the economy of persuasion.15 Its logic 
is by no means restricted to the capitalist market. It starts to 
in.ltrate all sectors of society: from education to politics, from 
mass media to high culture, from health care to the military. In 
the economy of persuasion, what counts is what looks good in 
order to seduce and sell.
In the past, the main idea of advertising was to demon-
strate – and o"en exaggerate – the advantages of a product. 
3e contemporary advertising industry is not content with 
such a modest goal. ‘Now it manufactures a product of its own: 
the consumer, perpetually unsatis.ed, restless, anxious, and 
bored,’ Christopher Lasch wrote nearly forty years ago.
Advertising serves not so much to advertise products as 
to promote consumption as a way of life. It ‘educated’ the 
masses into an unappeasable appetite not only for goods 
but for new experiences and personal ful.lment. It upholds 
consumption as the answer to the age-old discontents of 
loneliness, sickness, weariness, lack of sexual satisfaction; 
at the same time it creates new forms of discontent peculiar 
to the modern age.16
3ese words seem even more relevant today.
Consumption is all too o"en about creating dissatisfaction: 
with products, with services, and most importantly with your 
general standard of living. If you are completely satis.ed with 
your car, your clothes, your mobile phone or your skin, you 
have no reason to consume further. But if you feel something 
isn’t quite right, that is another story. 3e advertising industries 
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try their hardest to create a discrepancy between what you have 
and what you might have. 3ey promise an improved personal 
appearance, higher status, greater self-esteem, and a more 
enjoyable life. When faced with these images you o"en end 
up feeling worse about your current situation, but also more 
willing to consume.
People who work in marketing are usually aware of some of 
the negative impacts of the images they create. 3ey are o"en 
the most enthusiastic readers of the growing genre of anti-
consumerist literature. Naomi Klein’s No Logo is frequently 
seen on the shelves of branding agencies around the world. 
So how exactly do marketers deal with these negative views 
of what they do? It might be amusing to be ironic every now 
and then. In some cases, marketers have actually incorporated 
anti-marketing messages into their own campaigns. However, 
such irony is likely to wear thin. To avoid this existential peril, 
many people working with brands can simply avoid thinking 
too much. 3ey try their best to control their doubts and stop 
uncomfortable questions bubbling up. One common trick here 
is to outsource these questions to ‘the market’ or ‘the customer’.
When what the customer wants is always right, it is easy 
to refrain from asking tough questions. In a study of business 
ethics, a British manager said that he was in favour of environ-
mental issues. When asked about how that in?uenced him at 
work, he said: ‘It is not for me to bring personal prejudice or 
my own opinions into the marketplace. What’s important from 
my point of view is to re?ect my customer’s requirements. So 
whatever I happen to think is irrelevant. I must give the cus-
tomers what they require.’17 For this manager, the customers’ 
requirements stand above prejudices or opinions. Or to put it 
in another way: You should not let your own prejudices and 
opinions interfere. Rather, you should be willing and ready to 
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obey the prejudices and opinions of the customer. Of course, 
a high degree of respect for the customer’s views is necessary, 
but one may still try to in?uence or persuade them. But in a 
customer-oriented economy, people tend to focus on giving the 
market what it wants. 3inking is outsourced: the customer 
knows best. Just follow him or her.
With the marketisation of ever wider spheres of life, there 
is a tendency to treat people as customers in all aspects of their 
lives. No longer are they seen as clients, patients, passengers, 
students or citizens. 3ey are customers. Even prisoners are 
considered to be customers in some prisons.18 3is leaves you 
wondering whether one day enemy .ghters will considered to 
be ‘customers’ who need to be ‘served’ by the military.
When people focus on customers, they may put signi.cant 
resources into re?ecting on what they need and how to ful.l 
these needs. But any more serious thinking is avoided. Instead, 
people see the marketplace as the centre of the universe and the 
customer as someone who is always right. Broader questions 
are removed from the agenda. 3is whole process is oiled by a 
strong dose of functional stupidity.
Conclusion
Sixty years ago John Kenneth Galbraith argued that we lived in 
an a@uent society.19 Today, we are on average about three times 
richer than when Galbraith coined the term. 3ere is serious 
overproduction in many parts of the economy. Household items 
are used only a few times before being thrown away. 3ousands 
of books are published every day – the vast majority .nd only a 
few readers. Medical procedures which are of little real bene.t 
to patients are routinely prescribed. Millions of scienti.c arti-
cles are produced every year, and less than half of them are ever 
read by anyone apart from the editors, reviewers and authors.20 
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To help us dispose of this massive surplus we produce every 
single day, we have created an economy of persuasion. 3e sheer 
size of this operation might lead people to ask ‘What the hell are 
we doing?’, but most are aware that asking these questions too 
persistently is potentially harmful – for their own psychological 
wellbeing as well as for their professional prospects.
Convincing people about things they do not need or want 
has become crucial for many businesses, public organisations 
and employees. In some contexts this is not a big deal: calcula-
tive and even cynical attitudes dominate. Some people do the 
job, and do not expect anything beyond a pay cheque. But most 
people want something more than that. 3ey want a sense of 
meaning in their work, and to feel as if they are doing something 
worthwhile. 3e cruel fact is that many jobs are experienced by 
their occupants as meaningless.21 Creating a sense of worthi-
ness in this kind of work is a challenge.
Branding o>ers one solution. It helps to transform what are 
o"en dull jobs into something that sounds exciting and inter-
esting. Instead of creating packaging for toothpaste, people can 
say they work with a brand. What are clean teeth compared 
with a deeper meaning and love for the toothpaste? Instead 
of selling overpriced vodka, people can say they help to create 
purity, clarity and perfection. Instead of teaching bored stu-
dents and writing pointless research articles, you can say you 
are a world-class scholar with in.nite possibilities.
All this is far from easy. Branding activities are o"en met 
with indi>erence or cynicism. Employees o"en ask critical 
questions. To ensure that branding works, organisations need 
to gag the killjoys. Moaning and groaning are o"en margin-
alised and good news is celebrated. Denying reality can be 
helpful in all this. It calls for cultures of positivity. We will look 
at this topic in the following chapter.
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Tell us something enjoyable!
How do you avoid talking about negative things? 3is was a very 
practical problem that a group of people working for a newspa-
per were trying to deal with. Some time ago one of us did a study 
of a daily tabloid newspaper.1 We witnessed how it operated, how 
decisions were made, and how people working there thought.
One of the most important events at the newspaper each 
month was the review meeting. It was one of the few times 
when all the major people in the organisation came together, a 
basic organisational ritual. Members of the tribe gathered and 
expressed commitment to a shared set of values. But instead of 
a totem pole they focused on headlines. 3e stated aim of these 
meetings was to review what they had done right and what they 
had done wrong in the previous month, and perhaps to learn 
from this. 3e meeting was one of the few places where senior 
people at the paper could ask big questions about what they 
were doing and how it might change.
3e meetings had a typical routine. When senior people 
from each department at the newspaper shu@ed into the room, 
they were faced with a wall covered with the front page of all the 
‘best-sellers’. Another wall was covered with ‘disaster’ issues. 
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3ere were about twice the number of front pages on the best-
seller wall as there were on the disaster wall, as the .rst covered 
all work days and the second only weekends and the worst-sell-
ing day per week. A"er the obligatory small talk was out of the 
way, the group started to discuss declining sales .gures. 3ey all 
found this a bit depressing. One of the editors chipped in: ‘Tell us 
something enjoyable!’ 3ey quickly changed the topic to some 
success stories, such as issues which had sold particularly well, 
but as they worked their way through the best-selling issues, a 
sense of confusion arose. 3e people in the room had little or no 
idea why one issue had outsold another. Sometimes a relatively 
dull issue had sold well while an issue with an eye-catching news 
scoop had done poorly. 3e pattern of sales seemed to be almost 
random. 3e same was true for disaster issues.
Naturally, people in the room tried their best to understand 
why it was that some issues sold well while others did not. 3ey 
o>ered all sorts of theories: ‘It’s Monday, so sales are down’; ‘It’s 
a holiday, so sales are up’; ‘People are changing their buying 
behaviour, so sales are down’; ‘3e weather was bad, people are 
watching TV, so sales are down’; ‘3e weather was good, people 
are on the beaches, so sales are down’. 3e result was a system 
of ‘almost Ptolemaean complexity’. But at the root of it all was 
a very simple but seemingly unshakeable assumption: great 
front-pages sell newspapers.
On the surface, this meeting was all about going through 
the successes and failures of the month and providing a set of 
random explanations. But if you look a little closer, you can 
see functional stupidity at work. 3e people in the meeting 
knew that dark clouds hung over the newspaper industry, but 
they were not really interested in hearing the bad news. 3ey 
spent far more time reviewing their successes than their fail-
ures. When forced to consider bad news, they came up with all 
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sorts of folk theories about why this might have happened. Any 
attempts to take a more scienti.c or systematic look at the situ-
ation were laughed o>. Instead, they reverted again and again 
to their favourite explanation – based on their deeply shared 
common belief – that it is headlines that sell newspapers. 3is 
was despite the fact that they had evidence right before their 
eyes that it was not necessarily so.
Maintaining a deeply held belief in the face of huge amounts 
of evidence to the contrary is a classic marker of functional stu-
pidity. At the newspaper, a shared culture of newsmaking was 
built around the belief that headlines strongly a>ect sales, even 
though this probably was not the case. In many ways this belief 
was very functional – wrong but still of value. People liked 
the meeting, it was entertaining to see the headlines that were 
‘good’ and (though less so) ‘bad’. 3ere was a good atmosphere: 
people cracked jokes and exercised their sarcasm. 3e meeting 
worked as a good organisational ritual. It gave people a chance 
to meet and express their common understandings and beliefs 
about newspaper work.
For the people who met here, making news was about 
entertainment, giving an unsophisticated audience what they 
wanted: celebrity gossip and short articles. 3e people present 
recreated their cultural universe and guided the work within 
the newspaper. It gave them a common sense of identity, mar-
shalled their activities and kept them focused. It helped people 
feel sure when every twenty-four hours they had to make fast 
decisions about how to .ll forty-eight pages of the newspaper: 
what to include, what to highlight, what to put on the front 
page, the back page, how to design the headline. All of this 
helped to ease the way through the rea=rmation of a shared 
culture. But it was not on the agenda; it was a tacit function. As 
a result, they spent a lot of valuable time addressing something 
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that is most likely to be a non-issue: the direct e>ect of head-
lines on sales. Focusing on this and basing their work on false 
assumptions meant that the newsmakers overlooked many of 
the profound changes that were going on in the industry, some 
of which would eventually become an existential threat.
Organisational culture calls for people to take certain 
assumptions and beliefs for granted and refrain from think-
ing about them. If the people working at the newspaper were 
to have begun to think seriously about the (non-)relationship 
between their assessment of the quality of the headlines and the 
actual sales, the entire organisational ritual would have been 
ruined. Being mindless about this helped to recreate and rein-
force the organisational culture.
Marching to the same tune without thinking about it
Most organisations are held together by a stubborn attachment 
to an overall set of beliefs, a common language and practice. 
3is is what is known as organisational culture. According 
to the anthropologist Cli>ord Geertz, culture provides the 
meaning human beings use to interpret their experiences and 
guide their actions.2 As soon as human groups come together 
for a prolonged period of time they create a shared culture. It 
gives them a common way of understanding the world and 
deciding what needs to be done.
Like any other kind of human group, organisations develop 
cultures. 3is is a system of common symbols and meanings. 
It provides ‘the shared rules governing cognitive and a>ec-
tive aspects of membership in an organization, and the means 
whereby they are shaped and expressed’.3 Culture tells people 
what exists, how one should relate it, how things should be and 
what is important to strive for.
Some cultures value collectivism while others value indi-
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vidualism; some focus on quality, others on high productivity. 
Some .rms proclaim a sales orientation, others a long-term 
customer orientation. Some organisations have highly com-
mitted employees while others have highly exploited human 
resources. In one organisation, rules may be viewed as strict, 
almost holy principles to be obeyed at all costs. In another, they 
could be seen as loose guidelines that can be bypassed. Age may 
be viewed as a source of wisdom in one .rm, a sign of inertia in 
another. Some cultures celebrate hierarchy and di>erentiation, 
others egalitarianism and community. Pepsi and CCC (to be 
addressed below) o>er nice contrasts.
Culture comes from a wide range of sources in an organi-
sation – top management is only one of them. O"en people at 
the top are less in control of the culture than they would like to 
think. 3e reality is that most people throughout the organisa-
tion play a role in creating the culture. In his study of a hi-tech 
company, Gideon Kunda noticed that power to shape culture 
was ‘clearly possessed by those invested with formal authority 
and high status’, but the .rm’s ‘open and shi"ing environment, 
reputation, status and real rewards are in the hands of numer-
ous, o"en unknown, others’. Everyone being able to create 
and shape culture might sound attractive. Kunda was not so 
sure. In these kinds of meritocratic cultures ‘agents of control 
are everywhere’, he wrote. ‘One is surrounded and constantly 
observed by members (including oneself) who, in order to 
further their own interests, act as spokespersons and enforcers 
of the organizational ideology.’4
When there is a ‘strong’ culture, there is also likely to be 
a strong tendency for people to think in homogeneous ways. 
Culture does the thinking for them. It can give them a sense of 
integration and direction, but it can also trap them in set ways 
of understanding the world.
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O"en individuals internalise a strong culture. 3eir sense 
of who they are becomes almost indistinguishable from what 
the company is. As one partner in an accounting .rm put it: ‘At 
one level we are completely independent, but we all march to 
the same tune without even thinking about it.’5
Compass or prison?
Organisational culture is a compass that gives people direction, 
but it is also a prison that limits their freedom.6 Culture guides 
and integrates, but also blinds and sti?es thinking.
A cultural compass makes it easier to .nd your way at 
work. It directs you in what to think, feel, say and do. O"en it 
works automatically. You don’t have to think that much about 
basic issues, and it allows you to move around an organisation 
without too many problems. When you follow the compass, 
you get along with other people in the organisation. 3e cul-
tural compass at Pepsi pointed sta> towards competition and 
chasing market share. Delivering results was the only thing that 
really mattered. Complications that might come from family 
commitments, loyalty and friendship were to be ignored.
Culture can also imprison people. 3is is what happens 
when shared beliefs become a shared blindness. When all 
people in an organisation think in the same way, they also .nd 
it hard to imagine anything outside their narrow cultural uni-
verse. Culture is partly unconscious, an assortment of ideas, 
beliefs and meanings that we take for granted and rarely think 
about in any sustained way. Certain values in an organisation 
are seen as self-evident; we think they are undoubtedly supe-
rior. When we stop re?ecting on the values of the organisation, 
an organisation can start to operate like a psychic prison. 3is 
is what happened at the newspaper. Despite lots of evidence 
to the contrary, the newsmakers remained locked into the 
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assumption that it was headlines that sold papers and that dis-
cussions around this would improve the situation.
Strong organisational cultures are o"en fuelled by power-
ful unconscious forces.7 For instance, people can start to treat 
leaders as father .gures who they imagine can punish or protect 
them. Emotions infuse many organisational cultures. Some-
times cultures can be paranoid: in these kinds of organisations, 
people feel that the environment is hostile. 3ey are oversensi-
tive to critique. Other organisations can have an obsessive need 
for order. Many bureaucracies are characterised by obsessive 
and o"en irrational rule-following. In these kinds of cultures, 
openness, freedom or creativity is viewed as a sign of disorder. 
Fantasies about lack of control and chaos make people nervous. 
As a result, organisational members are eager to punish even 
the mildest rule-breaking.
Organisational culture is o"en used to control subordi-
nates. A strong culture means that employees think similar 
things. 3is liberates people in the .rm from being disturbed 
by alternative ideas. It also has some bene.ts for employees: it 
can help them feel comfortable and secure. In some cases, the 
culture can function so smoothly that they hardly notice it at 
all. Undisputed assumptions rule.
Cultures of optimism
All organisational cultures are to some extent unique. However 
there are themes that many of the organisations we have looked 
at share. One of these is optimism. 3is is the idea that you 
should always look on the bright side and do your best to be 
upbeat. You do this by encouraging an unbroken stream of 
upbeat messages. Crucially, negative stories and news should 
be avoided.
One organisation that was seized with a culture of optimism 
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was the Finnish mobile phone-maker Nokia. In their in-depth 
study of the company, Timo Vuori and Quy Huy found that 
the organisation was dominated by a widespread preference for 
optimism.8 Middle managers were extremely hesitant to share 
bad news. ‘If you were too negative, it would be your head on 
the block,’ one middle manager explained. People working in 
the company tended to jib at asking critical questions – both of 
their boss as well as each other. One middle manager described 
how: ‘Nobody wanted to rock the boat … I didn’t want to be 
labelled as a mean person who was constantly criticising the 
hard work of others.’ Another pointed out that: ‘Critique was 
seen as negative; the mindset was that if you criticise what’s 
being done, then you’re not genuinely committed to it.’ Middle 
managers tended to focus on creating good-news stories. One 
person described how middle managers ‘wanted to give them 
[senior managers] good news … not a reality check’. Another 
described how ‘the message about each product area had to be 
kept positive so [the units] would be allowed to continue [to 
operate]’.
Top management were seduced by this relentless stream 
of good news. When they found they were not receiving the 
upbeat news that they wanted, then they simply replaced 
someone who was a bearer of bad tidings with someone else 
who was more optimistic. ‘New blood’ with a ‘can-do’ attitude 
tended to be favoured. One middle manager described how top 
management ‘trusted these people when they said it’s going to 
work out. 3ey had blind faith. 3e management team … knew 
a lot of people – but they picked some young, fast-talking guy 
who said: “I have this little trick, I’ll .x this thing.”’ 3e top 
management team were largely unable to make accurate judge-
ments about these optimistic promises because they had little 
or no background in the technical aspects of the job. Instead, 
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what they were more interested in was the business plans that 
were presented. One senior manager described how: ‘People [in 
Nokia] learned to speak the [new technical] language quickly; 
they became quasi-experts. 3ey gave the impression that they 
understood [this new area], but [I realised later] it was only 
skin-deep.’ 3is meant the company became committed to 
increasingly unrealistic timescales and projects. When things 
went wrong, they were o"en overlooked or covered up with a 
sheen of good news or pseudo-expertise. All this was useful for 
people in the short term: it meant that top managers could tell 
their investors they were doing something about the strategic 
challenges they faced. It also meant that middle managers could 
hang on to their job, avoid .nding themselves in uncomfort-
able situations and keep their division open. But the relentless 
optimism gave rise to serious problems in the longer term. It 
meant that timescales kept on slipping, and some of Nokia’s 
new products which were supposed to be responses to Apple’s 
iPhone were either of inadequate quality or late to the market. 
3is meant Nokia’s position as industry leader was eroded and 
it was eventually taken over by Microso".
Another place where we found a culture of optimism was 
CCC, a renowned and rapidly growing IT consultancy with 
about 500 sta>.9 When one of us studied the .rm, we noticed 
that employees were encouraged to look on the bright side of 
the organisation. ‘Don’t criticise if you don’t have a constructive 
suggestion’ was an important norm. Moaning and groaning 
were cardinal sins. 3is stopped any ‘negative’ thoughts being 
shared. When no one in the organisation shared problems or 
contradictions that they came across, individuals started to feel 
that any negative experiences they had were either mistaken or 
just an exception. A culture of positivity made it feel odd when 
you faced a problem. It was even more odd to talk about it. 
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People who did indeed register problems were likely to start to 
think that there might be something wrong with them, as they 
were the only ones who seemed to be bothered.
3ere are apparently many good things about being optimis-
tic. At CCC it meant that employees were motivated. Because 
uncomfortable issues went unmentioned, there was an absence 
of con?icts. 3is meant that people in the .rm were more likely 
to get along. 3ey felt that the workplace culture was gener-
ally positive. But the relentless optimism at CCC had some 
downside. It created a reluctance to face up to problems. 3e 
emphasis on being positive meant that setbacks, bad news and 
di=culties that did not have clear solutions attached to them 
went unreported. 3is le" little space for doubts and critical 
thinking. At CCC, it meant that when problems arose during a 
serious downturn in the economy, the organisation was slow to 
respond. It didn’t want to dwell on the negative, so it preferred 
to overlook anything that smacked of bad news.
Cultures of change
One thing executives are frequently very optimistic about is 
change. 3ey assume that it is always for the best – no matter 
what the change actually is. 3is change .xation is supported 
by a bloated change-management industry whose various 
experts and advisers make their living by propagating the need 
for drastic changes and promises of great accomplishments. 
Every new management fashion o>ers an opportunity for ever 
more change. When organisations become fashion victims, 
they start too many projects – many of which are dropped 
too soon or performed with too little enthusiasm.10 3e results 
are o"en cynicism and time-wasting. People start to secretly 
harbour negative expectations from the outset. 3is tends to 
make change more di=cult next time. If it happens too o"en, 
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organisations can get stuck in what Eric Abrahamson has 
called the ‘repetitive change syndrome’.11
A hi-tech company that one of us studied had a serious 
case of repetitive change syndrome.12 3e .rm was undertak-
ing a cultural change project. It started with optimistic ideas 
about promoting a customer orientation, developing visible 
leadership and facilitating teamwork. All units in the .rm ran 
workshops to discuss these issues. A"er the workshop, they 
reported what they had done. 3en nothing happened. Top 
management believed all the units were feeling inspired and 
had continued to work on these themes. Middle managers 
expected that top management were driving the initiative and 
waited for new instructions. Everyone assumed that someone 
else was the change agent.
People in the company didn’t know about this collective 
myopia. We only uncovered it because we spoke with people 
across the company. As we were outsiders, employees would 
o"en admit to things they would not tell to colleagues or supe-
riors. Armed with this new-found knowledge, we spoke with 
two senior managers in the company who were involved with 
the project. It quickly became clear that they did not want 
to hear bad news. 3ey started out by saying that they were 
eager to hear about our .ndings. 3en they added that they 
understood the change programme had been broadly seen 
as a success. We told them this was far from being true: the 
response to their change project was overwhelmingly passive 
and/or negative. People thought it was based on good ideas but 
they were frustrated that nothing happened. We relayed some 
typical responses to the initiative: ‘just talk and paper’, ‘bread 
and circuses for the people’, ‘just another sign of top manage-
ment hypocrisy’.
3e senior managers listened. When it became time for 
Stupidity Paradox.indd   198 07/04/2016   20:01
CULTURE-INDUCED STUPIDITY 199
them to respond, they suddenly changed their talk. 3ey said 
that they had realised that the change project hadn’t worked, 
but they were not really responsible. 3ey had only got involved 
fairly late. 3e CEO and CTO owned the project. 3ey blamed 
others for the misfortunes. It quickly turned out that these 
managers were not interested in more detailed feedback. 3ey 
didn’t want to learn why the initiative had not worked. 3ey just 
wanted the programme to be forgotten about as quickly as pos-
sible. Some time later, one of us described this case to a group of 
managers during an executive development programme. Most 
seemed to recognize the process and outcome. One of the man-
agers on the course responded: ‘It ends like this every bloody 
time.’ Careful feedback, learning, doing it better the next time? 
No. Bad news and honest feedback are usually avoided. Organi-
sational amnesia usually wins the day. All that is sought for 
is positive news about change. Any other form of feedback is 
bad for your reputation, bad for your self-esteem and bad for 
your career. So when there is a chance, unwelcome feedback is 
swept under the carpet. Deliberate ignorance and mindlessness 
protect people from feeling obliged to think through issues and 
contribute to more rational organisational behaviour. 3e ideal 
of learning and rationality is preached. Functional stupidity is 
practised.
Cultures of now
As well as being optimistic, many organisations have a strong 
emphasis on the present. 3e present (and the near future) 
counts more than the past. Managers think in the short term 
because they are evaluated by their superiors and colleagues on 
their short-term results. Some managers say that ‘Our horizon 
is today’s lunch’ and like to make quips like ‘I know what you 
did for me yesterday, but what have you done for me lately?’13
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3is short-term mentality equates to an endemic lack of 
responsibility. Managers are keen to claim responsibility for 
things that have already worked out. 3is means ‘big corpora-
tions implicitly encourage scapegoating by their complete lack 
of any tracking system to trace responsibility. Whoever is cur-
rently and directly in charge of an area is responsible – that is, 
potentially blamable – for whatever goes wrong there, even if 
he has inherited others’ mistakes.’14
Sometimes things go wrong and a negative outcome or a 
growing awareness of a problem emerges, o"en triggering 
‘blame time’. Rarely are there in-depth investigations of who is 
truly responsible for a bad result. Rather political expediency 
and limited accountability are what counts. Actors will bypass 
responsibility for bad outcomes, just as they rush to assume it 
for positive results.
Talk and appearance – their behaviour in ‘high-visibility’ 
situations such as presentations to senior managers – may 
matter more for employees’ promotion than solid work and 
competence – what they have actually accomplished. In cul-
tures that value action and decisiveness, senior people o"en 
rely on their perceptions. Lengthy investigation, deep analy-
sis, careful re?ection and rational decision-making are usually 
avoided.
Most organisations feed this culture of now. 3ey place a 
huge premium on the present and the near future while for-
getting the past and entirely ignoring the medium or distant 
future (except in sporadic jargon-.lled mission statements). 
An exponent of the dominant recipe for senior managers is 
Dan Eliasson, head of the national police force in Sweden. 3e 
publication of a book on the treatment of nine police employ-
ees involved several very serious allegations of severe bullying, 
ostracism and even baseless criminal complaints against police 
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o=cers who were considered to have been critical of ine=-
ciency and poor working conditions. In an interview Eliasson 
responded: ‘My mission is to create a strong, open and empa-
thetic organisation here and now. I won’t spend time dwelling 
on historical injustices.’15 3ese were the words of a man well 
suited to the culture of here and now. Like many who ply their 
careers in an age of functional stupidity, he knew which way 
to look.
Cultures of uniqueness
Another common theme in many contemporary .rms is the 
idea that they are unique. We found this theme at work in 
CCC, an IT consultancy we brie?y discussed above. Managers 
and other employees repeatedly told us that the work climate 
was great. People had excellent relationships with one another. 
3ere was a close sense of community across the .rm. 3e 
organisational structure was ?at. Sta> thought this .rm was 
unique, and the best in its .eld. 3eir clients were very satis.ed, 
they were growing fast, they had high pro.t margins and very 
low turnover. ‘Fun and pro.t’ were the overall values. 3e CEO 
emphasised the .rm’s ability to create a positive work climate: 
‘If there’s anything we’re good at it’s this, we are damned good 
at this.’ 3is was viewed as a>ecting commitment and work 
cooperation. People stayed in the .rm and were willing to put 
in extra work hours. 3e culture was based on a ‘we-feeling’ 
and loyalty. 3ere was a strong group pressure to help out. 
Many employees felt that they could work hard at CCC. 3ey 
really made an extra e>ort, they said.
CCC was established at a time when the market for IT 
consultancy and bespoke so"ware development was expand-
ing quickly. 3e .rm talked up its unique ‘business concept’, 
which involved combining IT expertise with knowledge of 
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management and strategy. Consultants were encouraged to 
establish contacts with senior managers in client companies. 
3eir aim was to make IT into a top management issue rather 
than a concern of the IT department. ‘3is is our strength, this 
is what we’re good at,’ one consultant told us.
Most people in the .rm believed that CCC’s success was 
largely a result of their fantastic business concept. One con-
sultant said: ‘Linking the development of a new system to the 
customer’s business concept and area of operations is our basic 
philosophy.’ Another said: ‘I don’t believe we are any better 
[than other companies] from a purely technical point of view. 
We are better at some things. And that is precisely the fun-
damental business concept: management and IT development. 
But we are no better at IT development, perhaps worse in some 
cases. But on the management side – our way of handling cus-
tomers – that’s where we’re better. Our target group is corporate 
managements, not IT departments.’
A few employees had a rather di>erent picture of the .rm’s 
business concept. 3ey pointed out that very few people had 
much expertise in management or strategy. 3e vast majority 
of employees were programmers and systems analysts. 3is 
suggested that the business concept might be rather hollow. 
Talking about developing as well as implementing strategic IT 
solutions sounds much better than what people were actually 
doing – programming.
Some things helped to preserve people’s pride in this busi-
ness model. A few projects in line with the ideal of doing 
strategic IT were highlighted. People also stressed develop-
ment: they claimed that while they might be doing operational 
work now, in the future they would be doing strategic work. 
Some interpreted the ‘strategic’ aspect of the company’s work 
as having contact with senior people. By focusing on the future 
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and using unconventional interpretations, the ‘strategic’ aspect 
of the business concept was preserved.
A few years later, we spoke with a handful of senior manag-
ers who had worked at CCC at the time, but had since le" the 
company. One of them told us that the business concept was ‘a 
myth, a sales trick’. ‘We did not have that type of competence 
among the consultants. We did not have that type of manage-
ment consultants,’ he told us.
It was a skilfully fantasised and carefully nurtured myth 
– I claim somewhat maliciously. But I think it is true, also. 
I still don’t think there is anything wrong with doing so, 
because it worked at the time. 3at is not a bad character. If 
the consultants feel that we are good at combining manage-
ment and IT – .ne. 3ey were happy about it, it worked in 
their projects and earned money through programming, 
that’s what it was all about.
3e shared belief in the ‘unique’ business concept worked 
as a social glue and identity booster. It guided employees’ sense 
of how they saw themselves and the company. It bound them 
together and helped them feel good about themselves. It allowed 
them to tell themselves: ‘We don’t just do programming, we do 
strategic work’ and ‘We are one of a kind.’ 3is seemed to work, 
even though it didn’t stand up to the reality test.
However, this obsession with the uniqueness of their busi-
ness model came with problems. Managers who came from 
other .rms sometimes felt that their colleagues were ‘a mutual 
admiration club’. 3ey assumed that CCC was the best, and 
did not think there was much to be learned from other .rms. 
In some parts of the company, managers took the .rm’s ideas 
too seriously. For instance, some subsidiaries took its business 
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concept of fusing IT and strategic advice to heart. 3ey recruited 
experienced, quali.ed and expensive people who could o>er 
both IT and strategic expertise. However these individuals 
turned out to be overquali.ed for the simpler and less costly 
tasks that customers typically asked for.
Cultures of #atness and community
Alongside a celebration of the uniqueness of the .rm, employ-
ees at CCC talked a lot about how ?at the organisation was. 
3ere was little hierarchy, we were told. Subordinates had a lot 
to say about appointments of new managers. 3ey could veto 
candidates they did not approve of. Managers were expected to 
socialise with sta>, be excellent at communicating with people, 
great raconteurs, be supportive and be a visible presence at 
parties and other social events. On top of all this, they should 
be liked by their subordinates. 3is was all part of the ‘fun-and-
pro.t’ culture that was espoused.
Hierarchy is hard to avoid, particularly when a .rm grows. 
However, individuals are o"en inclined to overlook this. At 
CCC, some people noticed there was a widening distance 
between themselves and the senior executives as the number 
of employees grew to 500, but many others claimed they were 
working in a ?at company. When we asked one sta> member 
what was di>erent about CCC, he pointed out the lack of hier-
archy: there were only two levels in the company – subsidiary 
managers and consultants. But when we asked whether he 
could select or even in?uence his assignments, he said this 
was not usually the case. His most recent assignment had 
come when someone showed up and told him which project 
he would be working on. We asked whether the person who 
had given him this assignment had managerial responsibili-
ties. ‘Yes, he works directly below the subsidiary manager,’ he 
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responded. Apparently the ?at structure was not so ?at a"er 
all.
Propagating a rather selective view of the company as ?at 
and social di>erentials as low reinforced a sense of community 
and of gladness to work for CCC. Many employees said that 
they were willing to go the extra mile for the .rm. Some sta> 
members we spoke with pointed out that wages were average, 
while the .rm charged clients premium prices. Most thought 
that was not a big deal, because ‘you get so much else out of 
working in the .rm’, one consultant told us. 3is included 
a positive work climate, a sense of intimacy at work and the 
feeling of being part of a great company. One client said: ‘CCC 
is not a .rm, it’s a religion.’
3e non-hierarchical view at CCC cultivated a naïve belief 
that the .rm had few power di>erentials. People followed hier-
archy while believing it did not exist. Employees were willing 
to be seduced. 3is great company and the excellent manag-
ers who run it probably know what they’re doing, employees 
seemed to think. Behind this lurked a wish to avoid cognitive 
dissonance: they wanted to see an organisation that was in line 
with their beliefs. A strong feeling of community in the .rm 
reduced the inclination to ask awkward questions. 3ey didn’t 
want to disturb what were relatively harmonious workplace 
relationships.
Encouraging sta> to turn a blind eye to hierarchy had 
advantages for them: it promoted a good climate, fostered 
loyalty and pride, supported a sense of community. Employees 
all found this motivating. 3e image of the .rm was also very 
positive. It made the company seem as if it was at the cutting 
edge. Clients were o"en impressed.
But this aversion to hierarchy was never exclusively good. 
It came with considerable risks. Seductive messages started to 
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lead the .rm astray. 3is became even more di=cult when the 
.rm faced a deep recession that damaged business. CCC was 
slow and reluctant in responding. With a strong norm of always 
being positive and a deep belief in the uniqueness and superior-
ity of the .rm’s business concept, they found it hard to discuss 
problems openly and frankly. Also community ideals made 
it hard for managers to take di=cult decisions about letting 
people go. Instead, they swept di=culties under the carpet. As 
problems piled up, smaller di=culties started to become crises 
that were impossible to ignore. 3e shake-up and transition 
was di=cult to cope with.
Conclusion
Cultures make organisations work. A shared culture helps to 
make collective action happen: it coordinates people, o>ers a 
shared sense of purpose and creates a common identity. People 
see their work reality in similar ways. Con?icts and confusions 
are reduced. But cultures have drawbacks too. 3ey can create 
tunnel vision and conformity. Divergent thinking is inhibited. 
In this sense, a strong culture is a mixed blessing. It works 
simultaneously as compass and psychic prison. Cultures always 
include a degree of functional stupidity. It helps coordination 
and integration, which makes it a key resource for e>ective 
organising.
Many of the organisations we have looked at in this chapter, 
and indeed throughout the book, embody this tension. 3e 
stress on being optimistic, being change-oriented, focusing 
on the present, being unique and being non-hierarchical is 
common in many organisational cultures. On the one hand, 
these values come with some strong bene.ts. Optimism means 
that people assimilate good news; an obsession with change 
means that organisations are dynamic; a focus on the present 
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makes people action-oriented; a celebration of uniqueness 
makes them proud of their company; values of non-hierarchy 
means they feel they belong to a community. All this can bond 
people together and help them to be collaborative, engaged in 
their work and feel good about themselves.
However, each of these common cultural themes creates a 
dangerous oversight. Optimism means that talking about bad 
news is taboo. An obsession with change means people dri" 
from one change initiative to another with no real bene.ts. A 
strong focus on the present means that they overlook lessons 
from the past and discount the medium to long-term future. A 
belief in its uniqueness can make an organisation self-obsessed. 
An abhorrence of hierarchy means important power di>eren-
tials are ignored.
Each of these oversights can underpin some serious long-
term failures. When you can’t mention bad news you o"en 
can’t adapt to important changes. When .rms dri" aimlessly 
between change initiatives they waste resources and gener-
ate cynicism. When people look at the past they are unable 
to learn. 3ose who grow self-obsessed grow blind to others. 
Ignoring power makes it harder to get things done.
Sometimes culture can be dominated by functional ele-
ments, but at other times stupidity can take over. Usually, 
cultures are a bit of both. Quite how much is hard to assess 
more precisely, but they can easily slip from being functional to 
being stupid. 3is tends to happen sooner or later.
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Part Three
Managing Stupidity
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9Stupidity Management and How to 
Counter It
Why we need to be stupid
We are o"en told that organisations need to be knowledge-
intensive – they should encourage smart people to do smart 
things in order to compete in a smart economy. But much of 
the time, being too smart can be dangerous. It can lead to con-
?icts, uncertainties, doubts and reduced motivation. People 
may then not be particularly productive. 3is is why most 
e>ective organisations are also well versed in stupidity. 3ese 
organisations are not just full of enlightenment, re?ection and 
knowledge. In many cases they actively discourage these pos-
sibly subversive qualities.
Earlier in the book, we cited management gurus who claimed 
that the most e>ective way for .rms to remain competitive is 
to ‘hire smart people and let them talk to one another’ (p. 24.1 
Although this sounds great, it could be very risky. Smart people 
talking openly can come up with dangerous ideas. 3ese ideas 
might not just be about how to create more advanced .nan-
cial models to make very rich people richer, or brilliant ways 
to market more cola. Instead, these smart people might start 
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asking questions. 3ey might look at the awkward truth behind 
many organisational practices. 3ey might see empty shams 
in arrangements and ideas that senior management prize. 
Encouraging smartness may lead people to re?ect on bigger 
issues like the overall purpose of their work. It could also lead 
people to query organisational arrangements. 3ey might start 
asking for justi.cation for common practices and unreasonable 
inequalities. All these questions are likely to make many people 
feel a little uncomfortable.
Given these potential di=culties, it should not be so sur-
prising that stupidity management is an important activity for 
managers – although it is never presented in explicit ways.
Stupidity management involves interventions that reduce or 
narrow thinking at work. 3e stupidity manager tries to make sure 
that people don’t transgress the mindsets prescribed by the organi-
sation and industry. 3ese common assumptions are to be taken 
for granted. People should concentrate on the means, not the ends.
3ere are many tools at people’s disposal to boost stupid-
ity. 3ese include culture, branding initiatives, referring to 
industry best practice, organisational structures and systems 
and leadership. Organisations o"en want fervent acceptance 
of things that could be challenged: visions, strategies, fashion-
able ideas, change initiatives, structures and human resource 
management procedures, to name a few. Challenging all these 
things could lead to pluralism, con?ict, confusion, endless 
debate and ultimately, indecision. To deal with these threats, 
stupidity management is sometimes necessary.
3e vice chancellor of the university that one of us works 
at recently gave a speech. ‘We must make sure that the organi-
sation becomes more e>ective,’ he said. ‘Decisions need to be 
implemented. No longer can decisions be viewed as arguments 
in a debate.’ Here is a senior .gure put out by the surplus of 
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independent thinking and discussion. He is worried that people 
insist on thinking and expressing their own views rather than 
assuming that top management is sure to know best.
Stupidity management poses a dilemma. Greater functional 
stupidity can have bene.ts. It can facilitate decision-making, 
create a good workplace climate, safeguard people’s sense of 
self, and o>er a sense of direction. But too much functional 
stupidity may have drawbacks. It can obstruct clever decision-
making and problem-solving, build a conformist workplace, 
undermine identities, and desensitise people to problems.
3e two sides of stupidity management go together. 3is 
means that any budding stupidity manager faces a trade-o>. 
Do they want more stupidity and functionality, or do they want 
more smartness and less functionality? Whereas in some situ-
ations it may be bene.cial to make a quick decision that people 
don’t question, in others the manager might want to encour-
age decision-making to be as thoughtful as possible. But they 
should also be willing to accept the time, resources and e>ort 
this will require. A"er all, free thinking and open discussion 
creates con?icts and disorder, as well as change that people may 
not be willing to follow.2
Decision-making is easier if you reduce complexity by 
asking people not to think too much. It takes less time, energy 
and cognitive resources. It also avoids the risk of getting 
bogged down in analysis paralysis. But when you limit people’s 
thinking, you lose a lot of information, you don’t fully inter-
rogate your ideas, and you may end up making bad decisions. 
We o"en prefer to save time and energy rather than consider 
all the issues. As a result, decisions regularly involve a signi.-
cant degree of functional stupidity. 3is is bound to happen 
when organisations imitate others, when top managers confuse 
PowerPoint presentations with solid information, and when 
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organisations create new structures without thinking about 
how they will work in practice.
Workplace relations can sometimes be improved if open-
ness and the potential con?icts this can bring are curtailed. 
When .rms have a shared culture, it can mean that people 
think and behave in the same way, they talk in the same kind 
of language, and celebrate a shared identity. 3is creates con-
sensus, positivity and strong communal bonds and facilitates a 
shared sense of purpose. But it also comes with increased con-
formity and limitations on thinking.
Identities are secured and strengthened when people start 
to de.ne themselves in closed, secure and stable ways. 3is 
happens when people con.dently state things like: ‘I am a 
leader’, ‘I am a great communicator’, ‘I’m a change agent’, or: 
‘I’m part of an elite .rm which only employs the best and the 
brightest.’ In an increasingly fragmented world, the identities 
we try to build for ourselves are o"en not as reliable as they 
seem. 3e leader may .nd she has no followers. 3e alpha com-
municator might .nd himself being misunderstood, or even 
worse, ignored. 3e change agent might .nd she is just another 
follower of fashion. 3e best and brightest may be seen by out-
siders as brainwashed organisational automatons. When this 
happens, a hard-won sense of self can rapidly evaporate.
People deal with the contradictions and dilemmas that crop 
up at work through stupidity management. It helps them buy 
into ?u>y ideals that are valued by external audiences. It enables 
them to develop a faith in systems they can see do not work as 
they should. It can persuade people to perceive corporate imita-
tion as innovation, or help them develop a zeal for meaningless 
tasks. Ultimately a good helping of stupidity management can 
aid people to accept much of the empty talk and baseless ideas 
that are hallmarks of contemporary corporate life.
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To explore how stupidity helps people to deal with con-
tradictions, let’s take a closer look at a typical scene from 
corporate life: an o>-site meeting. One person who attended 
the meeting described how: ‘A consultant led a session on 
“how we feel toward each other.” It’s just an opportunity to see 
how you handle yourself in that kind of session. 3e only one 
who believed all that California bathtub crap was the consult-
ant. I’d believe it too for ."een hundred bucks a day.’3 Clearly 
this employee did not .nd the session particularly enjoyable. 
However, those who set up and ran the session would probably 
not rejoice to hear it described as ‘California bathtub crap’.
But let’s do a quick thought experiment. Imagine you are 
managing this unenthusiastic seminar participant. He comes 
to you a"er the o>-site and starts grousing about the ‘California 
bathtub crap’. You too may have some misgivings, but the top 
brass told you to roll out a relationship-building session to your 
sta>, and you’re trying to make the best of it.
What options do you have to deal with this in-house critic? 
You say: ‘You’re probably not negative about everything in the 
whole session. You must have got something out of it’ … ‘3ink 
about the positive aspects’ … ‘3at was just your experience. 
Maybe you should be more open’ … ‘Other people liked the 
event. Maybe your view is just an outlier’ … ‘You’re entitled to 
your feeling, but sharing your negativity with them may spoil 
it for the others’ … ‘You’re just being simply too negative, and 
coming across as a grouch. 3at is bad for you.’ You might 
point out: ‘3e company doesn’t appreciate people who don’t 
make positive contributions and can only moan.’ Or: ‘It’s up to 
the participants to use the session productively. Any negative 
aspect is your own failure to get it and co-create a powerful 
learning experience.’ All this can be followed up with hints that 
your dissatis.ed subordinate may not be leadership material.
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Some of these tactics may work. If they do, then our grum-
bler might turn to some stupidity self-management: ‘Perhaps 
there were some insights in the session a"er all’ … ‘Do I need 
to be a little more open-minded and less critical?’ … ‘Maybe my 
evaluation is not so grounded in reality’ … ‘I should support 
others so they can get something out of it’ … ‘I don’t want to 
appear to be negative, so I’ll try to be more positive’ … ‘I need 
to help create a good workplace climate and stop myself from 
so much groaning and moaning.’ Or simply: ‘I need to watch 
my step here.’
Of course, stupidity self-management may happen – even 
without that help from the manager. But o"en stupidity and stu-
pidity self-management work in tandem. When this happens, 
they can save the ‘California bathtub crap’ as well as its cham-
pions. 3ey can also ensure that sceptics don’t have such bad 
experiences and feel shame for not speaking up about the crap.
Behind these speci.c actions are likely to be matters like 
leadership, structures and formal processes, following fashion, 
organisational cultures, appraisal practices, career systems and 
other forms of more systematic stupidity management.
We don’t know what the outcome of this little instance was. 
It is likely that the person only shared their feelings with the 
researcher. But the story is familiar. Similar scenes abound in 
corporate life, but are o"en contained. 3e lubricant of func-
tional stupidity, aided by the engineering work of stupidity 
management and the careful maintenance work of stupidity 
self-management, helps to make the organisational machinery 
tick. At least on the surface.
Stupidity management: some tricks of the trade
3ere are many ways managers try to encourage functional stu-
pidity. However, there are four common forms that we think 
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are worth highlighting: authority, seduction, naturalisation 
and opportunism.
3e .rst trick of stupidity management is using authority. 
3is is when a manager makes use of her formal position in 
the hierarchy and their ability to distribute punishments and 
rewards. O"en, actually using rewards or punishments is not 
as e>ective as subtle reminders that they could be used. Respect 
for authority discourages more junior sta> from thinking too 
much. People are o"en reminded that ‘the boss knows best’ or 
that ‘leadership will show followers the way’. People are made 
to think that as subordinates they should follow policies and 
orders. 3ey should focus their minds on their task, not asking 
what should be done or what assumptions are being made. 3is 
can train people into a sort of thoughtlessness. 3ey slowly get 
used to not thinking outside of their hierarchical level, formal 
routines, accepted ideas and established systems. Instead they 
put their e>ort into making systems work more e=ciently. 
3ey don’t ask whether it is the right system in the .rst place. 
Milgram’s famous studies of authority and obedience showed 
clearly how many people blindly followed authority and 
refrained from thinking by themsleves.4
3e second trick that managers can use is seduction. When 
they do this, they try to persuade people by enlisting attractive 
ideas or arrangements. A ?urry of buzzwords, an impressive 
PowerPoint presentation and a well-dressed consultant can 
easily divert from a lack of substance. Being spellbound can 
make your audience feel great. Attractive stories about corpo-
rate greatness – now or to come – are o"en mindlessly accepted 
and retold with great enthusiasm. 3e future is usually a great 
thing for any stupidity manager – it is not sullied by the mis-
takes of the past or the problems of the present. People can be 
seduced by being encouraged to think things are great. Being 
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upbeat, assuming that change is always good and lauding the 
organisation’s excellence are all vital parts of this.
A third trick of the stupidity manager’s trade is to make even 
the strangest practice appear to be natural. 3is we call naturali-
sation. 3e assumptions that are made in an organisation, its view 
of reality and its dominant goals need to be seen as self-evident. 
3is involves the stupidity manager going out of their way to con-
vince colleagues that ‘3ere are no alternatives’. 3ey might do 
this by reminding them that ‘3is is how we’ve always done it’, or 
even better: ‘3is is how everybody else is doing it.’ For instance, 
they may point out that you need to have strategies, budgets, 
annual appraisals, CSR initiatives (or whatever else) because eve-
ryone else in your industry has these things. By doing this, they 
may project even the most tenuous arrangement as normal. If 
everybody else is doing something, then it seems self-evident you 
should do the same. It is just a natural thing to do.
A .nal trick is the appeal to opportunism. You do this by 
speaking to people’s self-interest. When incentives are stacked 
up in the right way, people can be schooled to avoid asking too 
many di=cult questions. 3is may mean buying into trends that 
they know to be questionable because good things will follow. 
An employee might be swayed into thinking: ‘OK, this may be 
an empty management fashion, but the CEO is interested and 
the project will support our unit’s position in the .rm. It may 
also really work.’ A touch of stupidity management may help 
the opportunist to disguise naked self-interest and show com-
mitment to empty ideas. With enough incentives, it is easier 
to explain away and rationalise even the gravest doubts. Func-
tional stupidity can be a useful way to reduce or even avoid 
unpleasant feelings that come with opportunism.
Functional stupidity can be accomplished through authority, 
seduction, naturalisation and opportunism. O"en there is a mix 
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of these elements. When any or all of these stupidity strategies 
work well, they can help us to minimise anxiety, avoid feelings 
of emptiness, sidestep doubt and neutralise moral dilemmas.
In some organisations, one in particular of these stu-
pidity-management techniques dominates. In hierarchical 
organisations like the military, displays of authority are used 
to encourage people not to think too much. By invoking rank in 
an army unit, you can o"en duck even the trickiest questions. 
In a .rm dominated by a ‘transformational leader’, seduction 
may come foremost. By appealing to grand visions and excit-
ing images of the future, these organisations can help people to 
avoid thinking and go straight to believing. In bodies wrapped 
in tradition or convention, such as many public-sector organi-
sations, naturalisation is common. Following what has always 
been done, or doing what others are doing, can become a proxy 
for careful thinking. Finally in professional service .rms, 
appeals to opportunism can be common. For instance, a con-
sultant can easily be encouraged to overlook problems with a 
prospective client if they o>er a lucrative contract.
More o"en, these typical tricks of the stupidity management 
are used in tandem. If we return brie?y to Pepsi, we .nd all 
four being used together. 3e strict hierarchy encouraged the 
Pepsi executives not to think independently or express deviant 
ideas. 3ey feared that independent thinking would stymie 
their careers. 3e Marine Corps of the Business World were 
seduced into believing that they belonged to the best, brightest 
and toughest. 3is meant they avoided asking the kind of nega-
tive questions that a more neutral and sober observer might. By 
portraying a steep hierarchy and .erce competition as natural, 
Pepsi made executives allergic to raising issues that might shake 
their position in the corporate pecking order. Finally, there was 
a strong self-interest of executives buying into the dominant 
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cultural universe. Of course, they could cynically play along 
and privately confess that this was corporate bullshit nobody 
seriously believed in, but it is likely that the rewards and status 
that come with such a position would slowly remind them that 
manure can grow roses.
Stupidity management at CCC
One company we have already looked at which is quite e>ective 
in fairly so" and productive stupidity management is CCC.4 3is 
IT consultancy .rm worked mainly with seduction. 3rough a 
strong process of socialisation, new recruits were encouraged 
to develop a deep-seated love for the company. 3rough the use 
of rich symbolism, people were guided into seeing their work as 
extremely meaningful. 3rough being given the right to veto 
the appointment of managers, subordinates were encouraged 
to think of themselves as working in an egalitarian workplace. 
3rough having a warm and open style of leadership, employ-
ees viewed the company like an extended friendship group. 
When all this was put together, it created a strong feeling of 
identi.cation with the .rm. It started with a one-week ‘project 
management philosophy’ course, which everybody from new 
subsidiary managers to secretaries had to take part in.
3e tone at CCC was set by the founders. 3ey recruited 
people from their network, paraded values like community, 
informality, social activities and openness, and stressed the 
.rm’s uniqueness. 3e founders were admired. 3ey nurtured 
their image and taught other managers how to do leadership. 
3is together with selective recruitment created a homoge-
neous organisation and meant there was little in the way of 
encouragement to think di>erently.
It had the e>ect of disarming suspicion and reducing 
critical thinking. Trust and a willingness to be seduced were 
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encouraged. Employees seemed to think that this .ne company 
and its .ne managers knew what they are doing. A strong feeling 
of community reduces the inclination to stand out. Conform-
ity breeds a desire not to disrupt harmony by thinking like an 
outsider. People were constantly reminded that they should see 
themselves as being loyal group-members.
People were encouraged to be to be positive and optimis-
tic. Fun and pro.t were the slogans. 3ey were reminded 
‘not to be critical if you didn’t have constructive suggestions’. 
Moaning and groaning were to be avoided. 3is was not seen 
as repressive. Instead, it was a way of committing to a happy 
community and a .ne workplace climate. However it also 
entailed an implicit risk of sanctions. 3is meant that seduc-
tion and anxiety coincided. By preventing people from airing 
criticism, they started to avoid recognising problems such as 
inconsistencies between corporate messages and practices. 
And given the right mood and mindset, you could always dis-
regard or explain away what did not .t your idealised view of 
the organisation.
Managers were an important part of organisation life and 
also played a role in activities like parties, corporate cooking 
classes, and a company choir. 3is meant the company took 
up quite a lot of the time of its employees, many of whom were 
young – the average age was just over thirty. It also meant that 
managers were well informed about the thoughts and feelings 
of their employees. It prepared them well to deal with any nega-
tive emotions or criticism which might arise.
Encouraging functional stupidity at CCC also had some pos-
itive e>ects for the organisation as a whole. It helped to create 
a positive climate, a sense of loyalty, pride, identi.cation with 
the .rm, a feeling of community, the experience of work being 
meaningful, and increased motivation. It also helped to polish 
Stupidity Paradox.indd   221 07/04/2016   20:01
THE STUPIDITY PARADOX 222
the external image of the .rm. Consequently, clients were o"en 
impressed.
But functional stupidity cuts both ways. It also comes with 
considerable risks. Blinkers and norms of positivity foster low 
levels of critical scrutiny and re?ection. 3e ability to learn is 
reduced. Incoming managers from other .rms sometimes felt 
their new colleagues were a mutual admiration club, with little 
to learn from outside. But perhaps the most worrying part is 
that people at CCC had great problems dealing with a deep 
recession and a rapidly shrinking market. 3ey were allergic 
to bad news. To pick up signals and communicate awareness 
of crises was out of tune with the speciality of looking on the 
bright side of corporate life.
In such a situation, it was time to call o> stupidity man-
agement. Sadly, this was not easy to accomplish. 3e e>ects of 
skilful stupidity management are o"en deep and lasting.
Anti-stupidity management
O"en the problem that organisations face is not too little func-
tional stupidity, but too much. Society and working life is full of 
grandiosity – high-?ying vision, branding baloney, leadership 
nonsense, fantasies of the knowledge society and fashion-
able pseudo-solutions.5 In this book we have looked at many 
organisations that have been seduced by grandiosity. 3ey have 
encouraged their employees to stop thinking outside narrow 
areas, and this has brought serious consequences. Everyone 
from CEOs to low-level employees is regularly put at risk of 
overdosing on stupidity management. We believe that reducing 
this kind of corporate no-think is one of the most urgent, yet 
most challenging, issues that organisations face today.
To start to destupidify our otherwise (technically and oper-
atively) smart .rms, we need to drop the myth of relentless 
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positivity. In recent years people have been grabbed by the 
notion of positive thinking. 3e message is that by looking 
on the bright side and building up an optimistic demean-
our, then you will succeed. 3e roots of this idea run deep in 
North American culture and have .lled many pages of self-
help books. But in recent years, it has taken on the mantle of 
science. Psychologists like Martin Seligman have promoted the 
idea that by being optimistic you can succeed in every aspect 
of your life, including your work. 3e problem, of course, is 
that just being optimistic can mean that you overlook some of 
the very real negative problems that can plague organisations. 
Relentless optimism may keep us happy for the moment, but it 
can also mean that we become deluded.
Perhaps instead of encouraging only optimism, organisa-
tions should try to build up a virtue that the poet John Keats 
de.ned nearly 200 years ago – negative capability. Writing to 
his brother, Keats described negative capability as the ability 
to be in ‘uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irrita-
ble reaching a"er fact and reason’. For Keats this meant being 
able to experience, and recognise experiences, and remain 
open to the world. For him, this found its best expression in 
poetry. Over the following two centuries people have seized 
upon this phrase to describe something that is o"en lacking in 
our knowledge- and positivity-obsessed culture: the ability to 
face up to uncertainty, paradoxes and ambiguities.6 Instead of 
trying to super.cially resolve or ignore them, we should be able 
to work with them. Negativity capability involves ‘the ability 
to tolerate anxiety and fear, to stay in the place of uncertainty’, 
and so to allow for ‘the emergence of new thoughts or per-
ceptions’.7 According to the political theorist Roberto Unger, 
negative capability is one of the central motors of economic 
development. It is the ability to escape from the ‘false necessity’ 
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of belief that the institutions we work within are natural and 
enduring. For Unger, our negative capabilities are our ability 
to autonomously challenge and recreate these institutions in a 
quest to bring about new forms of wealth creation.8
For us, negative capabilities are the ability to think criti-
cally – the ability not to be constrained by the false necessities 
which are set up by rules, routines, cultures, brands, and many 
more of the mechanisms of organisational life. It means the 
ability and willingness to ask questions and to be re?ective. 
3is means querying the assumptions that we make, asking 
for and being prepared to give justi.cations, and considering 
the outcomes and broader meaning of what we do. Doing this 
requires mature thinking – something that is sorely lacking in 
most of our organisations as well as society at large.
Fostering and exercising negative capabilities may be tough. 
Demands for order, discipline, consensus and optimism o"en 
make it hard to ask questions. As we have argued throughout 
the book, critical thinking takes time and e>ort. It creates 
uncertainty and o"en it upsets people. Ongoing inquiry and 
re?ection might be a virtue in the university seminar room, 
but it can easily turn into a dangerous vice in the boardroom.
Having said this, we think that negative capabilities are 
an absolutely essential part of any thriving organisation. It is 
this capability that can stop organisations becoming ossi.ed 
into outdated or fashionable mindsets. It is also this capability 
which can help .rms avoid the kind of corporate bullshit that 
increasingly clogs up so many organisations. It is these negativ-
ity capabilities that can help an organisation to learn and hold 
on to vital lessons from the past. But perhaps most importantly, 
it is these negative capabilities that can enable an organisation 
to create new and more thoughtful lines of action.
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Exercising negative capabilities
Much has been said about the techniques of critical thinking. 
O"en it is held up as a special skill possessed only by a few great 
thinkers, path-breaking innovators or political revolutionaries. 
3is may be true when it comes to very sophisticated problems, or 
when we break with .rmly established ideas, but critical thinking 
is not just something for professional critics. It is a practice that 
most people can – and sometimes do – engage in.9 We engage in 
critical thinking when we ask some fairly simply questions – both 
of ourself and of others: What is going on here? What do others 
think is going on here? What the hell do we think is going on 
here? Let’s look at these questions in a little more depth.
Observe
3e .rst thing any good critical thinker does is to observe. 
3is means asking the deceptively simply question: ‘What is 
going on here?’ To answer this, critical thinkers need to care-
fully look and listen, and then try to capture what is going on 
in the situation. Observations need to be open. It is easy to fall 
into pre-established categories like leadership, information and 
decision-making. A good observer looks beyond the categories 
and sees what people are actually doing.
Good observers note what is not so obvious. Beneath the 
surface or beyond common sense there may be di>erent things 
going on. A discussion about strategies may be more about people 
at work trying to boost their identity as ‘strategists’. People listen-
ing to a persuasive management guru talking about excellence 
may be more into enchantment than learning. A manager talking 
to subordinates may be less about visionary leadership and more 
about reinforcing their position as immature followers. 
If you are trying to solve a business problem, understand-
ing all the facts .rst and being able to accurately and clearly 
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describe the issues is an excellent start. It is what we, as univer-
sity teachers, try to get the experienced managers we teach to 
do. O"en they .nd it hard because they don’t want to describe 
the problem in a broad and open-minded way. 3ey just want 
to apply a pre-packaged solution. 3e di=culty here is that it is 
pretty hard to solve a problem that you don’t accurately under-
stand and cannot clearly describe .rst.
3is points to one great pitfall that any good critical thinker 
has to avoid: premature problem-de.nition and solutionism. 
As we saw in chapter 3, there is a tendency for skilled people 
to jump to a solution before they can accurately describe 
the problem in detail. Avoiding solutionism means stopping 
oneself – and indeed others – from reaching too fast for the 
tools. Like a good pathologist or a skilled mechanic, you should 
spend some time thinking about the problem .rst.
Interpret
Once you have a good understanding of the issues – and can 
carefully describe them – the next step is to .nd out how other 
people understand it. 3is involves trying to .gure out the way 
people talk about the issue, what they think and how they see it. 
3e aim at this stage is to answer the question that every good 
anthropologist asks: ‘What do the natives think is happening 
here?’ Your aim is to gather people’s views – however wrong-
headed or upsetting they might appear – and try to start seeing 
it their way. 3is should lead to a number of di>erent perspec-
tives on the very same issue. By asking a range of people, you 
will quickly .nd that the same issue can appear to be radically 
di>erent depending on who you talk with. For the marketing 
department, it may be about poor branding; for the engineers, 
poor design; for the .nancial folks, inaccurate costing. For 
some people it may not be a problem at all – just an unavoidable 
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issue that we have to live with. Good managers can understand 
the issue from each of the main groups’ perspectives. Really 
good managers can talk to them in their language. Excellent 
managers can translate between the di>erent groups’ languages 
– helping marketers to understand engineering-speak (and vice 
versa).
At this point a second trap raises its head. 3is is myopia. 
All too o"en it is easy to feel comforted in your own perspec-
tive. Most of us have been trained in a particular professional 
language and have been rewarded for using it for years. As a 
result, we quickly become professional idiots who are trapped 
within this language. ‘I have the solution. Now, what is the 
problem?’ is how many operate as true Fachidioten (profes-
sional idiots). As a result, we see only a narrow aspect of a 
problem. We turn a deaf ear to all the other voices and ways 
of understanding an issue. When this happens, we become 
one-dimensional men and women who are trying to deal with 
multidimensional issues. Good interpretations resist and tran-
scend .xed ideas.
Question
Having understood how di>erent people describe the same 
problem, you need to take the next and .nal step. 3at is asking 
questions about these di>erent perspectives. A critical thinker 
does not naïvely accept what they see on the surface. Nor do 
they blindly accept the views of others. 3ey need to question 
their views. 3ey do this by asking the question: ‘What the hell 
is going on here?’ 3is means doing the kind of things that stu-
pidity management typically puts a stop to. It means asking: 
‘What are the assumptions we are making here?’, ‘What are the 
reasons why we are doing this?’ and ‘What are the wider out-
comes or broader meaning of this?’ By beginning to ask these 
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disruptive questions, many of the unseen or unthought issues 
and problems may begin to come to light.
When looking at an issue critically, it is possible to ask a 
range of questions. You can ask cognitive questions such as: 
Is this correct? Does this idea or practice stand critical scru-
tiny? You can pay attention to emotional issues. You might ask 
yourself: Does this feel OK? Is there some anxiety or fear that 
I need to take seriously? Or does it feel too good? You might 
also attend to moral questions like: Is this ethically defensible? 
What are the wrongs involved here? Finally, you can ask your-
self motivation questions: Why is someone doing this? What is 
driving them? How do they bene.t? What do you get out of it? 
And why are you interested in the .rst place?
O"en the ideas that come up at this stage can be disturbing, 
both for the person addressing the issue and more o"en for 
the organisations. Once you have .rst-hand impressions from 
observations, and have scanned the available perspectives, 
the central questions that you need to start asking are: What 
assumptions are we making, what are the reasons behind what 
we are seeing, and what are the wider implications or mean-
ings of this? Answering each of these questions is likely to 
?ush out many of the real issues that have been lurking in the 
background.
3e .nal trap that can raise its head at this stage is naïvety. 
3is happens when you take people – or indeed your own 
observations and ‘solutions’ – at face value. All too o"en there 
are deep meanings or broader problems which are lurking 
behind what you see on the surface. By avoiding scepticism and 
not asking di=cult questions, you are likely to simply end up 
dealing with symptoms and not getting to the deeper causes.
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Dispelling stupidity
Critical insights can be provoked in many di>erent ways. We 
believe some of the following nine processes are a useful trigger 
for people to engage in critical thinking and serious re?ection.
Re"ective routines. You could build routines that encour-
age re?ection into projects or your working schedule. In 
your work group or department, you could try asking criti-
cal or re?ective questions once a week or once a month. For 
instance, instead of just asking what you have done this week 
or month, you could get a sense of what others think you have 
done. Even simpler questions, like ‘Why?’, ‘Where is the evi-
dence?’ or ‘What does this mean?’ could be useful for ?ushing 
out much of the bullshit. In addition to this, you could run 
‘what the hell’ sessions where people are asked to bring along 
one example of strongly questionable corporate practices they 
have come across recently. You might create time and space for 
re?ection and thinking. Many public-sector organisations have 
lectures and seminars with outside experts. Sometimes these 
are outside the organisation’s core business. 3ey are expected 
to give some broader food for thought. Some more commercial 
organisations hold lunch seminars. One US boutique invest-
ment bank, for example, regularly had an outside speaker with 
expertise on a topic which was completely unrelated to the .rm. 
3is was appreciated by the sta>: it provided them with some 
space and time to think. But it also allowed them to continue 
their broad education. Sometimes such inputs can just remind 
people that other ways of thinking are possible.
Devil’s advocates. Sometimes it is tough to ask critical ques-
tions yourself. O"en our internal censor cuts them out. If this is 
the case, then you can appoint a professional critic – otherwise 
known as a devil’s advocate (DA). 3ere are many PAs, why 
not also DAs? 3is is a person whose job is to challenge what 
Stupidity Paradox.indd   229 07/04/2016   20:01
THE STUPIDITY PARADOX 230
is going on, to question, to pose counter-arguments and so on. 
3e idea is that by asking these critical questions, we are forced 
to think further and articulate justi.cations. 3e process might 
be annoying and sometimes painful, but it typically results in 
better decisions and less blind optimism. Individuals could 
.nd a devil’s advocate in the form of a friend or adviser who is 
willing to ask them the right critical questions, and by doing so 
force them to think again. A team could choose someone inside 
it as a devil’s advocate – their job would be asking tough ques-
tions, poking holes in arguments and strategically undermining 
consensus. 3e role of devil’s advocate could be supported 
by allocation of some time and resources (say a half-day per 
week for doing the observing, interpreting and questioning as 
sketched in the section above). People could rotate through the 
role, taking turns. Others could express views to the DA, who 
then could summarise and then pass them on. 3eir role is to 
‘ask anti-stupid questions’.
Post-mortems. We are supposed to learn from our failures, 
but we rarely do. One of the big reasons for this is that when 
things go wrong, we look for ways of hiding it. When this 
happens, organisations and individuals o"en make the same 
mistake many times over. As one manager said when one of us 
presented a study of an organisational change project leading 
to nothing, apart from wasted time and lower trust in corpo-
rate management: ‘3is happens every bloody time.’ If we were 
actually interested in reducing the risk of mistakes being made 
again and again, then we would take a long cold look at what 
went right, and see that what went wrong is a good place to 
start.
Pre-mortems. O"en we learn lessons only when it is too 
late. A common refrain heard when projects go wrong is ‘We 
could see that coming’. 3e frequent answer to this is: ‘Why 
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didn’t you say something?’ One way to ensure that people 
speak up before it is too late is to hold a pre-mortem at the 
start of a project.10 3is involves a fairly simple routine of 
saying to the team: ‘Imagine you are two years down the line 
and this project has been a disaster. What do you think went 
wrong?’ Typically, if you have a group of experienced people 
they will identify a list of issues that typically trip up a project 
like the one you’re setting out on. A"er you have worked out 
the top .ve or ten potential issues, you can use these to start 
coming up with ways of avoiding the problem in the .rst place. 
3is kind of exercise tends to do two things. First, it generates 
preemptive solutions. But perhaps more importantly, it helps 
to de?ate the kind of self-serving biases that so frequently 
haunt projects.
Newcomers. O"en people who are new to an organisation 
come up with a fresh perspective. 3ey see things that old 
hands do not. 3ey ask the kinds of questions that are deemed 
to be taboo by others. All these qualities make newcomers ideal 
critics. To harness this potential you could ask them questions 
like: What do you .nd strange or questionable? What surprised 
you here? What has struck you as di>erent from other work-
places? Do you experience something as exotic or stupid? Have 
you asked yourself what do they really do here? Answers to any 
of these questions are likely to be very revealing to the people 
who have been around for some time.
Outsiders. Sometimes organisations can gain from learning 
from an outsider. One way to do this is to understand what an 
outsider sees in your organisation. 3is might involve inviting 
people in from other organisations to observe what is happening 
and report back. Sometimes, this genuine outsider perspective 
can be revealing. Another way to get an outside perspective is 
to become an outsider yourself. 3is means going into another 
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organisation that you are not familiar with to see how it works. 
For instance you could shadow someone in a di>erent type of 
organisation for a few days. By doing this, you might begin to 
see your own organisation and routines with fresh eyes. 3is 
is sometimes done in management development programmes. 
Participants switch organisations, or shadow each other for a 
work day, and then they get some perspectives.
Engage your critics. Many organisations already have 
critics, but they do their best not to listen to them. If you are 
genuinely interested in understanding the systemic stupidities 
within your .rm, then engaging your critics could be useful. 
3is might mean speaking with pressure groups, academics or 
social movements that have been critical about practices within 
your industry. It also might mean trying to learn from critics 
who are inside the organisation, or perhaps from those who 
have le". O"en these critical communities can be a source of 
pain, but they can also be a source of potential insight. Even if 
they turn out to be wrong, you might learn something.
Competitions and games. Games can be a useful way of 
rooting out stupidities. One well-known example is bullshit 
bingo: people are encouraged to look out for clichés and other 
meaningless statements and make notes when they hear or 
see them. 3e .rst to spot ten items of bullshit wins a prize. 
You could also hold a stupidity-spotting competition. People 
would identify the most stupid organisational arrangements. 
Anonymous proposals might be made and anonymous voting 
take place. By giving a degree of humour to these o"en di=cult 
things, it may be possible to make people less anxious about 
expressing honest opinions.
Anti-slogans. All too o"en we take management-speak too 
seriously. Perhaps we should learn something from ‘culture 
jammers’ and start to develop a kind of anti-management-speak. 
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Concepts like functional stupidity, stupidity management, win-
dow-dressing and bullshit bingo could all be part of it. 3ere 
are a few .ne dictionaries of management jargon. How about 
writing a local dictionary of anti-management jargon? 3ese 
concepts and anti-slogans can become part of the popular 
culture of the corporate body, and hopefully serve to remind 
people not to be too stupid.
Anti-stupidity task force. Much in organisational life is 
about adding positive projects, structures, systems, procedures 
and activities. But sometimes the discontinuing or cancellation 
of activities and arrangements matters much more. O"en this 
is done slowly and informally, but a better and more e>ective 
arrangement may be to systematically go through issues and 
make conscious choices, a"er careful discussions, about what 
is to be dropped. In most organisations there is plenty to choose 
from. 3ese kinds of cancellation projects may face sti> resist-
ance from people with a career interest in a speci.c issue, or 
who fear looking bad to the outside world. But the bene.ts may 
far outweigh the costs of the operation.
We think it is vital that organisations provide some system-
atic backup to destupidi.cation. Many of the proposals involve 
groups of managers, departments and others, but there are of 
course informal groups within organisations capable of waging 
insurgency against managerial claptrap. We can imagine clan-
destine groups springing up in many organisations to challenge 
the kind of corporate bullshit that we are routinely faced with. 
In fact it would not be outlandish to call for a wider anti-bullshit 
movement where people vow to .ght against the word viruses 
of management-speak that have invaded so much of our lan-
guage. 3is merry band of anti-bullshit crusaders could easily 
mount surprise attacks on the worst examples of corporate 
claptrap. 3ey might learn from the tactics of ‘culture jammers’ 
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who have created their own perverse examples of advertising to 
show the stupidities of branding. Instead of a Joe Camel with 
cancer, the management jargon busters could create manage-
ment anti-fashions like fat thinking (instead of lean thinking), 
Level Zero leadership (in place of Level 5 ), debranding (instead 
of rebranding), de.ciency drives (instead of e=ciency drives) 
and much more. Each of these movements might rid us of some 
of the pointless management gu> that is increasingly clogging 
the arteries of our organisations and stopping them from actu-
ally carrying out their core tasks.
As well as being a collective movement, we think that much 
anti-stupidity management can be done on the individual 
level as well. Being re?ective is central. 3is means cultivat-
ing your ability to ask about assumptions, give and demand 
justi.cations and think about the broader meaning of your 
work. Doing all these things requires the kind of emotional and 
intellectual maturity which is sadly all too o"en discouraged 
by contemporary organisations (and society at large), but there 
are ways to support and develop this maturity. Creating time 
to read, think, cultivate relations, network and develop negative 
capacities outside workplaces is vital. Anti-functional stupid-
ity is, however, ultimately not a one-band show. It needs to be 
supported by groups, both informally and formally. It can be 
systematised and institutionalised. Rather than these endless 
– and o"en stupid – measurements of happiness at work, 
resources could well go into assessments of stupidities there.
Doing anti-stupidity management with "nesse and 
feeling
Doing anti-stupidity management is not easy or uncontrover-
sial. O"en it can be dangerous and even career-limiting. People 
are o"en unsure about their observations or thinking and they 
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are nervous about expressing any critical or alternative views. 
And even if they are, in principle, right, it may not be a good 
thing to point at absurdities – it may create problems. And yet 
criticism is vital.
When trying to upend stupidities, there are issues to bear in 
mind. 3e .rst is that it can be hard to spot functional stupidities. 
O"en what deserves this label resists assessment. Organisations 
and work are full of ambiguities and complexities. Stupidities are 
o"en in the eye of the beholder, and some have bad eyesight. It is 
not necessarily that you believe it when you see it. You may see 
it because you believe it. Sometimes the identi.cation of some-
thing stupid is an outcome of self-interest, limited knowledge or 
bad judgement. In the worst case we just project our prejudices 
onto the usual suspects (consultants, academics, engineers, top 
management) and see the stupidities of the others but not our 
own. O"en we remain blind to great stupidities that are right 
under our eyes. What all this means is that we may need to be 
humble in our judgements about what is and is not stupid. 3is 
requires us to go for re?ection rather than just projection.
We also need to be hesitant in assuming that stupidities are 
always bad. As we have tried to show throughout this book, 
there are many positive things about stupidity in organisa-
tions. Sometimes it can be very useful. Consequently, stupidity 
should not always be challenged.
We should be wary of hasty anti-stupidity activism. O"en 
there are interests and feelings which are bound up with the 
stupidities we loathe. Trying to bring them down through anti-
stupidity management can easily evoke political and emotional 
di=culties we may not have expected.
Sometimes we have little choice. Many stupidities are 
imposed on us and we just have to live with them. When this 
is the case, one can try to minimise the harm they do through 
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taking them less seriously. But sometimes there is little point in 
cultivating anti-stupidity against laws or strong pressure from 
clients and top management. We need to pick our battles.
Finally, dealing with stupidities can o"en be a costly and 
di=cult business. Dealing with one’s own stupidities can lead to 
existential problems. O"en the work of rooting out stupidities 
in organisational life can take so long and prove so completely 
thankless that sometimes it is best just to look the other way.
A di=cult balance must be struck between the active culti-
vation, acceptance, mild questioning and direct challenging of 
functional stupidities. Pragmatism and sensitivity are required. 
Cognitive and emotional overload as well as political problems 
need to be considered. Functional stupidity is, a"er all, a mixed 
blessing.
But as we have said, anti-functional stupidity is desperately 
needed – and there are also rewards for this. A more meaning-
ful work experience and making contributions to those who 
are supposed to be served by organisations – patients, clients, 
customers, students, the environment, taxpayers, shareholders 
– can be richly rewarding. And o"en people are grateful for 
initiatives and contributions.
Anti-stupidity work needs to be done with .nesse and 
feeling. One needs to be reasonably sure, thoughtful and well 
formulated. O"en it is good to work gradually: talk to others, 
check observations and interpretations, and raise the questions 
with people you trust before acting. 3is is good for making sure 
you have a point, can express it well, but also have some moral 
and political support.11 Acting may involve raising questions 
and starting discussions. It may also be about taking initia-
tives, or more organised attempts to decrease stulti.cation. It 
may lead to some work along the nine lines we suggested above.
At the most general level, anti-stupidity management 
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requires work in three interrelated realms. First, at the indi-
vidual level, we should re?ect, engage in critical thinking and 
consider killing o> our own stupidities; we need to do anti- 
stupidity management. Second, it also requires work on the 
cultural and collective norms. Expressing feelings and thoughts 
about functional stupidity in social settings should be encour-
aged and legitimised. Finally, it requires the use of structural 
arrangements to undermine functional stupidity. 3is might 
involve devoting time and resources, making infrastructural 
arrangements and having formal appointments of individuals 
and groups to work with anti-functional stupidity.
With some e>orts along these lines, a better balance 
between functionality and stupidity can be accomplished. But 
one should not pretend that this is easy.
Anti-stupidity management in a hospital clinic
We have painted a gloomy picture of contemporary organisa-
tions, but it isn’t the entire picture. 3ere are many positive 
things going on in many workplaces. Many organisations 
deliver the goods and services required. Given the glut of posi-
tive pep talks, we don’t need to join this already huge chorus. 
However, the unre?ective practitioner is, our studies indicate, 
much more common than their more re?ective counterpart. 
3e time, ability and interest to re?ect is o"en very limited. We 
have explored this in these pages. However, let us balance the 
story with a more positive example.
Stella is the head of a clinic in a Swedish university hospital. 
She is a highly re?ective, critically minded person who is always 
prepared to question truths and practices. Showing a high level 
of integrity, she always reacts against unproductive systems, 
structures, procedures and priorities. She is seen as very com-
petent and loved by her co-workers. But she is not necessarily 
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so loved by senior managers. Let’s look at just one example of 
her actions: her insistence on not spending the clinic’s entire 
budget. In her hospital – as in most organisations – it is usually 
seen as a sensible thing to spend one’s entire budget – even if 
you don’t need to. You can allow yourself some extra advantages 
through spending the surplus, and why make an extra e>ort to 
be economical with resources if you don’t have to? Spending the 
budget may ensure that your allocation continues next year and 
reduce the risk of budget cuts. Stella, in contrast, is eager to use 
resources well and stresses that it is good to have a surplus. She 
explains this to the personnel in an email a"er mentioning that 
the clinic did .nancially extremely well, with high productivity 
at low cost, but not at the expense of quality.
Why is !nance important?
You have all heard the expression ‘monopoly money’, ‘it 
disappears in the black hole’, and there are all kinds of 
nasty expressions in relation to .nance in the public sector. 
It seems that it is bad to talk about being .nancially e>ec-
tive, but I say once more: All the money that can be saved 
through more e>ective ways of working will contribute 
to more health care where it is needed. Spending money 
without any gains for the patients means withdrawing care 
and treatment from someone else. We have shown that it 
is possible to make sustainable savings that don’t mean we 
are all ‘just running faster’. Our organisation contributes 
to less stress and to increased control over our own work 
situation. It is also nice to avoid saving on things that are 
bene.cial for the patients. We don’t have to suspend activi-
ties that we think are necessary and meaningful. We are 
not subjected to the ‘moral stress’ that can occur when you 
are forced to make savings that a>ect patients.
Stupidity Paradox.indd   238 07/04/2016   20:01
STUPIDITY MANAGEMENT AND HOW TO COUNTER IT 239
You are all part of this clinic’s success, and its continu-
ing development. 3anks – once more – for the past year 
and for being so tremendously fantastic!
3is is a good example of thinking independently and 
taking responsibility. To move outside functional stupidity and 
narrow mindsets, and pursuit of the mantra that ‘everyone is 
doing this’, guides so much of organisational work. Health care 
is pressed for resources, but a major issue in many cases is not 
a shortage of resources per se, but people’s inability to think 
through and be responsible for how resources are being used. 
Anti-stupidity management could be a large part of the solu-
tion to many resource problems in many organisations.
In conclusion
In this book we have explored the concept of functional stupid-
ity. For us functional stupidity is inability and/or unwillingness 
to use cognitive and re"ective capacities in anything other than 
narrow and circumspect ways. It involves a lack of re"exivity, a 
disinclination to require or provide justi'cation, and avoidance 
of substantive reasoning. Functional stupidity means thinking 
within the box: overadaptation to set ways of thinking and 
acting. In many cases functional stupidity can produce positive 
outcomes. Managers, professionals and many others cultivate 
stupidity management. We also frequently self-stupidify. We 
do this when we avoid questioning our assumptions, sidestep 
giving and demanding justi.cations, and refuse to consider the 
outcomes or broader meaning of our actions. We follow author-
ity, are prepared to be seduced, we see things as natural and 
unavoidable and we rationalise our opportunism. Intelligent 
people are not immune to functional stupidity. Actually, rea-
sonably intelligent people with successful careers have usually 
Stupidity Paradox.indd   239 07/04/2016   20:01
THE STUPIDITY PARADOX 240
developed high levels of functional stupidity. Careerists are 
o"en good at self-stupi.cation. Skilled leaders are o"en e>ec-
tive stupidity managers. It can help to smooth the action of 
their working life and economy.
Functional stupidity has big advantages: it helps individu-
als to manage their own doubts, be happy, feel comfortable 
with ambiguity, get along with their colleagues and superiors, 
present themselves as positive and upbeat, be more productive. 
And ultimately make a fairly steady climb up the corpo-
rate hierarchy. Liberal doses of functional stupidity can also 
help organisations to eliminate di=cult questions, engineer a 
sense of harmony and ultimately make people more e=cient. 
It reduces the frictions and con?icts that so o"en pop up in 
.rms that are sta>ed by otherwise intelligent people. In the 
many image-intensive and seduction-dependent organisations, 
people inclined functional stupidity .nd a good habitat.
But functional stupidity is a double-edged sword. For indi-
vidual employees, not using their intelligence can create a 
mounting sense of malaise and disappointment. Discrepancy 
between proclaimed values and actual work can prove to be 
troublesome. In extreme cases, it can mean that people grow 
cynical and alienated. Eventually they become completely dis-
engaged from their workplaces. For organisations as a whole, 
functional stupidity can mean that people start overlook-
ing problems. When this becomes routine, it can build up to 
large-scale disasters. But also many more modest, suboptimal 
structures and practices may develop. 3e result can be an 
organisation full of smart people that is riddled with stupidity.
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